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The main purpose of the following thesis is to explore filmic adaptations and 
appropriations of Shakespeare’s plays in their interaction with contemporary cultural, social 
and political issues. The analysis takes the hint from a theoretical background focused on the 
materialist implications of the philosophical realm of aesthetics, and the role the sublime 
plays in bringing them out.  
After retracing its origins as a rhetorical and philosophical notion intertwined with the 
history of aesthetics, I shall consider the sublime as an aesthetic category rooted in formal 
disorder and disproportion, which finds its concrete sources in the work’s overall disunity, 
incompleteness and fragmentation. As its etymological meaning of “height”, “peak”, 
“exaltation” suggests, the sublime in the aesthetic is still related to the ‘elevation’ of the 
mind, raising excitement and astonishment in the audience. Considering the “dismantling” 
function that the sublime has historically assumed in nature as in art, my interest is to analyse 
how such a notion is created within the artwork and operates in relation to material reality. In 
doing so, my aim is to demonstrate that the sublime opens the work of art to an exchange 
with the actual context of both its production and reception, by which it ultimately elevates 
the mind of the receiver to the awareness of reality’s own conflicts and crises.  
My analysis intends to explore how the notion of sublime can work within the 
cinematic medium, and in particular, with cinematic adaptations and appropriations of 
Shakespeare’s plays. The passage from the Shakespearean source to the cinematic medium 
is already significant in this regard. As a matter of fact, the openness and incompleteness of 
Shakespeare’s texts have paved the way for their ongoing re-interpretation and re-creation, 
by which issues of different eras could be variously voiced or acknowledged. Since no 
univocal, totalising vision emerges from the text nor holds it together, every performance of 
Shakespeare can be considered an adaptation already, while also inviting more radical 
appropriations. With the adaptation to the cinematic medium, the Shakespearean source text 
is necessarily made fit for different historical, cultural, linguistic or socio-political contexts, 
which often encourages readings from new or unconventional points of view. What follows 
is often a more or less explicit engagement with both cultural and socio-political issues of a 
specific historical moment, as well as the personal, intellectual response they may provoke 
in the adaptor/movie director.  
My purpose is to examine the personal and historical concerns that can be involved 




carries them out. In order to do this, I define a concept of “cinematic sublime” as given by a 
series of cinematographic techniques and devices that carry the dismantling function of the 
sublime within the work of art, triggering an active, participatory response in the audience. 
The fundamental quality of the cinematic sublime is that it opens the work of art to a 
dialectical relationship with the cultural and social context in which it was produced and 
received. Consequently, I chose to focus on Shakespearean adaptations/appropriations 
which, while adjusting Shakespeare’s texts to the cinematic medium, openly re-interpret 
their conflicts and ambiguities in the light of new personal and historical contexts and of 
different political, social and cultural issues. These films seem more apt to being analysed 
according to the notion of cinematic sublime because, far from being contained within the 
safe boundaries of fiction, they tend to exasperate the fissures and faultlines of their source 
texts. By questioning pre-established rules and given categories of representation, they 
destroy the totalising illusion of unity, and expose the disharmony and disproportion of their 
form. In this kind of adaptation, the peculiar relation between the cinematic medium and 
material reality is what creates the call for surprise or shock in the audience, the urge of 
raising doubts and uncovering clashes usually associated to the sublime. My work aims at 
showing how the sublime in art, through the subversion of traditional modes of 
representation, instead of relaxing or appeasing the audience, has them accordingly shocked 
or astonished, ‘elevated’ to the consciousness of reality’s own fundamental disorder.  
While looking for a cinematic form that could embrace such issues, I turned to the 
work of those filmmakers for whom the Shakespearean material could be considered an 
instrument and not the purpose of their art. This implies a personal and often daring 
reworking of the source texts, and Orson Welles is certainly a groundbreaking director in this 
regard. The first adaptation I chose to analyse is Chimes at Midnight (1965), as it inventively 
reworks the character of Falstaff by drawing on different Shakespearean plays, mainly Henry 
IV, Parts I and II, with brief borrowings from Richard II, Henry V, and The Merry Wives of 
Windsor. My analysis takes the hint precisely from the “incredible unevenness” of the film, 
its apparent aesthetic and technical erring, since Welles’s radical manipulation of the source 
texts is able to create an interaction with the material context in which the film was shot. The 
radical cutting and rearranging of the source texts is considered first of all as a means to 
expose and re-interpret the conflicts and ambiguities of which the Shakespearean texts 
themselves are made in the light of the director’s own artistic and intellectual intent, and of 
contemporary socio-political issues as well. Furthermore, technical flaws, associated to 




consequently more direct, astounding sensory impact on the audience. The overall stylistic 
disorder and instability of the film is what gives rise to the cinematic sublime in Chimes at 
Midnight: while retracing the interplay between Shakespeare’s texts, Welles’s re-creation of 
them and its reception, I will look at the film’s ‘faultlines’ as a means to displace rhetorical 
readings of Shakespeare’s plays, and to question univocal, pre-established interpretations of 
history and contemporary reality.  
My work then focuses on Pier Paolo Pasolini’s short film Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole? 
(What Are the Clouds?), a 1968 appropriation of Shakespeare’s Othello. As with Orson 
Welles, the Shakespearean source offers Pasolini a hint to explore his own artistic and 
intellectual interests; and even more so, since the Italian poet and filmmaker felt more clearly 
unbound from the constraints of Shakespeare’s language and texts. What seems particularly 
relevant to the notion of cinematic sublime is the role of the Shakespearean material in 
leading to a new phase in both the director’s cinematographic production and ideological 
concerns. Performed by semi-human puppets in a marionette theatre, the play is 
“incorporated” within a web of visual and verbal intertexts, shifting among a plurality of 
styles and media. While retracing the strategy of appropriation that structures the film, my 
analysis considers the “incorporation” of Othello in an intertextual discourse as a way to 
uncover and exasperate the rules of mimesis. In doing this, my aim is to underline the role of 
the cinematic medium in escaping and dissolving the boundaries of mimetic representation, 
allowing content to speak in its immediate materiality. According to Pasolini, cinema is 
structured by our very sensuous perception of the world, and thus reproduces reality instead 
of merely representing it, carrying the spectators to the same level of, or “within”, reality 
itself. In Nuvole, the continuous tension between form and content carries out the disrupting 
effect of the cinematic sublime: it liberates Othello from the bounds of fiction, subtracts it 
from the reifying power of representation, allowing the film to re-discover a direct, unfiltered 
way to express a new, ever-changing reality with its own language. 
Finally, I take into consideration a highly idiosyncratic Shakespearean appropriation, 
Gus Van Sant’s 1991 My Own Private Idaho. The way this movie is relevant to the main 
interest of my thesis is twofold: besides daringly incorporating Shakespeare’s Henry IV plays 
within the context of early 1990s American street life, the film also appropriates and 
reinvents the visual style of Orson Welles’s Chimes At Midnight. My Own Private Idaho is 
apparently a very deliberate effort to do something new and culturally specific with the 
source material: it creatively reworks the characters of Prince Hal and Poins as two 




‘father’, an old fat drug-addict named Bob Pigeon, is shaped on Welles’s own portrait of 
Falstaff. The Shakespearean core of the film is in its turn entangled in a net of quotations 
where different media, genres and styles are intermingled, responding to the overall strategy 
of ‘repetition with a difference’ on which Idaho is built. Van Sant’s relocation of the 
Shakespearean source so that it speaks through the ‘outsiders’, the socially, economically and 
sexually marginalised of the contemporary American landscape, discloses the dismantling 
effect of the cinematic sublime: the hybrid structure of the film, its open, unfinished form in 
continuous movement, pushes the spectator in a constant status of liminality, and it is from 
this in-between status that ideological distinctions between ‘self’ and ‘other’ can be seen as 
undermined. 
The analysis of these three case studies according to the notion of “cinematic 
sublime” intends to demonstrate that the work of art is itself part of sensuous reality, 
inseparable from other realities – such as economic production, social conflict, political 
upheavals. The filmic adaptations and appropriations of Shakespeare’s plays chosen are 
particularly apt to show a deep engagement with contemporary cultural, social and political 
issues, since their form opens them to a vital exchange with the actual context of both their 
production and reception. Shakespeare’s texts, reinvented through thought-provoking and 
daringly personal filmmaking strategies, testify not only for the directors’ own artistic and 
intellectual experience and feelings, but also for the historical scenario in which the film is 
materially immersed. Thus, history, war, the body, social and economic unrest, sexual 
marginalization – all find their way to and from the movies themselves, creating a dialectic 
relationship between the work of art and the material background it springs from. The films 
considered, by means of a series of cinematographic techniques, intertextual and meta-textual 
devices, and repetition strategies, defy traditional rules and categories of representation, 
challenging the audience into re-thinking boundaries. Their aesthetic of the sublime, in 
relation with the material conditions of production and reception, is thus capable to uncover 
clashes and dismantle pre-established or univocal visions of reality, elevating the mind of the 












Aesthetics and the Sublime  
 
The concept of aesthetics has historically covered a variety of subjects, caught up as 
it has been within a network of distinct discourses which both complement and compete 
with each other, and that, consequently, have opened it to constant redefinition. Nowadays, 
aesthetics does not only designate the philosophical discipline associated with critical 
judgement concerning works of art, but is also used in a more general sense with reference 
to beauty, quality, taste, and the distinguishing characteristics of a culture as manifested in 
art.1 
In its original formulation by the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten, 
aesthetics does not refer in the first place to art, but “is born as a discourse of the body.”2 In 
accord with its etymological derivation from the Greek αισθητικός (“perceptive, sensitive, 
sentient”3), in turn derived from the verb αισθάνομαι (“to perceive, to feel, to sense”4), the 
term aesthetic distinguishes the material against the immaterial; those perceptions and 
sensations bound up with life as opposed to the conceptual domain of thoughts and ideas. 
Such a category, both etymologically and philosophically considered, can be said to concern 
the most concrete dimension of the human, to be rooted in the realm of everyday experience. 
In the words of Terry Eagleton, the territory of aesthetics  
 
is nothing less than the whole of our sensate life together – the business of affections and 
aversions, of how the world strikes the body on its sensory surfaces, of that which takes root in the 
gaze and the guts and all that arises from our most banal, biological insertion in the world. The 
aesthetic concerns this most gross and palpable dimension of the human, […]. It is thus the first 
stirrings of a primitive materialism – of the body’s long inarticulate rebellion against the tyranny of 
the theoretical.5  
 
                                                 
1 See Pierre Destrée, Penelope Murray, “Introduction” to Id. (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics,  
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015, p. 2. 
2 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p. 1.  
3 See “αισθητικός – ή – όν”, in Franco Montanari, Vocabolario della Lingua Greca, Torino: Loescher, 2004, p. 
98. The translation from Italian to English is mine.  
4 See “αισθάνομαι”, in ibid. The translation from Italian to English is mine. 




Being a discourse on sensuous perception, aesthetics speaks of art as of a “material” 
reality, which is inseparable from other realities such as the body, modes of production, class 
conflict, the state – so that “in speaking of art, [the aesthetic] speaks of these other matters 
too.”6 There follows that attitudes and responses to art, and the very status of artworks 
themselves, are inevitably conditioned by the wider concerns of society and of the historical 
period considered. The connection between works of art and the context of the material 
development of their historical moments becomes especially relevant in relation to 
manifestations of the sublime in art.  
The term “sublime” has its origins in the Latin adjective sublimis (sub- “up to” + a 
second element perhaps related to limen “threshold”, or to limus “oblique”), meaning “high, 
elevated” or, metaphorically, “noble”7; its appearance in English dates back to the late 16th 
century from Middle French sublime, in the sense “dignified, aloof”, especially referred to 
the manner of expressing lofty ideas. Colloquially referred nowadays to anything either 
“lofty, grand, or exalted in thought, expression, or manner”; “of outstanding spiritual, 
intellectual, or moral worth”, or “tending to inspire awe usually because of elevated quality 
(as of beauty, nobility, grandeur) or transcendent excellence”8 – the sublime is a broadly 
aesthetic concept whose very complex development is intertwined with linguistic changes as 
well as the history of rhetoric, literary and art criticism, and philosophy.  
Understanding it first of all as a category of aesthetic judgement and value, the 
sublime can be viewed as the most intense and vibrant dimension of any aesthetic 
experience: it singles out moments of increased contact on the part of the Beholder with any 
given aesthetic object, when what is touched, heard, seen, or felt almost seems to come alive 
for the Beholder. The impact of the sublime on the perceiving subject can be disorienting, 
exhilarating, or supremely quieting; this is due in part simply to the intensity of the 
experience itself, since the sublime captures ordinary experiences in their extraordinary 
quality.9  
In order to understand the work of art as a means of lighting up a range of wider 
cultural, social and political issues, I shall first outline a brief history of the linkage between 
aesthetics and material reality and of the peculiar place that the sublime holds within it.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 3. 
7 See “Sublimis”, in Luigi Castiglioni, Scevola Mariotti, Vocabolario della Lingua Latina, Torino: Loescher, 
1990, p. 1092. The translation from Italian to English is mine. 
8 “Sublime”, in Merriam-Webster.com, 2015, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sublime>. 




1.1 Art as Μίμεσις  
 
1.1.1 Plato’s  Condemnation of Imitative Poetry 
 
Even though the aesthetic as such is born only with the rise of modern philosophy, 
art and its role within society have been central questions since the dawn of Western 
thought. Some of the first known examples are given by the work of archaic Greek poets 
themselves (from the seventh to the beginning of the fifth century B.C.), where they would 
incidentally allude to questions concerning poetry or art in general. Pronouncements on the 
origins and the aim of poetry can be found both in early epic writers (Homer and Hesiod) 
and in lyric and elegiac poets (Archilochus, Solon, Anacreon, Pindar and Sappho). On the 
whole, the archaic poets shared a common view which saw the source of poetry in divine 
inspiration and its aim in providing pleasure to and enchanting the listener; nonetheless, art 
was still not treated independently, but was perceived as nothing different from other aspects 
of life.    
During the classical period, works of art continued to be a source of observations on 
aesthetic matters, but by then philosophy had widened its range from natural to aesthetic 
phenomena, becoming, from then on, the main representative of aesthetic ideas. Merging 
with philosophy meant that aesthetics developed not in isolation, but within each 
philosopher’s own system of thought; that is, in conjunction with the rest of human quests. 
The first major contribution to classical aesthetics (and to aesthetics of antiquity as a whole) 
is represented by Plato’s considerations on art in his dialogues Ion and in part of Books II, 
III and X of The Republic (4th century B.C.). The latter dialogue is significant as to Plato’s 
account of what effects imitative arts – arts which do not produce, but reproduce things – 
have on the individual and within society. Socrates and Glaucon, the interlocutors, undertake 
to sketch the essentials of an ideal just city, among which they quickly come to agree in 
accounting people who act as “guardians”: an army against outer enemies and similar to 
police in inner affairs. Profiling the ideal character of the future guardians occasions a long 
excursion concerning their education, which includes gymnastics for the body and 
instruction in the fine arts for the soul. Concerning the latter, the dialogue offers a detailed 
discussion on the pedagogical impact of poetry and music:  
 
For a start, then, it seems, we must supervise our storytellers. […] We shall persuade nurses 




stories is far more important than trying to shape their bodies with their hands. We must reject most 
of the stories they tell at the moment. […] The ones Hesiod and Homer both used to tell us – and the 
other poets. They made up untrue stories, which they used to tell people – and still do tell them.10  
 
According to Socrates’s explanation, young people should be warned against 
learning from storytellers who “give us the wrong impression of the nature of gods and 
heroes”11; for, if they hear and absorb false opinions from myths and tales, it will be hard to 
erase these opinions in the course of their adult lives. The negative impact on the souls of 
the young is said to be increased by the imitative nature of poetry: Socrates believes that 
young people will imitate the characters of the stories they hear, and that those traits will 
enter into their own habits and nature: 
 
So if we stick to our original plan, which was that our guardians should be released from all 
other occupations, and be the true architects of freedom for our city, and that everything they do 
must contribute to this end, it is essential that they do not do or imitate anything else. If they do 
imitate anything, then from their earliest childhood they should choose appropriate models to imitate 
– people who are brave, self-disciplined, god-fearing, free, that sort of things. they should neither do, 
nor be good at imitating, what is illiberal, nor any other kind of shameful behaviour, in case 
enjoyment of the imitation gives rise to enjoyment of the reality. Have you never noticed how 
imitation, if long continued from an early age, becomes part of a person’s nature, turns into habits of 
body, speech and mind?12  
 
The last Book of the Republic, in particular, deals with the necessity not only to 
exclude imitative poetry from the education of philosophers, but also to banish poets and 
painters, for Plato deemed art dangerous to the stability of what he envisioned to be an ideal 
republic or city-state. Plato’s argument against art has to be understood in relation to his 
metaphysical theory of Forms or Ideas, according to which the non-material world of Ideas 
is the highest and most fundamental level of being. The further ontological level is that of 
nature, where perceptible objects reproduce the Ideas materially; lastly we find the products 
of poetry and painting, in their turn the reproduction of natural things through their shapes 
and colours only. Thus, from the perspective of ontological classification, in relation to an 
absolute Reality incarnated by the Ideas, the work of art finds itself demoted to the rank of 
                                                 
10 Plato, The Republic, ed. by G. R. F. Ferrari, trans. by Tom Griffith, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000, pp. 61-62.  
11 Ibid., p. 62. 




imitation in the second degree. In the famous analysis of Book X of the Republic, the work 
of art is defined “μίμεσις μιμήσεως” (“imitation of an imitation”): just an image (ἐίδωλον) of 
perceptible objects – in their turn the earthly imitation of the Ideas – with no connection to 
the ‘true’ realm of Ideas. So, being “two removes from the truth”13, art is more of an illusion 
than ordinary experience, for it involves only the unsteady and deceitful appearance of 
sensuous objects, which lack ontological reality. Instead of elevating the soul towards 
knowledge or the intuition of the Ideas, then, art just lowers it more to the world of sensory 
appearance:  
 
[T]he art of imitation is a far cry from truth. The reason it can make everything, apparently, 
is that it grasps just a little of each thing – and only an image at that. […] In that case, shall we say 
that all artists, starting with Homer, are imitators of images of goodness and the other things they 
create, without having any grasp of the truth?14  
 
This attack on imitative poetry is based on the example of the painter, who can paint 
anything without knowing what makes its true essence, that is, whether it is good or bad:  
 
As we’ve just been saying, the painter will create what looks like a shoemaker, though he 
himself knows nothing about shoemaking and the kind of people who look at his painting know 
nothing about it either. They judge things by their colours and shapes.15 
 
In the same way, poets in the tragic tradition are as ignorant of virtue as painters are 
of the uses of the things they paint, for they can tell of the actions of heroes and gods in their 
poetry without knowing whether those actions are good or bad: 
 
The same goes for the poet, too, I take it. We can say that he colours his pictures of all these 
skills with his words and phrases, and that the only thing he knows anything about is imitation. The 
result is that people like himself, people who judge things on the basis of language, think that what 
he has to say seems excellently said – whether he is using his metre, rhythm and harmony to describe 
shoemaking, or generalship, or anything else. Such is the power of bewitchment naturally possessed 
by the tools he uses.16 
 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 317. 
14 Ibid., pp. 317-320. 





Art’s connection to sensory experience goes well beyond sight or hearing, and affects 
human emotions as well. Plato’s argument against it goes on to explain that its corruptive 
power derives from upsetting the balance among the soul’s parts with its representations of 
characters driven by false virtues. Imitative poetry – tragedy above all – shows men 
behaving contrary to the dictates of reason, guided just by the overflow of their passions. 
Confronted with such a display of emotions, the spectators’ reason is appalled, whereas their 
impulses rejoice in the emotional release. This way the dramatic illusion weakens the 
rational impulse’s control over sensuous drives and desires, lulls men’s moral and social 
vigilance, and binds it to the passions it portrays:  
 
[The poet’s] products […] are inferior by comparison with the truth, and he resembles [the 
painter] also in associating with an inferior part of the soul, not with the best part. […] [Poetic 
imitation] feeds and waters these things [all the desires, pains and pleasures in the soul which we say 
accompany any of our actions], when they ought by rights to wither away. And it makes them our 
rulers, though if we want to be better and happier rather than worse or more wretched, they ought to 
be ruled by us.17  
 
Plato outlaws imitative poetry since it harms the soul by exciting inappropriate 
emotions and aiming at pleasure – mimetic artists, then, just need to know how to please the 
people, and in doing that will be pulled away from the truth. Although his condemnation of 
art and its effects has traditionally been interpreted only as a debasing rejection of it, it 
nonetheless bears out one of the first assertions of the strong connection between works of 
art and the sensuous world. His notorious critique against poetry, as a matter of fact, would 
not make sense without the supposition that poetry, like the other arts, is embedded in 
society and has an ethical function, both by its content and its effects on an audience. Plato’s 
vision of art was to be inherited – though empirically and analytically reworked – by his 
most prominent follower, Aristotle, whose Poetics (4th century B.C.) is the first known 
treatise entirely dedicated to the description of poietic art and of its function. 
 
1.1.2 Aristotle’s Pleasure of Μίμεσις 
 
As with Plato, crucial to Aristotle’s definition of art is the notion of μίμεσις, which, 
however, is appropriated within the latter philosopher’s own metaphysical system, where the 
                                                 




Ideas are deprived of their transcendence and become immanent to natural things 
themselves. In such a context where there are no different ontological levels, imitation does 
not imply the inferiority of art to nature nor its epistemological vacuity; on the contrary, 
imitation now means that the process of artistic creation equals that of natural creation, 
establishing a dynamically structural relation between life and the work of art. As a matter 
of fact, the activity of ποιετική, being for Aristotle on a par with the mimetic process, has its 
origins “deep-rooted in the very nature of man. To imitate is, even from childhood, part of 
man’s nature […]; and so is the pleasure we all take in copies of things […].”18 Aristotle 
thus relates the development of poetry to human nature itself, which makes the products of 
this kind of μίμεσις not just appearances, empty images (φαντάσματα, as Plato calls them), 
but εικόνα, images that are ontologically connected to the natural objects and phenomena 
they represent (and not just reproduce).  
So, whereas Plato was struggling with the problem of the relationship between 
mimesis and truth, Aristotle shifted to the notion of verisimilitude (εἰκός). According to the 
philosopher, “poets take their μίμεσις from men in action”19; that is, the object of mimetic 
poetry (tragedy and epic) is human existence such as it presents itself to our eyes. As such, it 
is just a raw, unformed and disordered material, to which poietic art must give the shape that 
Aristotle calls μύθος – “the putting together of the events”20 internal to the work of art. 
Poietic art is thus able to mould real life into an organic form (the artful organization of the 
tragic material), whose characteristics of unity and necessity transpose life itself from the 
contingency of mere existence to the universal plan of verisimilitude. Such universal 
qualities allow poetry to be a representation of likely events – events that did not necessarily 
happen but that are likely to have happened – and therefore to be plausible enough to engage 
emotions roughly in the same way that real‐life events engage emotions, which is what 
confers imitative poetry a high epistemological value.  
Besides starting their learning through it, Aristotle makes clear that all humans take 
delight in mimesis. Such a delight is in turn explained first as part of the pleasure that 
everyone takes in learning (probably by imitating others), and then as the delight that one 
takes in recognizing a product of mimesis to be a representation of something that one has 
seen before. What in the philosopher’s view distinguishes art products from the rest is the 
fact that they aim at entertaining and providing pleasure instead of fulfilling life’s 
                                                 
18 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. and with a commentary by George Whalley, ed. by John Baxter and Patrick 
Atherton, Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997, p. 57. 
19 Ibid., p. 51. 




necessities; more specifically, “the poet must procure the pleasure coming from pity and fear 
through mimesis.”21 Alongside the pleasure of a form of learning or understanding, poetry 
can evoke pleasure from pity and fear precisely because it is a mimesis of terrible deeds: if 
we did not have the clear awareness, in the back of our minds, that this is all mimesis, we 
would not experience pleasure from these emotions, but pain.22 It is as a source of such a 
pleasure connected to pity and fear that poietic art, instead of being corruptive like Plato 
deemed it, acquires a new, self-sufficient status. Following the definition of tragedy central 
to the Poetics, we see that it  
 
 is a μίμεσις of an action that is morally serious and purposeful, having magnitude; uttered in 
heightened language and using each of its resources separately in the various sections of the play; 
presented by people acting rather than by narration; bringing about through a process of pity and 
terror the purification [κάθαρσιν] of those destructive or painful emotions [παθήματα].23  
 
Although the remark about κάθαρσις remains cryptic (it is still not clear whether it is 
the spectator that is cleansed of tragic emotions or it is the tragic emotions themselves that 
are in a way cleansed of their excesses), and it is only marginally mentioned here (the term 
in this peculiar meaning is not taken up again in the remainder of the text), the notion of 
κάθαρσις is central to the effects and social function that Aristotle attributes to the work of 
art. A more accurate description of this purifying process can be found in the dissertation on 
music from Book VIII of the treatise Politics, where, after distinguishing harmonies into 
moral, practical and enthusiastic, the philosopher assigns to moral harmonies the purpose of 
education; as for the practical and enthusiastic ones, they both are associated to the purposes 
of catharsis and entertainment or “relaxation from the uneasiness of the mind”24, so as to 
relieve people who fall into a quasi-pathological state of mystic or religious frenzy: 
 
[F]or that passion which is to be found very strong in some souls is to be met with also in all, 
but the difference in different persons consists in its being in a less or greater degree, as pity, fear, 
and enthusiasm also; which latter is so powerful in some as to overpower the soul: and yet we see 
those persons, by the application of sacred music to soothe their mind, rendered as sedate and 
composed as if they had employed the art of the physician; and this must necessarily happen to the 
compassionate, the fearful, and all those who are subdued by their passions: nay, all persons, as far 
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as they are affected with those passions, admit of the same cure [κάθαρσις], and are restored to 
tranquillity with pleasure. In the same manner, all music which has the power of purifying the soul 
affords a harmless pleasure to man.25  
 
Transferred to tragedy, the process of catharsis originates when “a person who hears 
the events unfolding trembles and feels pity at what is happening.”26 Such emotions as έλεος 
and φόβος are at the roots of the cathartic process: έλεος (usually translated as “pity,” 
“compassionate grief,” and the like) was thought to be essentially connected with the 
undeserved misfortune of other people – whenever one observes another’s unmerited 
suffering, one comes to experience a certain share of this same suffering. Such a 
phenomenon might be due to an anticipation of harmful things that could happen to us, as 
Aristotle himself claims defining this emotion as aroused by evils “that one expects himself 
or one of the people close to him to suffer” (Rhet. II.8, 1385b14–5). Since the spectator’s 
grief about the fate of the tragic character is inextricably connected with the vulnerability of 
his own existence, έλεος becomes a mechanism that functions as an emotional tie between 
the spectator and the tragic hero leading up to φόβος (“terror” or “fear”). Because of what 
happens to the tragic characters, the spectator experiences an unpleasant worry about 
imminent future harms or evils, since he fears he is similarly vulnerable to the sort of 
misfortune they suffer, and that such misfortune would strike him quite as unjustifiably as it 
strikes the tragic heroes.27   
The capacity of tragedy to arouse such feelings of pity and terror is for Aristotle an 
essential part of the work of art itself, coming from its very structure (μύθος); that is, the 
crafty combination of plot, characters, thoughts and language. But since the spectator is 
facing just a μίμεσις of life, being taken over by those passions in this situation allows 
him/her a purification from such extremes in order to act reasonably and temperately in real 
life. Tragedy’s mimetic nature, instead of allowing those irrational feelings to take over the 
soul as Plato believed, becomes for his follower the source of a purification from excesses. 
Although Aristotle himself does not define nor explain any further the consequences of this 
process, it can be assumed that κάθαρσις allows to qualify the pleasure produced by tragedy 
as neither morally nor socially harmful. By making precisely the production of this kind of 
pleasure the only distinctive goal of tragedy, Aristotle treats poetry as an autonomous art: he 
does not deem it a danger for man’s soul, nor does he demand exclusively that it should be 
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morally instructive, so that poietic art seems to be emerging as a self-sufficient endeavour to 
be judged by principles of its own.28  
 
1.1.3 Longinus’s Rhetorical Sublime 
 
A concern with the responses that art has on the individual and on society is also 
evident in ancient discussions of rhetorical style, which incorporate an aesthetic dimension 
notwithstanding their practical function. Such is the case of the treatise Περί Ύψους (On the 
Sublime), which brought about the first known appearance of the sublime within literary 
debates. Both date and authorship of the book are still a matter of controversy: it was 
believed for a long time to belong to a third century A.D. Greek rhetorician named Cassius 
Longinus, but since nowadays the essay has generally been dated back to the first century A. 
D., doubts were cast upon this paternity, and the issue still remains unsolved.29 What we can 
safely say is that it is the first proper treatise of literary criticism to be known to us, which 
belongs to a period – between the Hellenistic and the Imperial Ages – when great attention 
was paid to matters of style and eloquence of discourse. This was a comparatively 
uncreative period for Greek literature, whose language was still the language of the Attic 
classics, written four or five hundred years before. Such a language was everywhere taught 
in schools (to Greek speakers as to the cosmopolitan urban populations of Egypt, Syria and 
Asia Minor) with the aim of instructing people in the art of writing and speaking, the so-
called “rhetoric”: a massive doctrinal system embracing the content, arrangement and style 
of every kind of writing.30  
Responding to the demands of the time, On the Sublime is primarily a manual of 
composition, where the author’s main purpose is to give rhetorical instructions. The subject 
of the treatise is first of all related to the basic distinction between three degrees of style 
(χαρακτήρ or genus dicendi), which goes back a long way in Greek thinking. An established 
tradition of describing speech since Aristotle distinguished between a ‘grand’ or ‘high style’; 
a ‘middle’ or ‘smooth style’; and a ‘slight’ or ‘plain style’. ‘Sublimity’, then, clearly refers 
to the older rhetorical concept of the ‘high style’ achieved by means of certain precepts 
concerning diction, sentence-structure, figures and rhythm.31 But as a matter of fact, Pseudo-
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Longinus’s teaching goes far beyond the description of the traditional rhetorical concept of 
sublime as ‘high style’. Closer to the etymological meaning of the ancient Greek term ύψος-
ους as not simply “height”, but “summit, peak; exaltation”32, Pseudo-Longinus’s 
fundamental interest lies in identifying the characteristics that mark out an emotionally 
intense and elevated tone of writing from the merely pleasing and soothing, whose aim 
should specifically be the production of a certain kind of effect on the hearer/reader.33 
Although it is necessary to keep in mind that such a notion is still strictly linked only to the 
dimension of words and the different ways of arranging them together, the sublime “tone of 
writing” is much more than just a matter of form as it is a matter of emotional response to a 
certain form.  
‘Sublimity’ is defined as “a kind of eminence or excellence of discourse”34 that 
results in an “ecstasy”; a “combination of wonder and astonishment” which is able to “exert 
invincible power and force”  and “tears everything up like a whirlwind”35. This strength, 
though, is at place only when nature and art work together, which means that, nature being 
the “law unto herself in matters of emotion and elevation”36, method is nonetheless 
necessary to mould it up, “to provide […] correctness in training and application.”37 The 
combination of nature and art in order to create sublimity also emerges from the account of 
the five sources of the sublime, which the author exemplifies as: greatness of thought; strong 
emotion; certain figures of thought and speech; noble diction; dignified word arrangement. 
The first and most important one, “natural greatness”38 (μεγαλοφυΐα), introduces a matter of 
considerable importance and originality within the literary criticism of antiquity, which 
seems to prelude to the digression on ‘genius’ further on in the text:  
 
Even if it is a matter of endowment rather than acquisition, we must, so far as is possible, 
develop our minds in the direction of greatness and make them always pregnant with noble thoughts. 
[…] ‘Sublimity is the echo of a noble mind’.39 
 
Sublimity, then, is also related to ethical ideals: not everyone indiscriminately is 
capable of producing it; there needs to be a certain amount of moral predisposition to 
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accomplish the refinement of judgement, of imitative ability and imaginative effort, and this 
in order to know “what is really valuable, and […] distinguish it from the sham”, to know 
one’s “place as a citizen of the kosmos”, one’s “greatness and […] limitations.”40 One of the 
best exemplifications brought by the author of the ‘greatness of thought’ is Homer, who is 
able to accompany the choice of cosmic subjects (storms; divine epiphanies; the wonders of 
anatomy or astronomy) and violent emotion with that kind of ‘elevation’ of mind capable of 
knocking the reader out, raising in him both “excitement” and “astonishment.”41 
Due to the lacuna of the ‘emotion’ (πάθος) section, the text skips to the discussion of 
those figures of speech and thought which conduce to sublimity, making “style more 
emotional and excited, and emotion is as essential a part of sublimity as characterization is 
of charm.”42 Since the way of arranging words and thoughts results in a marker of real 
emotion, figures are seen as “a means by which, […] imitation approaches the effect of 
nature. Art is perfect when it looks like nature, nature is felicitous when it embraces 
concealed art,”43 which statement reinforces the notion of the blending of nature and art as 
the ground upon which the sublime is free to flourish.  
The section on ‘diction’, apart from some general remarks about “the choice of 
correct and magnificent words” that “gives things life and makes them speak,”44 comprises 
the digression on ‘genius’ (φύσις), which is the most eloquent part of the book, and central 
to its message. Genius, even when it makes mistakes, is preferable to impeccable 
mediocrity, because by nature it is the greatest works, those that go up to the limit (sub-
limine), that our admiration is driven to, not to mere prettiness or exactness in detail: 
 
[Nature] implanted in our minds from the start an irresistible desire for anything which is 
great and, in relation to ourselves, supernatural. The universe therefore is not wide enough for the 
range of human speculation and intellect. Our thoughts often travel beyond the boundaries of our 
surroundings. […] It is a natural inclination that leads us to admire not the little streams, however 
pellucid and however useful, but the Nile, the Danube, the Rhine, and above all the Ocean. Nor do 
we feel so much awe before the little flame we kindle, because it keeps its light clear and pure, as 
before the fires of heaven, though they are often obscured. 
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[…] : the useful and necessary are readily available to man, it is the unusual which always excites 
our wonder.45 
 
The same goes for literature: since it is by nature that man is endowed with the 
power of speech, grandeur is admired in nature as well as in writing. That explains why the 
sublime is attributed only to the work of great geniuses, who, “for all their faults, tower far 
above mortal stature. […] [S]ublimity raises us towards the spiritual greatness of god.”46 
The prize of their sublime effect is the transgression of boundaries, the abandonment of the 
common rules that restrict creativity, and the burst forth which inspires and is inspired by a 
divine spirit of something bigger than us. This central passage, though ambiguous at times, 
does not simply state nature’s predominance over art; it reaffirms the necessity of their 
combination instead, as, the author concludes, “[i]mpeccability is generally a product of art; 
erratic excellence comes from natural greatness; therefore, art must always come to the aid 
of nature, and the combination of the two may well be perfection.”47 
There follows in the treatise the section on ‘word arrangement’, where the author 
provides examples of the ways in which rhythm is decisive for producing the sublime effect 
and also common words can be given grandeur by skillful placing. The ethical concern of 
the treatise becomes still clearer towards the end, where we find an appendix in form of a 
dialogue between an unnamed philosopher and the author, in which the causes of the 
contemporary decline of ‘sublime’ writing are debated. Whereas the philosopher attributes 
this failure to the loss of free speech and political liberty, the author himself counters this 
view, ascribing the present dearth to a moral collapse rather than to external circumstances. 
Opposite to the philosopher’s accusation of political slavery, Pseudo-Longinus places his 
denunciation of mental slavery to such passions and desires as avarice and love of pleasure. 
“Amid such pestilential corruption of human life, how can we expect any free, uncorrupted 
judge of great things of permanent value to be left to us?”48 he finally asks the philosopher.  
Such final considerations may be the key to reading the whole treatise, by which we 
come to appreciate Pseudo-Longinus’s contribution in turning a previously merely rhetorical 
and stylistic notion as that of the ‘sublime’ into an ‘elevation’ or ‘excellence’ of discourse 
with deep ethical implications. For some, rhetoric was simply a tool, capable of good or bad 
use; Pseudo-Longinus, on the other hand, insists that the writer or the orator (the “public 
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man”) should also be a man of worth and of noble thought:  in order to achieve sublimity of 
discourse, it takes a ‘sublime’ mind. Pseudo-Longinus’s moralism may be seen as an attempt 
to come to terms with the literary issues of his times, most probably the Augustan Age, a 
‘Renaissance’ situation in which reaction to staleness in literature rose both in form of the 
purists’ restrained and spotless imitation of the classics, and in form of the bold re-creation 
of their greatness by means of the ingenium (invention), which approach is namely the one 
praised by Pseudo-Longinus in On the Sublime. Nurtured in the study of the classics, the 
mind develops its own intellectual and emotional response to life, by which personal 
capacity only is it able to create a brilliant and tense context in writing.49 This means that the 
same greatness as that of the classics can also be achieved without strictly imitating the 
earlier writers, but rather, by imitating nature.50 The restraining rules of purists led, in the 
author’s view, to impeccability and to dullness as well; to avoiding mistakes, but also to 
pedantry and frigidity. Pseudo-Longinus’s systematization of the ‘rhetorical sublime’ thus 
represents the first known establishment of some degree of freedom from rules, and of 
boldness of thought, whose tradition is going to inform repeatedly the transformational 
capacities of the discourse on the sublime. Besides, the treatise’s vocabulary of the effects of 
sublimity (“astonishment”; “enthusiasm”; “ravishment”; “transport”) does service within 
both a rhetorical and an emotional framework, establishing a link between practical criticism 
of texts and an ethical account of human nature. It can be said, then, that “the sublime begins 
in rhetoric and ethics, and that the history of the discourse on it describes the complex set of 
relations which pertain between the three overlapping domains of rhetoric, ethics and 
aesthetics.”51 As a matter of fact, Pseudo-Longinus’s work was hugely responsible for the 
role the theory of the sublime was about to play in modern aesthetic speculation, where its 
rhetorical conceptual base came together with issues connected not only to the moral, but 
also physiological and social dimensions.  
 
After being constrained within a metaphysical/transcendental framework for about a 
thousand years by the theistic conception of art of the Middle Ages, aesthetics in the Early 
Modern period slowly started reconsidering the role of sensuous reality. In light of its 
reworking of philosophical ideas from antiquity – above all, those linked to the Neo-Platonic 
tradition and to the newly-discovered Poetics by Aristotle – the Renaissance marked the 
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success of the classical concept of art based on the imitation of the harmony of nature. A 
variation in such a conception of art was ushered in only with the advent of the so-called 
Mannerism (from the early decades of the 16th century on), when artists refused sheer 
imitation of natural beauty and began to look for expressiveness, guided by newly 
formulated doctrines such as that of the Genius and its ability to conceive the idea of nature 
by itself. The following rejection of uninspired imitation and its rules brought to a 
revaluation of deformity and disproportion, contributing to the emergence of a certain 
degree of subjectivity in art. The same tendency to put in the limelight those elements that 
classical aesthetics had left behind because ‘irregular’ is to be found throughout the Baroque 
period, which “witnessed a growing taste for the extra-ordinary, for those things that arouse 
wonder”; in such a cultural climate, moreover, “artists explored the worlds of violence, 
death and horror, as happened with the works of Shakespeare and of the Elizabethans in 
general, […].”52  
In such a context, Pseudo-Longinus’s treatise – and with it the notion of the sublime 
– had been acquiring new popularity, being rather widely distributed through new editions, 
and translations in the early-modern European languages between the late sixteenth and the 
seventeenth century. But it was only with Nicolas Boileau’s 1674 translation of it into 
French (Traité du Sublime ou de Merveilleux dans le Discours, Traduit du Grec de Longin) 
that On the Sublime was brought in the limelight, becoming a central text in European 
criticism throughout the eighteenth century. It may sound rather puzzling that a treatise such 
as Pseudo-Longinus’s was significantly championed for the first time in the history of 
modern literature by a Neo-classicist writer such as Boileau, since Neoclassicism is 
generally understood to emphasise the correct application of rules to art, and to call for 
measure and reason, so that it should be regular, rational and harmonious. On the Sublime, 
despite some degree of ambiguity, points undeniably to elevation of mind and intense 
passion, and so to ‘excess’, as a means to achieve successful writing, and states clearly 
enough that rules are insufficient to make a composition sublime, so that something 
additional – to be found only beyond those rules – is required in order to reach ‘sublimity’ in 
art. Accordingly, Boileau defined the Sublime in the “Preface” to his translation as a “ ‘je ne 
sais quoi’ that is easier to feel than to speak about;”53 “the extraordinary and marvellous 
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which can strike us in discourse, making a work lift us up, ravish us, transport us.”54 
Nonetheless, Pseudo-Longinus’s ideas were quickly absorbed into Neoclassical artistic 
theory, up to the point that they were also made to serve as a supplement or a counter-
tension to the establishing of the correct techniques for the creation of art; or just as a 
support to Neoclassicist practice, as Boileau himself did with his Critical Reflections on 
Some Passages from Longinus, one of the central texts as far as the seventeenth-century 
“Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns” is concerned.55 
As we have seen, sublimity has been up to here still tied to the dimension of 
discourse and language (the ‘rhetorical sublime’), but the interest for this notion brought 
about by seventeenth-century theorists and translators was soon to have it shifted to the 
‘natural’ and then ‘transcendental’ sublime, within larger philosophical realms. 
 
1.2 Aesthetic Ideology 
 
1.2.1 A Science of the Concrete 
 
The turning point which brought to the thorough consideration of aesthetics as a 
modern philosophical category in its own right is represented by Alexander Baumgarten’s 
Aesthetica (1750). Baumgarten appropriated the term “aesthetic” for the first time in his 
discourse on the “criticism of taste” Meditationes philosophicae de nonnulis ad poema 
pertentibus (“Philosophical considerations of some matters pertaining the poem”) in 1735 
and in his later fragment Aesthetica (1750-1758), where it was first treated as a modern 
philosophical category in its own right. “Aesthetica […] est scientia cognitionis sensitivae”56 
(“Aesthetics […] is the science of sensible cognition”), Baumgarten defines it in the opening 
line of the Prolegomena to this work. Conceptualising the aesthetic discourse for the first 
time in modern European thought, Baumgarten applies it to the field of human sense 
perception as a whole, and finds its object in the study of sensory cognition as opposed to 
the knowledge acquired by the mind. Following on Baumgarten’s footsteps, from the 
eighteenth century on, the affective or aesthetic moment became central to human 
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experience as such, so that what was thought and said about artworks became tightly bound 
up with what was thought and said about the nature of human experience in general.  
By bringing to the philosophical limelight “the science of sensible cognition”, 
Baumgarten’s Aesthetica is a significant and innovative introduction of the whole terrain of 
sensation to the govern of reason. According to the German philosopher, aesthetic cognition 
reconciles the universalities of reason with the particulars of sense: while participating in the 
perfection of reason, its elements still resist the separation into discrete units characteristic of 
conceptual thought.57 Sensation is in fact characterised by an irreducible particularity, a 
series of determinate specificities which threaten to go beyond the bounds of abstract 
thought itself: “Individuals”, writes Baumgarten, “are determined in every respect […] 
particular representations are in the highest degree poetic.”58 Aesthetics emerges as a 
theoretical discourse that incorporates the domain of senses into reason and Enlightenment 
rationality. As a hybrid form of cognition, the aesthetic can organise the raw stuff of 
perception, revealing for the first time the inner structure of the concrete. If reason as such is 
necessarily detached from the lowly particulars of the concrete, the aesthetic, in 
Baumgarten’s view, finds its reason to exist as the ‘sister’ of logic – a sort of ratio inferior at 
the level of sensuous life, whose task is to order this domain in an autonomous manner, 
though similar to the way reason proper operates.59  
Thus, aesthetics as a category is given by the necessity to attribute to the world of 
perception and experience its own appropriate discourse and inner logic, instead of merely 
letting it derive from abstract universal laws. “Science”, Baumgarten writes, “is not to be 
dragged down to the region of sensibility, but the sensible is to be lifted to the dignity of 
knowledge.”60 Being a kind of “concrete thought” or sensuous equivalent of the concept, the 
aesthetic mediates between the rational and the real.61  
 
1.2.2 Burke’s Physiological Sublime 
 
While early German aesthetics was needed in order to descend from the universal to the 
particular, elaborating a kind of ‘concrete logic’ which would bring Reason down to the 
level of the senses, the British approach to such a category went quite the other way around. 
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Moving from the particular to the universal, British philosophers tended to start from the 
individual body’s affections to get to the collective sphere of ‘moral sense’. The exploration 
of affective experience was actually the starting point of most philosophical considerations 
related to the rising modern subjectivity, and it also led to a renewed interest in the sublime.  
 By the middle of the eighteenth century, the notion of the sublime had been 
consolidated through a vivid speculative tradition of ‘Longinian’ derivation. The enormous 
influence exerted by Pseudo-Longinus’s Περί Ύψους, partly due to his ‘classical’ authority 
and partly to the prestige of Boileau, not only gave rise to the so-called ‘rhetorical sublime’, 
but was also determinant for those further theories of sublimity that developed the rhetorical 
conceptual base into the ethical and political domains. The debate on the sublime carried on 
by British philosophers in the eighteenth century, in particular, is centred on recognising the 
interconnections between the subject’s aesthetic experience and its ethical and social 
conduct.62 As the aesthetic, based on affective experience, is then inevitably in association 
with other forms of understanding and experiencing the world, so does the sublime take the 
hint from a physiological dimension to infiltrate the ethical and socio-political realms. Such 
is the approach of what we may call the first modern phenomenology of the sublime, 
Edmund Burke’s 1757 A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of the Sublime 
and the Beautiful. 
Moulded by eighteenth-century empiricist thought, Burke’s research is directed at 
finding the sublime not anymore within the outer world of the objects that arouse it, but 
within the interior landscape of mental affect. Attention shifts, therefore, from the ‘sublime’ 
qualities possessed by an object to the mental processes of the subject which register and 
react to them. Shifting to the perceiving subject, such an approach implies exploring the 
physiological and psychological nature of sublime feelings and the way they impact and 
move the judging mind.63 This is very clearly stated in the title itself he gave to his work, 
since its aim is that of examining the “passions in our own breasts; […] the properties of 
things which we find by experience to influence those passions, and […] the laws of nature, 
by which those properties are capable of affecting the body and thus of exciting our 
passions.”64  
The senses being the starting point of Burke’s inquiry, sensations of pain or pleasure 
are the primary element in processing the aesthetic experience, to which is then added the 
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power of the imagination of operating on those ideas, and, finally, judgement – the 
reasoning faculty – concludes this process by relating them to the human passions, manners 
and actions.65 The experience of the sublime and the beautiful is therefore primarily linked 
to feeling certain passions; namely, Burke categorises beauty under the label of passions 
“which belong to generation”, having “their origins in gratifications and pleasures”66 and 
being “directed to the multiplication of the species,”67 sublimity is said to “concern self-
preservation”, and to “turn mostly on pain or danger”68:  
 
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever 
is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to 
terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is 
capable of feeling.69 
 
This is the first, plainly physiological definition of the sublime we encounter in the 
Inquiry, to which Burke adds some further explanations: 
 
When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are 
simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are, 
delightful, as we everyday experience.70 
 
The sublime has its source not just in the ideas of pain and danger, but rather in their 
negation, in the relief from them: this makes it not a positive pleasurable sensation as it 
would be the case with sheer beauty, but a negative pleasure instead, coming out of the 
privation of pain, to which Burke, for a matter of scientific precision, attributes the name of 
delight: “Whatever excites this delight, I call sublime.”71  
The sublime, in its turn, casts the mind in a state of astonishment,  
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in which all its motions are suspended, […] the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that 
it cannot entertain any other, […]. Hence arises the great power of the sublime, that, far from being 
produced by them, it anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible force.72 
 
The related paralysis of our rational capacity is the exemplary reaction to the 
sublime, which is aided by those things in nature showing properties rooted to fear and 
terror,  
 
[f]or fear being an apprehension of pain and death, it operates in a manner that resembles 
actual pain. Whatever therefore is terrible, with regard to sight, is sublime too. […] Indeed terror is 
in all cases whatsoever, […], the ruling principle of the sublime.73 
  
There follows a deeper research into the principles according to which the properties 
of things in nature excite our passions. Moving from the external object to the mental 
processes of the perceiving subject, Burke goes on to explore the material causes of the 
feeling of sublimity and the way it affects the mind, among which he places obscurity first:  
 
To make anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary. It is our 
ignorance of things that causes all our admiration, and chiefly excites our passions. […] [H]ardly 
anything  can strike the mind with its greatness, […] which nothing can do whilst we are able to 
perceive its bounds; […], and this sublimity is principally due to the terrible uncertainty of the thing 
described […],74 
 
which definition reminds very closely of Pseudo-Longinus’s explanation of our 
admiration for anything in nature that goes beyond certain boundaries, reaffirming 
formlessness and disproportion as sources of greatness – with the addition of an element of 
uncertainty, the ‘uncanny’ undecidedness of the nature of the object considered.  
The second fundamental property conveyor of sublimity for Burke is power: “I know 
of nothing sublime, which is not some modification of power,”75 which again agrees with 
the Longinian tradition of stressing the overwhelming control of the sublime over the mind. 
Burke states very clearly that this power is tied up to destruction: “Look at a man, or any 
other animal of prodigious strength, […] the emotion you feel is, lest this enormous strength 
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should be employed to the purpose of rapine and destruction.”76 This dominative and 
destructive power marks the sublime as a natural force beyond man’s ability to control, 
impervious to any human effort at conquering, domesticating or exploiting it. Burke goes on 
to add a whole lot of causes of the sublime, such as privation; vastness; infinity; difficulty; 
magnificence; loudness; suddenness; intermitting; thus giving shape to that peculiar 
‘sublime’ imagery which was going to achieve a huge success among Romantic poetry and 
visual arts.  
Following on the analysis of the ‘material causes’ of the sublime is that of the 
‘efficient causes’, by which Burke means “affections of the mind [which] produce certain 
emotions on the body” and those “distinct feelings and qualities of body [that] shall produce 
certain determinate passions in the mind.”77 Shifting definitely to what happens inside the 
perceiving subject, Burke explores how the material causes of the sublime previously 
explored relate to the subject by specific operations of the body and of the mind. We are 
shown how physical sensations (tension) act on mental affects (terror) so as to produce the 
sublime within the subject:  
 
Having considered terror as producing an unnatural tension and certain violent emotions of 
the nerves; it easily follows, from what we have just said, that whatever is fitted to produce such a 
tension must be productive of a passion similar to terror, and consequently must be a source of the 
sublime, […].78  
 
The sublime becomes thus internalised as an ‘affectation’ of the mind caused by 
certain external physical conditions79 that we may come so far as to name a kind of 
‘physiological’ or ‘psychological status’.  
 
The consequences of Burke’s reformulation of the sublime are manifold. By arguing 
that the sublime and the beautiful are mutually exclusive, and placing the sublime in 
antithetical opposition to the classical notion of beauty as a pleasurable experience, Burke 
suggests that formlessness and disproportion are sources of an aesthetic experience in its 
own right, capable of instilling intense emotion derived not from pleasure but from pain (or 
the absence of it). The most obvious consequence of these reformulations is the disruption of 
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the Neoclassical order, as concerns both its notion of ‘form’ and its subordination to ‘rules’, 
applied to the natural and to the aesthetical realm as well. There follows that the aesthetical 
experience is not anymore restricted to the rational, the harmonious and the flawless, but 
finds its most effective sources in disproportion and disorder instead.  
As we have already seen, the sublime goes well beyond the basic level of the senses, 
reaching out to the ethical and social spheres as well. As a matter of fact, Burke depicts his 
‘physiological sublime’ as an overpowering force that limits our reasoning capability and 
produces an “unnatural tension and certain violent emotions of the nerves.”80 Similar to 
exercise or labour, this force is at once painful in its exertion, yet pleasurable in its arousal 
of energy: “As common labour, which is a mode of pain, is the exercise of the grosser, a 
model of terror is the exercise of the finer parts of the system.”81 Whereas the beautiful is 
connected to those passions belonging to ‘generation’, such as pleasure and lust, the sublime 
is connected to those that belong to ‘self-preservation’ (pain and danger). As a kind of terror 
pushing on self-preservation, the sublime implies a constant confrontation with human 
finitude and limitedness, from which arises a strong sense of humility that crushes man into 
submission. It thus resembles a coercive rather than a consensual power, engaging our 
respect but not, as with beauty, our love: “we submit to what we admire, but we love what 
submits to us; in one case we are forced, in the other flattered, into compliance.”82 The 
sublime, with its “delightful horror”, is thus able to counteract the indolence and dissipation 
that the beautiful may bring about in a given social order by raising the individual, at the 
same time, to the awareness of his own strength. The moral and social action of the sublime 
experience as described by Burke lies in its acting as a counterbalance: it subordinates the 
individual to the whole by giving it the strength to rise above the whole itself. 
 
[The sublime] is beauty’s point of inner fracture, a negation of settled order without which 
any order would grow inert and wither. The sublime is the anti-social condition of all sociality, the 
infinitely unrepresentable which spurs us on to yet finer representations, the lawless masculine force 
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1.2.3 Kant’s Reconciliatory Aesthetics 
 
Immanuel Kant’s contribution to modern aesthetics mediates between the role 
merely supplemental to reason of Baumgarten’s “science of the concrete,” and the cognitive 
prominence of the body against the mind of British empiricism. His Critique of Judgement 
(1790), the last book of the three Critiques, corresponded to the purpose of drawing an a 
priori (or transcendental) philosophy of taste. Accordingly, it presented itself as a 
reconciliation of “the pure concept of objects of possible empirical cognition” and “the 
principle of practical purposiveness, which must be thought in the Idea of the determination 
of a free will”84 – that is, of pure and practical reason, of the conceptual and the empirical. 
As a matter of fact, Kant was writing to confute, on the one hand, the empiricism of 
Locke and Hume (hence his likewise confutation of Burke’s treatise), which claimed that all 
we know comes from the experience of our senses. On the other hand, the philosopher 
refuted the Rationalism and Idealism of the Neoplatonic tradition as well, for which the only 
true knowledge comes from the direct intuition of Ideas, pure forms which pre-exist our 
sensory experience. Halfway between these two extremes, Kant argued that knowledge 
cannot be entirely derived from sensory experience, but neither do we have direct access to 
some divine truth. He suggested that there are certain categories which are innate to man and 
determine his sensory experience: some a priori Ideas that originate in the supersensuous 
faculty of Reason, and without which he could not make sense of the phenomenal world 
(such as Infinity, Unity, Freedom, Justice, the Absolute, and so on). As creatures whose 
lives are determined by such Ideas, then, human beings share a dimension which 
‘transcends’ the empirical or phenomenal world they move in. Kant named this 
philosophical vision “transcendental Idealism,” and in it the aesthetic has a considerable role 
“as a phenomenalized, empirically manifest principle of cognition […] since the possibility 
of philosophy itself, as the articulation of a transcendental with a metaphysical discourse, 
depends on it.”85 
By participating equally in the cognitive principle of Reason and in the empirical 
principle of Nature, the aesthetic mode of judgement harmonises pure reason with practical 
reason, so that “the empirical world appears in its freedom, purposiveness, significant 
totality and self-regulating autonomy to conform to the ends of practical reason.”86 If the 
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aesthetic object, being an empirical phenomenon, cannot be incorporated into any universal 
law, it seems nonetheless stirred by an inherent finality, a sort of accidental yet ungraspable 
law inscribed in its very material form, thus connected only to its unique structure. Such an 
object, by displaying a purposive unity that is not deducible from a concept of the 
understanding, but comes spontaneously from the phenomenon itself, is in-between Reason 
and Nature: it does not involve cognition, but addresses the subject’s capacity for cognition 
in general. Aesthetic beauty, according to Kant, reveals that the world is comprehensible to 
the subject, adapted to its mental faculties, for “[i]f the aesthetic yields us no knowledge, 
then, it proffers us something arguably deeper: the consciousness, beyond all theoretical 
demonstration, that we are at home in the world because the world is somehow mysteriously 
designed to suit our capacities.”87 
Only in the aesthetic is the subject able to envisage itself in the act of knowing, that 
is, of reaching out to the object: in the aesthetic, it begins to grasp the relation of its 
capacities to material reality, and how fittingly its inmost structure seems predisposed to the 
comprehension of the real. Although it is not possible to know if things are actually shaped 
for the subject’s faculties or not, it does not matter: what is central is that it allows the sense 
of purposiveness, centredness and significance the modern subject was in need of.88 
 
A privileged place in Kant’s third Critique in which to observe the congruity of the 
aesthetic to the order of empirical reality as well as to that of pure reason is the “Analytic of 
the Sublime.” Following the section on the Beautiful, the sublime is first defined in contrast 
to that notion: 
 
The Beautiful in nature is connected with the form of the object, which consists in having 
boundaries. The Sublime, on the other hand, is to be found in a formless object, so far as in it or by 
occasion of it boundlessness is represented, and yet its totality is also present to thought. […] [A]s 
the mind is not merely attracted by the object but is ever being alternately repelled, the satisfaction in 
the sublime does not so much involve a positive pleasure as admiration or respect, which rather 
deserves to be called negative pleasure.89 
 
Kant’s idea of the sublime, like aesthetic experience in general, originates from the 
relation of the subject’s capacities to material reality. But if in the presence of beauty those 
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faculties are foregrounded so as to experience their adaptation to reality, the presence of the 
sublime draws attention to their limitations instead. The emotional, agitated response that 
the sublime produces in the beholder can be referred back to the limitations of knowledge, 
on the one hand, or, on the other, to the limitations of desire. To the first kind of response 
corresponds what Kant called the mathematical sublime, “that sublime which is absolutely 
great, […] what is great beyond all comparison”90 – whose experience is occasioned by an 
almost ungraspably vast, formless object, which, as such, can never be accessible to the 
senses. This “absolute magnitude” (die Gröβte) belongs in fact to a different order of 
experience, which requires, on the level of understanding, the so-called “comprehensio 
logica” and, on the level of reason, the “comprehensio aesthetica.” While the first mode of 
understanding conceives infinity as purely logical procession, the second one requires 
constant totalisation or condensation in a single intuition. But since the infinite is not 
comparable to any finite magnitude, the mode of understanding called “comprehensio 
aesthetica” is not sufficient: it cannot progress beyond a certain magnitude, which marks the 
limit of the imagination.91 The failure of the articulation between comprehensio logica and 
aesthetica translates into the failure of the imagination to synthesise the immediate 
perceptions into a full and unified image, to represent to our finite senses the idea of Infinity 
itself. Imagination, as the subject’s ability to grasp absolute magnitude with ‘the mind’s 
eye’, is thus overwhelmed by the suprasensory realm of Reason.  
In the presence of the mathematical sublime, the subject realises that finite and 
infinite entities are not comparable with each other, and so cannot be inscribed within a 
common system of knowledge. Human cognition (Erkenntnis) is simply not able to 
recognise the sublime as a comprehensible concept. This, on the one hand, reminds of the 
limits of human imagination and cautions that to grasp the world as infinite totality is 
beyond the subject’s epistemological capacities, causing in it the pain of inadequacy and 
incompletion. The sublime appears at first as a awe-inspiring, humiliating power, which 
makes the subject aware of its own humbling finitude, and of the fact that it is not the centre 
of the universe: thus decentred, the subject is consequently thrown into a painful loss of 
identity.92 Yet, if the struggle between imagination and Reason is initially such a displeasing 
and chastening experience, on the other hand, 
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[o]ut of the pain of the failure to constitute the sublime by making the infinite apparent 
(anschaulich) is born the pleasure of the imagination, which discovers, in this very failure, the 
congruity of its law (which is a law of failure) with the law of our suprasensory being. Its failure to 
connect with the sensory would also elevate it above it.93 
 
The failure of the imagination becomes “the distinguishing characteristic of the 
sublime: it transposes or elevates the natural to the level of the supernatural, perception to 
imagination, understanding to reason.”94 Thus, although the object may seem at first to 
overwhelm the subject, it is only its sensory capacities that are threatened, because while the 
imagination strives against Reason, the subject is made aware that there are suprasensory 
Ideas which transcend the material object. Drawing away the subject from sensuous 
experience towards the recognition of the higher, transcendental power of Reason within 
itself, the sublime – instead of uncovering, like the beautiful, the purposiveness of Nature – 
helps disclosing the teleology of the subject’s own faculties. Whereas the beautiful is seen as 
a metaphysical principle, the sublime aspires to being a transcendental one, which involves 
the recognition of the supersensible dimension of Reason, shared by the subject only by 
transcending the limits of the world as given by the senses. It is this supersensible capacity 
of the mind that can be properly called sublime, and not those objects in nature which have 
been traditionally associated with sublimity (merely formless, horrific, chaotic objects). The 
sublime does not reside in nature, but is simply occasioned by “an object (of nature) the 
representation of which determines the mind to think the unattainability of nature regarded 
as a presentation of Ideas.”95 “[T]he sublime is that, the mere ability to think which shows a 
faculty of the mind surpassing every standard of Sense.”96 
Kant’s analysis goes on to distinguish the dynamical sublime as coming from 
“[n]ature considered in an aesthetical judgement as might that has no dominion over us.”97 
Such an enormously powerful natural force seems initially to cause the inadequacy of 
human capacities – the subject feels small and weak, like it could be easily overwhelmed 
and annihilated. However, Kant suggests that when faced with no immediate danger, we can 
recognise this force as fearful without being afraid, so that  
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we readily call these objects sublime, because they raise the energies of the soul above their 
accustomed height, and discover in us a faculty of resistance of a quite different kind, which gives us 
courage to measure ourselves against the apparent almightiness of nature.98  
 
This faculty of resistance is the sign of “a superiority to nature even in its immensity. 
[…] Sublimity, therefore, does not reside in anything of nature, but only in our mind, in so 
far as we can become conscious that we are superior to nature within, and therefore also to 
nature without us […].”99  
The sublime capacity of the mind to overpower the forces of nature introduces the 
concept of morality, for “a feeling for the Sublime in nature cannot well be thought without 
combining therewith a mental disposition which is akin to the Moral.”100 As for the 
beautiful, it also contains a moral element, even if less apparent, in the autonomy of 
aesthetic pleasure from sensuous pleasure. As for the sublime, the connection with morality 
is instead much more evident, because “morality is involved, not as play, but as legal or law-
directed labour” that acts through “positively valorised sensory experiences”101 – 
specifically, the passage from the affect or mood of shocked surprise (Verwunderung) to that 
of tranquil admiration (Bewunderung)102: 
 
The initial effect of the sublime, of a sudden encounter with colossal natural entities such as 
cataracts, abysses, and towering mountains, is one of shock or, says Kant, astonishment that borders 
on terror. […] By a play, a trick of the imagination, this terror is transformed into a feeling of 
tranquil superiority, the admiration one expresses for something or for someone one can afford to 
admire peacefully, because one’s own superiority is not really in question.103 
 
The dialectic of imagination and reason is here mediated by affects, moods and 
feelings rather than by rational principles: instead of indulging in the (delightful because 
unreal) terror of the mightiness of nature confronted, the imagination shifts to the tranquil 
satisfaction of superiority, submitting to the power of reason. As Kant himself put it, “the 
absence of affection (apatheia, phlegma in significatu bono) in a mind that vigorously 
follows its unalterable principles is sublime, and in a far preferable way, because it has also 
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on its side the satisfaction of pure Reason.”104 By shifting from a first sensuous reaction of 
shocked but pleasurable surprise to a sort of ‘alliance’ with reason, the imagination 
functions so as to reconquer mastery over a nature, whose most immediate threat has been 
overcome. This way, the subject achieves a state of self-possession that equals a morally 
elevated state of mind; such a condition of moral superiority can only be given by the 
submission of imagination to reason, whereby it spontaneously gives up its own natural 
freedom to the higher freedom of reason.105 
The imagination seems to work within the moral design of the sublime in an 
basically negative way, due to its elevation from a metaphysical to a transcendental or 
critical principle. In short,  
 
the loss of empirical freedom means the gain in critical freedom that characterises rational 
and transcendental principles. Imagination substitutes for reason at the cost of its empirical nature 
and, by this anti- or unnatural act, it conquers nature.106  
 
Thus, the imagination can achieve the aim of the sublime: it overcomes and becomes 
indifferent to the pain of empirical shock, reconciling it with pleasure. The sublime results 
from this movement of the imagination that organises the affects under the formalised and 
stable order of reason: “[t]he raising of this reflection of the aesthetical Judgement so as to 
be adequate to Reason (though without a definite concept of Reason) represents the object as 
subjectively purposive”107 – and so, as concerning both reason and practical judgement. 
After going through a crisis or loss of identity, together with a massive 
destabilization of its metaphysical certainties, the subject experiences in the sublime an 
infinite totality that carries it away from the pleasures of nature and elevates it to the highest 
moral degree. While its senses are being overwhelmed, the subject is abruptly reminded of 
its own finitude by having to face its own cognitive limits; in this very moment, still, the 
subject strains beyond them, which shows – in a sort of ‘negative transcendence’ – the 
infinity of moral Reason. In the dynamical sublime, feeling acts in favour of morality: 
thrown beyond its own sensory limits, the subject feels that Reason transcends the senses 
infinitely, and so that true, ‘moral’ freedom is beyond sensory cognition.108 If infinite 
totality cannot be comprehended nor dominated, it is precisely by feeling this lack or 
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incapacity that the subject can grasp the existence of moral Reason and its imprint within 
itself. Therefore, as one of Kant’s commentators put it, “the principle underlying [men’s] 
consent in judging of the sublime is the ‘presupposition of the moral feeling in man.’”109 
 
Within Kant’s philosophical system, the sublime seems to function as the bridge that 
links the empiricism of the aesthetic to his Transcendental Philosophy, guaranteeing the 
conceptual and architectonic unity of his system:  
 
In this modality of aesthetical judgements, viz. in the necessity claimed for them, lies an 
important moment of the Critique of Judgement. For it enables us to recognise in them an a priori 
principle, and raises them out of empirical psychology, in which otherwise they would remain buried 
amongst the feelings of gratification and grief […]. Thus it enables us to place the Judgement among 
those faculties that have a priori principles at their basis, and so to bring it into Transcendental 
Philosophy.110 
 
Accordingly, Kant argued that aesthetic judgements are subjective and universal at 
the same time: they are particulars incorporated into a law of the understanding, but they 
originate from a feeling; they appear to explain and organise the world, but in fact they 
spring from emotion. Nonetheless, since the essence of the subject transcends its own needs 
and desires, a truly subjective judgement would be untainted by its concrete particularity and 
“devoid of every possible condition which would necessarily distinguish the judge from 
other people.”111 Because of the nature of our immutable faculties, which are shared by 
every individual and work the same way in each one of them, Kant believed that subjective 
judgements of the aesthetic kind would arouse a sort of universal accord. This means that 
aesthetic judgement is capable of going beyond the accidents that may separate one 
individual from another, and to involve the very structure of human experience as shared by 
all of them. So, aesthetic judgement implies that the subject’s particular response is actually 
of the same kind as those experienced by every other individual, and that this necessarily 
elicits spontaneous and immediate agreement from them all.112 Aesthetic judgements are 
thus “impersonally personal,”113 or, as Kant himself put it, universally subjective.114 
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  Standing in-between the empirical and the theoretical, Kantian aesthetics reconnects 
the concrete particulars of reality to a kind of universal law, defining a third realm where 
individual subjects can revel in the knowledge that their very structural constitution 
predisposes them to mutual harmony. The aesthetic seems to reveal that human beings are 
always already in agreement because they are ‘fashioned’ to be in accord with each other: it 
is responsible for what Kant calls sensus communis, a kind of universal solidarity as opposed 
to doxa or common sense (an unreflective collection of opinions or prejudices on which, 
historically speaking, bourgeois utilitarianism was going to fuel itself). So, contrarily to the 
actual political domain, where individuals are bound together just externally and 
instrumentally to pursue egotistic ends, the ‘intersubjectivity’ that aesthetic judgement 
creates outlines a community of subjects united in the very structure of their being. Whereas 
a purely superficial sociality is restricted to utilitarian behaviour and needs the back-up of 
coercion, ‘aesthetic’ solidarity is one of inward, immediate and spontaneous consensus115, 
where “every member should surely be purpose as well as means, and, whilst all work 
together towards the possibility of the whole, each should be determined as regards place 
and function by means of the Idea of the whole.”116 
What Kantian aesthetics offers, then, is “an ideological paradigm for both individual 
subject and social order”117, since the aesthetic dimension here does not simply come from 
or represent, but is itself a society.118 Besides the production of the artefact and the ideology 
connected to it, aesthetics in the Modern Age relates to material reality by proposing itself as 
a paradigm on which bourgeois individual and society can be measured. In opposition to an 
actual social philosophy that revolved upon egotism and appetite, Kant envisioned in the 
affective law of the aesthetic that which could bring individuals together more freely and 
successfully than bourgeois possessive individualism was doing by the end of the 18th 
century.  
 
1.3 Aesthetics and Politics 
 
Starting out with Baumgarten as a discourse that would reconcile sense and spirit, the 
aesthetic, up to the second half of the 19th century, has found itself divided between two 
opposites: an anti-sensuous idealism and an inflexible materialism. Kant’s subordination or 
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dismissal of sensuousness in favour of Reason in the aesthetic dimension gives way to 
various forms of idealism – from the subjective idealism of ‘Romantics’ such as Fichte or 
Schiller which sees the aesthetic in opposition to material reality, to Schopenhauer’s rejection 
of factual history from the aesthetic, to Hegel’s inadequacy of the phenomenal realm to 
represent the infinity of the idea. It is only with the three most relevant philosophers in the 
realm of modern aesthetics – Marx, Nietzsche and Freud – that the implicit materialism of 
the aesthetic is retrieved from the burden of idealism which has hindered it till now. My main 
focus and theoretical background will be the philosophical revolution brought about by Karl 
Marx’s recollection of the body as the starting point of thought itself.  
 
1.3.1 Marx’s Aesthetic Revolution 
 
Marx’s early philosophical activity is mostly dedicated to thinking history and society 
through again from the standpoint of the body. “Sense perception” he wrote in the Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts (EPM),  
 
must be the basis of all science. Only when science starts out from sense perception in the 
dual form of sensuous consciousness and sensuous need – i.e. only when science starts out from 
nature – it is real science. The whole of history is a preparation, a development, for ‘man’ to become 
the object of sensuous consciousness and for the needs of ‘man as man’ to become (sensuous) 
needs.119 
 
Just as the discourse of aesthetics was born in order to rescue and organise the world 
of the senses, which an excessively objectivist rationality was threatening to suppress, so 
Marx warned that “a psychology for which this book [of the senses], the most tangible and 
accessible part of history, is closed, can never become a real science with a genuine 
content.”120 Almost a century after Baumgarten had turned sense perception into a 
supplement to reason, Marx seemed now to subvert their relationship, calling for a form of 
knowledge which would be grounded upon the material preconditions that establish different 
relations with the world. Starting from his Paris Manuscripts, Marx deconstructs the 
opposition between the aesthetic and the practical which was distinctive of idealist (or 
bourgeois) philosophy. He reconsiders the sense organs that capitalism has either alienated or 
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commodified as historical products and forms of social practice. Modern subjectivity is again 
acknowledged as a sensible body, and, consequently, as part of an evolving material history. 
By reconsidering the senses from a set of contemplative organs to the primary form of 
connection with reality, the German philosopher was able to turn the aesthetic into a 
sensuously-based science that placed sense perception at the roots of human action. Marx’s 
philosophical reflection has its starting point in the aesthetic belief that exercising one’s 
senses and cognitive faculties as a mere end in itself, without necessarily backing them up 
with utilitarian aims, is the accomplishment of human subjectivity. The actualisation of the 
senses is a necessity of human nature pleasurable in itself, so that, like the work of art, it 
needs no practical justification.121 Similarly to art, Marx characterises “‘true’ human 
production as the impulse to create in freedom from immediate need.”122 
 
[…] [N]ot only the five senses, but also the so-called spiritual senses, the practical senses 
(will, love, etc.), in a word, the human sense, the humanity of the senses – all these come into being 
only through the existence of their objects, through humanised nature. The cultivation of the five 
senses is the work of all previous history. Sense which is a prisoner of crude practical need has only a 
restricted sense. For a man who is starving the human form of food does not exist, only its abstract 
form exists; it could just as well be present in its crudest form, and it would be hard to say how this 
way of eating differs from that of animals […] the society that is fully developed produces man in all 
the richness of his being, the rich man who is profoundly and abundantly endowed with all the senses, 
as its constant reality.123 
 
In fact, the history of the modern, middle-class subject is for Marx synthesisable as an 
apparently self-asserting but actually self-defeating process of the human body. By means of 
those technical ‘extensions’ of itself such as society and technology, the subject tries to 
master or ‘assimilate’ the whole world into its own bodily structure, but finally overplays and 
annihilates itself, abstracting its own sensuous essence.124 Bourgeois society of mid-
nineteenth century, dominated by capitalist struggle and class conflict, abstracts the human 
body into a labouring, alienated body, in the attempt to appropriate and control its faculties 
for utilitarian ends. The ‘sensuous expression’ of this estrangement of the human subject 
from its own body is the dislocation of its sensuous fullness into the single drive to possess, 
embodied by private property: “All the physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by 
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the simple estrangement of all these senses – the sense of having. So that it might give birth 
to its inner wealth, human nature has been reduced to this absolute poverty.”125 According to 
Marx, capitalism causes sensory life to separate in two opposite directions, which are equally 
unauthentic and grotesque caricature of the human body. First of all, capitalist society 
reduces the sensuous plenitude of the body to a “crude and abstract simplicity of need.”126 
Through the instrumentalization that capitalism makes of it, the human body becomes 
trapped under a compelling, abstract law that turns it into a mere labouring body, from which 
sheer corporeal pleasure is displaced.    
 
By reducing the worker’s needs to the paltriest minimum necessary to maintain his physical 
existence and by reducing his activity to the most abstract mechanical movement […] the political 
economist declares that man has no other needs, either in the sphere of activity or in that of 
consumption […]. He turns the worker into a being with neither needs nor senses and turns the 
worker’s activity into a pure abstraction from all activity.127 
 
Thus, the capitalist casts the worker’s senses off, as well as his own: “The less you 
eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre, go dancing, go drinking, think, love, theorise, sing, 
paint, fence, etc., the more you save and the greater will become the treasure which neither 
moths nor maggots can consume – your capital.”128  
After estranging his (and the worker’s) sensory life for the sake of the capital, though, 
the capitalist is also able to re-build his alienated sensuality and transfer it into the capital 
itself, since “everything which you are unable to do, your money can do for you: it can eat, 
drink, go dancing, go to the theatre, it can appropriate art, learning, historical curiosities, 
political power, it can travel, it is capable of doing all these things for you.”129 If, on the one 
hand, sensuous life is reduced to bare need by capitalist society, on the other hand, it 
undergoes an equally alienating exaggeration: while the worker craves to satisfy basic 
material needs, the upper-class acquires the opposite desire to gratify his “reified, unnatural 
and imaginary appetites.”130 The human body under capitalism experiences then a profound 
fracture, which divides it drastically between whimsical idealism and base materialism. The 
                                                 
125 Karl Marx, op. cit., p. 352. 
126 Terry Eagleton, op. cit., p. 199. 
127 Karl Marx, op. cit., p. 360. 
128 Ibid., p. 361. 
129 Ibid. 




result is that the body’s sensory drives, whose capacities are rationalised and commodified, 
are alienated either as brute appetite or as redundant desires.131 
As a way to reinstate the body’s plundered faculties, Marx prescribes the supersession 
of private property, which 
 
is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and attributes; but it is this 
emancipation because these senses and attributes have become human, subjectively as well as 
objectively. The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object, 
made by man for man. The senses have therefore become theoreticians in their immediate praxis. 
They relate to the thing for its own sake, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself 
and to man, and vice-versa. Need or enjoyment have therefore lost their egoistic nature, and nature 
has lost its mere utility in the sense that its use has become human use.132 
 
According to Marx, ‘aesthetic’ life can be accomplished only by releasing the bodily 
drives from the tyranny of abstract and universalistic need, and by retrieving the object from 
utilitarian abstraction to the use-value given by its material particularity. Since the subjective 
concreteness of the human senses is the product of a complex material history, only an 
objective historical transformation can bring about the practical conditions in which such a 
sensuously-centred subjectivity might flourish. This is the point where the aesthetic most 
clearly identifies with politics: the emancipation of sensory experience from instrumental 
abstraction can only happen within the appropriate political preconditions – historically 
speaking, with the overthrowing of the bourgeois state relations.  
 
1.3.2 Marxist Disruptive Aesthetics: Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno 
 
In a combination of both Hegelian and Marxist aspects, it was György Lukács’s 
approach to aesthetics that in a way led the path to the following Marxist philosophers. With 
the progressive evolution of market capitalism into higher corporate forms in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries, the subject’s new experience of itself becomes more and more 
connected to passively serving a deeper controlling structure that thinks and acts in its place. 
Instead of the self-determining individual of early bourgeois society, in monopoly capitalism 
the subject is fractured and alienated from the world, which is impossible to comprehend as 
the product of its own free activity. What faces the new subject is a self-regulative system 
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utterly indifferent of human practice, whose processes are merely formal and autonomous 
from the laws of sensuous reality, which – in the words of György Lukács – “disintegrates 
into a multitude of irrational facts and over these a network of purely ‘formal’ laws emptied 
of content is cast.”133 To such a reified historical condition, where, as in the commodity 
form, the subject is dreadfully torn apart from an object drained of immanent meaning, form 
is separated from content, spirit from sense, the solutions that Lukács envisions are two: one 
is socialism, the other is the aesthetic.134  
Connecting literary form to ideas of collective historical development, the Hungarian 
philosopher first developed the Hegelian idea that literature reveals deeply in its form the 
specific epistemological issues of the age in which it was produced.135 According to Lukács, 
the work of art’s relation to its historical moment is not that of a simple mirror, but is enabled 
precisely by its autonomy from empirical reality, its status as a semblance or appearance. 
This allows the work of art to be essentially ‘realistic’: the place where phenomena of the 
material reality are recreated in light of their universal truth, where the artist penetrates “the 
laws governing objective reality and [uncovers] the deeper, hidden, mediated, not 
immediately perceptible network of relationships that go to make up society.”136  
According to the philosopher, the “theoretical and philosophical importance which 
the principle of art acquired” with the rise of bourgeois society is due to its  
 
creation of a concrete totality that springs from a conception of form orientated towards the 
concrete content of its material substratum. In this view, form is therefore able to demolish the 
‘contingent’ relation of the parts to the whole and to resolve the merely apparent opposition between 
chance and necessity.137 
 
Hence the political address of Lukács’s aesthetic realism, according to which 
“literature is a particular form by means of which objective reality is reflected”138 whose 
“great social mission” is “a  vital relationship to the life of the people, a progressive 
development of the masses’ own experiences.”139 
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If Lukács finds in the artefact a remedy against the reification of the commodity, 
Benjamin models his revolutionary aesthetics on its very structure only to dismantle it from 
the inside. With the leaking of inherent meaning from the object, any phenomenon is free to 
signify anything else: the unhinging of form and content of present society that the 
commodity embodies becomes the point of departure of the allegorical sign – itself a dead 
letter or piece of lifeless script. Allegory, like the commodity itself, is born out of the ruins of 
a lost immanent meaning, but turns the alienating effects of this loss embodied by the 
commodity into new, politically charged, aesthetic parameters. Benjamin’s theory of the 
allegory, in a way, ‘redeems’ the split between signifier and signified brought about by the 
commodity into a semantic polyvalence of the referent. When liberated from all mystifying, 
univocal immanence, the allegorical referent is left an arbitrary material signifier, a fragment 
which can be turned into a multiplicity of meanings. As in the commodity, the meaning is 
always outside the allegorical object, extrinsic to its material being, so that in the work of art 
they can be woven together in a set of estranging correspondences – as with the practice of 
the avant-garde, in montage, surrealism, dream imagery and epic theatre.140 
The work of art becomes thus a concretion of what Benjamin calls a “constellation,” 
which exemplifies his notion that the idea is not what governs the phenomenon as some 
abstract and immanent essence, but lies precisely in the conceptual articulation of those 
diverse and contradictory elements that make up its concrete manifestations: 
 
ideas are not represented in themselves, but solely and exclusively in an arrangement of 
concrete elements in the concept: as the configuration of these elements. […] Ideas are to objects as 
constellations are to stars. This means, in the first place, that they are neither their concepts nor their 
laws. […] It is the function of concepts to group phenomena together, and the division which is 
brought about within them thanks to the distinguishing power of the intellect is all the more 
significant in that it brings about two things at a single stroke: the salvation of phenomena and the 
representation of ideas.141 
 
The individual phenomenon, understood as an extremely condensed image of social 
processes, needs to be disarticulated and then reconstructed in order to yield them up. Such a 
fragmentary or ‘constellatory’ epistemology definitely surpasses the Kantian division of 
empirical and conceptual: by refusing the idea of some metaphysical essence lying behind 
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the phenomenon and leaving its heterogeneous component parts contradictorily articulated, it 
liberates the thing’s damaged, suppressed materiality. With its resistance to the abstract 
power of totality, the concept of constellation is in fact a blow to the heart of the traditional 
bourgeois aesthetic and political paradigm and its rigidly rationalistic hierarchy of values. 
Tearing asunder all false organicist unity brings about the emergence of a renewed aesthetic 
or politics of the body, since “[j]ust as the aesthetic for the eighteenth century involved that 
whole new programme of bodily disciplines we call manners, […], so for Benjamin the body 
must be reprogrammed and reinscribed by the power of the sensuous image.”142 If the 
reinsertion of the body into the concept is the original preoccupation of the aesthetic, it is all 
the more so with Benjamin, who gives his reflections a thoroughly materialistic inflection.143  
 
The return to the body inaugurated by Marxist philosophers is profoundly marked by 
the awareness that, in the wake of the Nazis, the whole aesthetic issue has become 
irretrievably disfigured by fascism, which, as argued by Theodor Adorno, “was the absolute 
sensation.”144 Humanity, according to Benjamin, had reached such a degree of “self-
alienation” that “it can experience its own annihilation as a supreme aesthetic pleasure. Such 
is the aestheticizing of politics, as practiced by fascism. Communism replies by politicizing 
art.”145 Fascist ideology – a degeneration of the idealistic identity of concept and 
phenomenon – is a manifestation of dominative reason, “the belly turned mind,”146 which 
appropriates (devours) otherness in order to annihilate it. The horrors of Nazi-fascism, as a 
matter of fact, originate in the reification of spontaneous aesthetic sensations, which turns 
them into corporeal pleasures determined and regulated by political ends. This meant that the 
body and its pleasures had been progressively turned into an absolute, affirmative category. 
This non-contradictory, organicist transformation would eventually reveal itself as both 
fictitious and dangerous, as shown by the fact that “in the Third Reich the abstract horror of 
news and rumour was enjoyed as the only stimulus sufficient to incite a momentary glow in 
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the weakened sensorium of the masses.”147 Behind the fascist ‘aesthetic’ state, there is the 
shadow of Auschwitz, of physical wretchedness, and of sheer, pointless pain.148   
After being tainted by mass society and fascism, the aesthetic discourse for Adorno 
can only start again not from the body’s pleasure but from the other side of it – the suffering 
body. Suffering is in fact the direct expression of the internal fissure the subject has 
experienced with the ‘irrational rationality’ of the identity principle, for which “there should 
be no contradiction, no antagonism.”149 What is required now is in fact “a rational critique of 
reason”150 that would deconstruct ideology’s ‘pure identity’ and recognise instead “identity’s 
dependence on the non-identical.”151 – a project that Adorno assigns to art precisely on the 
basis of its autonomous status within society. According to the philosopher, the autonomy of 
art, its ‘otherness’ from the social reality it comes from, is the fundamental condition for its 
very existence: an artwork is created through the inscription of specific contents into a 
conceptual or mental space, which then has a physical manifestation. Aesthetic space thus 
runs parallel to ‘the real’; it is an alterity to lived experience which exists in a world of its 
own. In fact, such an autonomy is the enabling basis for art’s strong connections to empirical 
reality.152 Although Adorno voiced criticism of explicitly political or ideological art,153 his 
argument for detached rather than committed art actually demonstrates that all art is 
intrinsically and inescapably political. As a matter of fact, Adorno conceives the aesthetic as 
essentially detached from the empirical and therefore always an implicit critique of the 
empirical. Such a notion asserts a socially critical role for all ‘authentic’ art, and at the same 
time it warns against falling into some utilitarian commitment to one-sided ideologies,154 
which would spoil art of its true essence.  
Therefore, the work of art is a material product of social labour, but it detaches itself 
ideologically from that very empirical world, by bringing forth another world, made of 
images, specular to the material one. At once deeply rooted in the productive structure of 
society and ideologically independent from it, “both autonomous and fait social,”155 art is the 
epitome of the emancipatory “non-self-identity” principle, for which it can speak critically of 
the same social system of which it is part:  
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[Art] is defined by its relation to what it is not. […] [It] acquires its specificity by separating 
itself from what it developed out of; […]. Only by virtue of separation from empirical reality, which 
sanctions art to model the relation of the whole and the part according to the work’s own need, does 
the artwork achieve a heightened order of existence. Artworks are afterimages of empirical life 
insofar as they help the latter to what is denied them outside their own sphere and thereby free it from 
that to which they are condemned by reified external experience.156 
 
According to the philosopher, the less socially referential art is, the more powerful its 
critique to the very material conditions that produce it is. It is only by virtue of its 
unperishable abstract form that artworks can speak up for the contingent sensuous world 
against the oppression of the identity principle, and realise thus a (negative) dialectical 
reconciliation of subject and object. “In the form of an image,” Adorno explains in the essay 
“Reconciliation under Duress,” 
 
the object is absorbed into the subject instead of following the bidding of the alienated world 
and persisting obdurately in a state of reification. The contradiction between the object reconciled in 
the subject, i. e. spontaneously absorbed into the subject, and the actual unreconciled object in the 
outside world, confers on the work of art a vantage-point from which it can criticise actuality.157 
 
Art, as a “non-regressive integration of divergences,” overthrows the domination of 
reason, becoming “the only remaining medium of truth in an age of incomprehensible terror 
and suffering,”158 in which “the hidden irrationality of a rationalised society is brought to 
light.”159 By emancipating things from their present empirical confinement towards the non-
existent, artefacts allow a “negative knowledge of the actual world,”160 thus expressing an 
unconscious desire to change empirical reality. [Still, this cannot but remain a desire, for it is 
only through the unresolved conflict between the rational and the sensuous that the work of 
art can bring valid consciousness of reality’s own dissonance.]  
The aesthetic, which was born as a way to reconcile sensuous reality with thought, 
becomes now what keeps the breach between them open instead: as “the negative imprint of 
the administered world,”161 art retains reality’s negativity and thus, by acting like “the 
                                                 
156 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
157 Theodor Adorno, “Reconciliation under Duress,” cit., p. 160. 
158 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, cit., p. 27. 
159 Terry Eagleton, op. cit., p. 351. 
160 Theodor Adorno, “Reconciliation under Duress,” cit., p. 160. 




critique of praxis as the rule of brutal self-preservation at the heart of the status quo and in its 
service,”162 it empties thought of any blindly affirmative urge over it.  
 
1.3.3 Sublime Means Dismantling 
 
In 20th-century philosophy and cultural criticism, the discourse on the sublime seemed 
to have been losing its central role in aesthetic matters, but then it was vibrantly revived by 
the end of the century. One of the key thinkers concerned with looking back at theories on 
the sublime of the past in order to make the present clearer is Jean-François Lyotard, as he 
does, for instance, when trying to give a proper definition of Postmodernism. In his 1982 
essay “Answering the Question: What is the Postmodern?” he pleas against the latent 
tendency of contemporary times “to give up experimentation in the arts and elsewhere,”163 
which he sees as a conservative strategy by which authority is gained over culture and life in 
any of its aspects. Lyotard recognises that this tendency is not limited to the contemporary 
historical period only, but is to be found within thought throughout time, whenever we are 
faced with “the same call to order, a desire for unity, identity, security and popularity.”164 
Inserted in the debate between ‘therapeutic’ art, aimed at protecting the consciousness from 
doubt, on the one hand, and, on the other, art that questions the rules of its predecessors 
bringing a split to the consciousness instead, the sublime becomes a key mode of aesthetic 
engagement in the postmodern era. As a matter of fact, the philosopher starts reconsidering 
the Kantian aesthetic sublime as the point “where modern art (including literature) finds its 
impetus and where the logic of the avant-garde finds its axioms.”165 Understanding the clash 
between the pain arising from the struggle of the Imagination and the pleasure derived from 
the superiority of Reason over the Imagination itself in terms of “a conflict between all the 
faculties of the subject, between the faculty to conceive of something and the faculty to 
‘present’ something,”166 the sublime embodies that crisis in which both the impossibility of 
the mind to organise the world rationally and its straining beyond its own edges are revealed. 
The sublime is the notion which displays how inadequate and incomplete any representation 
of the world which attempts at catching it and making it fully ‘presentable’ is, as is the case 
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with Realism, whereas “Modernity, whenever it appears, does not occur without a shattering 
of belief, a discovery of the lack of reality in reality.”167 Lyotard explains:  
 
I shall call modern the art which devotes its “trivial technique”, as Diderot called it, to 
presenting the existence of something unpresentable. Showing that there is something we can 
conceive of which we can neither see nor show […]. But how do we show something that cannot be 
seen? Kant himself suggests the direction to follow when he calls formlessness, the absence of form, a 
possible index to the unpresentable.168 
 
The philosopher then makes the case of modern – that is to say, avant-garde –  
painting, as founding its axioms on the concept of the “incommensurability between reality 
and concept implied by the Kantian philosophy of the sublime”169 and presenting something 
negatively, by avoiding representation or figuration at all. In doing so, avant-gardes develop 
the aesthetic of the sublime in terms of a work of ‘de-realisation’, which continually exposes 
“the artifices of presentation that allow thought to be enslaved by the gaze and diverted from 
the unpresentable.”170  
According to Lyotard, the sublime relationship between the presentable and the 
conceivable which unfolds the ‘retreat of the real’ and gives birth to modernity, though, can 
manifest itself in a twofold way: either by stressing the inadequacy of the faculty of 
presentation, and so the nostalgia for presence; or by stressing the power of the faculty to 
conceive instead, and the “jubilation which comes from inventing new rules of the game.”171 
There follows what Lyotard calls the differend, which leads to the formulation of what the 
Postmodern is: 
 
[T]he modern aesthetic is an aesthetic of the sublime, but it is nostalgic; it allows the 
unpresentable to be invoked only as absent content, while form, thanks to its recognisable 
consistency, continues to offer the reader or spectator material for consolation and pleasure. But such 
feelings do not amount to the true sublime feeling, which is intrinsically a combination of pleasure 
and pain […].The postmodern would be that which in the modern invokes the unpresentable in 
presentation itself, which refuses the consolation of correct forms, refuses the consensus of taste 
permitting a common experience of nostalgia for the impossible, and inquires into new presentations  
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– not to take pleasure in them but to better produce the feeling that there is something 
unpresentable.172 
 
Thus, Lyotard’s definition of the Postmodern allows us to draw and underline in 
retrospect the most fundamental aspect of the sublime: it always brings about the questioning 
of pre-established rules and given categories, destroying the illusion to reconcile the concept 
and the sensible and totalise them into a unity, the price of which illusion is, according to the 
philosopher, the terror that hides “beneath the general demand for relaxation and 
appeasement.”173 
 
Lyotard brings the argument further in his 1984 essay “The Sublime and the Avant-
Garde”, taking the hint from Barnett Newman’s essay “The Sublime is Now” (1948), which 
understands the sublime as something ‘here and now’, to be found within those works of art 
which do not seek to be a representation of something outside them, but are rather simply a 
presentation of themselves. He starts from this modernist interpretation of the sublime as the 
happening (the Heideggerian Ereignis) in order to operate a revision of the notion throughout 
history that would throw a new light on the present status of art; namely to set out the 
significance of the avant-garde. With the premise that sublime has its nearest synonym in 
immanent, the elements that emerge as underlying every reformulation of the sublime from 
Pseudo-Longinus to Burke and Kant are: “unsureness” or indeterminacy (Boileau’s je ne sais 
quoi); the “discrepancy” between thought and the real world; disarray or destruction of 
harmony and the abandonment of rules.174 Lyotard synthesises the characteristics of this 
disarray as follows: 
 
[T]he artist is no longer guided by a culture that made him the object and master of a message 
of glory. Instead, he has become the genius, an involuntary receptacle of inspiration which comes to 
him from some “je ne sais quoi.”  Public judgement no longer relies on the traditional criteria of 
shared pleasures. […] The question is no longer to please a public by bringing it into a process of 
identification and glorification, but to surprise it. […] Even imperfections  –  aberrations of taste, 
ugliness –  play a role in this shock appeal. Art would no longer imitate nature but would create a 
whole other world, eine Zwischenwelt (a between world), as Paul Klee would later say, eine 
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Nebenwelt (a side world), one could say, where monstrosity and malformation have rights because of 
sublime potential.175 
 
There lies, according to the philosopher, the significance of the avant-garde’s 
belonging to the aesthetic of the sublime: in its effort to record “the occurrence of a 
perceivable ‘now’ as something unpresentable that remains to be presented.”176 The first 
consequence of the sublime politics of questioning the received state of things is art’s 
abandonment of its traditional identifying role in relation to the community, which is very 
likely to bring to a situation of isolation and misunderstanding, most of the times to 
repression too. Sublime art, such as the avant-garde is, is never welcome among communities 
that constantly strive in its opposite direction – they feed the unity of thought and language, 
the wholeness of the subject, the uniformity of history; they create appeasement and 
relaxation so that they can maintain order, security and authority. The sublime, instead, 
works against the illusion of totality: it focuses on the inexpressible, aggravates identity 
crises, enlarges the anxiety of the void; “is a stranger to consciousness and cannot be 
composed in terms of it. Rather, it is what dismantles consciousness, what dismisses 
consciousness; it is what consciousness cannot formulate, and even what consciousness 
forgets in order to compose itself.”177  
Lyotard’s final remark that “[t]he sense of the sublime is the name of the 
dismantling”178 actually sums up the importance of that notion in the history of aesthetics and 
its real-life implications. Taking the hint from such a theoretical impulse, the following work 
aims at showing how the sublime can be created within the work of art, and how its 
dismantling effect works in relation to material reality. 
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The Cinematic Sublime 
 
After exploring the origin of the sublime and its role within the history of aesthetics, 
my purpose in this chapter is to retrace how this notion and its dismantling power comes 
alive in cinema. What I call the “cinematic sublime” results from the combination of the 
characteristics attributed to this concept throughout history: as the etymological meaning of 
the term implies, the cinematic sublime is still a matter of ‘elevation’ of the mind, raising 
excitement and astonishment in the viewer. But instead of being connected to a mere 
rhetorical device, the sublime originates from the whole process of ποίησις or aesthetic 
creation in cinema. As for the cinematic sublime, the call for surprise or shock in the 
audience, the urge of raising doubts, uncovering clashes, and elevating the mind to the 
awareness of reality’s disorder emerge in the peculiar relationship the cinematic medium 
establishes with the material world.  
 
2.1 Sublime as “Impure Aesthetics” 
 
The first essential implication of the “cinematic sublime” is the deep interaction 
between the work of art and the larger social and cultural context in which it is produced and 
received. As the previous chapter shows, throughout its history, aesthetics has hardly ever 
been detached from what is often deemed its opposite – the political.  
 
The appearance of the aesthetic as a category in its own right is deeply interwoven 
with the historical situation of mid-eighteenth-century Europe, to the great revolutions of the 
Enlightenment and the changes they brought in the ways in which man conceptualised 
himself, his relations to others and to the world around him. Considering the birth of such a 
category as a product of modernity, we can observe that the conceptualization of art came 
alongside, and partly as a consequence of, those economic, social, and political changes 
running through from the eighteenth century. As a matter of fact, the idea of the aesthetic 
emerged while Western European societies were experiencing the economic ‘take-off’ that 




closely entangled with the main processes of its time such as the development of 
commodity-production under capitalism, “simultaneously a mirror-image of and a site of 
resistance to it.”1 The concurrent emergence of the idea of the autonomous artwork and the 
development of an autonomous commodity economy is significant to understand the role of 
aesthetics – as is the more general process of reification (the creation of self-perpetuating 
systems functioning according to their own laws) out of which modernity was born.2 The 
epistemological system in which the aesthetic began to rise was characterised by those 
conceptual differentiations that had already appeared during the Early-Modern era, which 
inevitably affected the formulation of aesthetics and its subsequent value. In particular, the 
split between subject and object, the barrier between human perception and external reality 
(theorised by Kant but retraceable at the roots of the Early-Modern period) conceptualised 
the world as a fragmented, objectified, alien realm, indifferent or hostile to a separate human 
subjectivity, consequently immersed in a crisis of meaning and self-definition. The culture 
of modernity is therefore differentiated, fragmented into separate, autonomous spheres, and 
that constitutes not just a decisive pre-condition for the emergence of the aesthetic as a 
category in its own right, but also determined its function. The permanent crisis of meaning 
that defines modernity is itself – and crucially – the ground that gives birth to the modern 
notion of the aesthetic.3  
Increasingly cut loose from the certainties of the old worldview, which grounded and 
provided guarantees for it, the emerging modern subject must find from within himself the 
foundations of a modern epistemology. In the context of a new understanding of the human 
subject, aesthetics is meant to be the ‘science’ that articulates the complexities of affective 
experience as a whole – so that what is said and thought about artworks is closely bound up 
with a developing vision concerning the nature of human experience generally.  Aesthetics 
in this period, then, does not exclusively concern art; rather more widely, it considers how 
we are formed as subjects, and how as subjects we go about making sense of our 
experience.4  
 
Where could [aesthetic pleasure] be placed in a world divided radically between subjects and 
objects? Was art a commodity, to be measured by the exchange-value it acquired in the market 
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place? Or was it an anti-commodity, one that defied the abstractness and cultural levelling of the 
market and gave access to a more authentic, genuine realm of market-transcendent values? Could it 
produce knowledge of this external world and simultaneously begin to give it meaning? Could it 
function in the new, reified world somehow to bring back into modernity the sense of meaning that 
was characteristic of pre-modern culture?5 
 
The aesthetic was precisely the field in which all of these possibilities began to be 
discussed, while they were accordingly enacted and explored within the concrete practices 
of the arts. In all of its autonomy and fictitiousness, the aesthetic seemed to offer a 
privileged access to the meaning of a reified and irremediably fragmented reality. As Alan 
Sinfield puts it, art is “one set of practices within the range of cultural production; a 
“discourse”, we might say, meaning the working assumptions of those involved in those 
practices, together with the institutions that sustain them.”6 Consequently, aesthetics is not 
an objective category of value, but a discourse that has been built and developed in order to 
affirm, or challenge, various sets of value in our cultures. The main function of the aesthetic 
is thus to attend to how art “functions in the social order – considering the kinds of human 
possibilities that it promotes, and may be made to promote; how it acts to sustain the 
prevailing power relations, and affords opportunity for dissidence and new understanding.”7  
 
Going back to some of the basic contributions to the construction of modern 
aesthetics, even in Kant’s ahistorical approach, it is clear that aesthetics was seen from the 
beginning as a sphere of human interaction with (and organization of) the world. In 
particular, aesthetic theories in the eighteenth century begin to play an unusually central, 
decisive part in the constitution of the dominant bourgeois ideology. The emergence of the 
modern notion of the aesthetic artefact itself coincided with the rise of the early-bourgeois 
class-society, and of a whole new form of subjectivity connected to that social order. What 
allows this linkage between modern aesthetics and bourgeois ideology is, first of all, the 
start of a material process by which cultural production becomes “autonomous” of the 
various social functions it has traditionally served: “[o]nce artefacts become commodities in 
the market place, they exist for nothing and nobody in particular, and can consequently be 
rationalised, ideologically speaking, as existing entirely and gloriously for themselves.”8 It is 
precisely this notion of the autonomy or self-referentiality the ‘ideological’ peculiarity of the 
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new aesthetic discourse, because it does not simply imply that art is isolated from all other 
social practices to become a sort of refuge from society’s actual values of competitiveness, 
exploitation and material possessiveness. Rather, art’s self-regulating and self-determining 
mode of being offers the middle class a fitting ideological model of subjectivity. This 
concept of autonomy is the main contribution of the aesthetic to the construction of the 
modern subject: while liberating concrete particularity by valuing sensuous faculties as 
radical ends in themselves, modern aesthetics also serves the external purpose of building up 
what was going to be the dominative middle-class ideology.9 The appearance of the 
philosophical discourse on the aesthetic in the eighteenth century can be seen as part of that 
historical process by which the modern (bourgeois) subject has built itself both practically 
and theoretically. In the context of the construction of this new subject and of the relative 
world order, what matters of the aesthetic is “not in the first place art”, but, on a larger scale, 
its contribute to “the massive introjection of abstract reason by the life of the senses”, and to 
“the process of refashioning the human subject from the inside”.10  
As we have seen, Kant’s third area of human judgement, by remaining ‘autonomous’ 
or pleasurable in itself, brings to a consciousness of our cognitive faculties, an awareness of 
human powers over nature. His notion of the aesthetic outlines within the subject’s own 
experience a profound reconnection to material reality, apparently healing the fissure 
between subjectivity and the phenomenal world. If with Enlightenment rationalism the 
object is drained of its immanent meaning to restore the subject’s primacy, the aesthetic with 
Kant works as a way to readjust the object’s sheer materiality to the subject’s transcendental 
faculties: in the aesthetic judgement, “objects are uncovered which seem at once real yet 
wholly given for the subject, veritable bits of material Nature which are nevertheless 
delightfully pliant to the mind.”11 As a matter of fact, the aesthetic seems to offer is the 
appropriate illusion of a material world which is not indifferent to human beings and their 
cognitive capacities. As one of Kant’s commentators wrote: 
 
It is a great stimulus to moral effort and a strong support to the human spirit if men can 
believe that the moral life is something more than a mortal enterprise in which he can join with his 
fellow men against a background of a blind and indifferent universe until he and the human race are 
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blotted out forever. Man cannot be indifferent to the possibility that his puny efforts towards moral 
perfection may, in spite of appearances, be in accord with the purpose of the universe […].12 
 
This capacity in turn allows Kant to say that the aesthetic experience harmonises the 
whole person, laying the basis for his disciple Friedrich Schiller to claim in his On the 
Aesthetic Education of Man that aesthetics should be the basis of humanistic education.13 As 
a matter of fact, Schiller’s thoughts on aesthetics were basically a development of Kant’s 
idealistic notion that the aesthetic is a realm of shared human understanding, and that it can 
bring about a reconciliation of man with the natural. The poet-philosopher reworked Kant’s 
aesthetic realm as part of a historical-ethical theory of human development, a progress of 
man that goes from a merely instrumental relationship to nature, to a recognition of its 
beauty, to a final stage of morality. This passage is crucially allowed only by going through 
the Bildung of aesthetic education: by involving both reason and sense, and thus healing the 
fracture between subject and object, the aesthetic creates a realm of equality on which social 
harmony can finally be modelled. Following Schiller’s utopian and Romantic development 
of Kant, both Hegel and Marx’s aesthetic started from considering the individual, organic 
artwork within a larger historical context, conceptualising artistic form as essentially 
imprinted by the historical moment in which the artwork is produced. While Hegel re-
thought the aesthetic in terms of his own historicising system as a manifestation of Geist, 
Marx borrowed the vision of art as an expression of an ever-evolving human history, but 
inserted it in his materialistic rather than spiritual view of such a development. Art, like 
labour, was thus inevitably involved in the alienating private-property system, and could be 
distorted into a highly specialised and differentiated activity that became then a commodity 
on the market.14 Such materialistic arguments by Marx and his followers established a 
connection between the aesthetic and the political which is essential to the notion of 
“cinematic sublime” I am going to develop.  
In Marx’s philosophical view, aesthetics and politics cannot be distinguished from 
one another. Unlike bourgeois idealism, he believes that the senses are already both objective 
and subjective, concrete actuality and individual interiority at once, for the emancipation of 
which certain objective material preconditions are necessary. Therefore, sensuous faculties 
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and social institutions are in a way complementary, different sides of the same 
phenomenon.15  
The discourse of aesthetics is thus also a political discourse, which addresses the 
alienation between reason and sense rooted in modern class-society, where the abstract, 
universalistic equality of individuals passes over their concrete differences and inequalities. 
Bourgeois society separates drastically the “abstract, artificial man, man as an allegorical, 
moral person” of the political state from the subject of civil society in its “sensuous, 
individual and immediate existence.”16 There follows that, according to Marx, “real human 
beings, real society” appear only as “formless, inorganic matter.”17  
Such a dislocation between abstract and concrete, spirit and desire, is surpassed 
within the aesthetic dimension. The work of art embodies in itself a reconnection of the 
sensuous and the rational, by bringing to light the roots of human rationality hiding in the 
needs and capacities of the material body. It is in the fully ‘aesthetic’ realisation of human 
needs and capacities that the body abandons individualistic, abstract usefulness, and is able to 
connect with a shared social world, where its own needs and desires are considered alongside 
those of others. This way, the body and its concrete interests are at the roots of and actually 
dictate apparently abstract matters such as justice or morality, and all those matters according 
to which societies are established and administered.18 Aesthetic emancipation, then, implies 
or rather contains in itself political emancipation, in which “real, individual man resumes the 
abstract citizen into himself and as an individual man [becomes] a species-being in his 
empirical life, his individual work and his individual relationships.”19 Within the work of art, 
abstract function and material condition are one thing: the aesthetic for Marx is thus the 
practical, critical activity in which – as in the communist social order he prospects – 
humanity is emancipated from all kinds of instrumentalization and re-conquers power over 
itself. 
 
Marx’s vision of the aesthetic will be variously adapted by the historical-materialist 
philosophers of the 20th century in light of the new socio-political conditions of bourgeois 
society, starting from György Lukács. According to the philosopher, the work of art is an 
answer to the commodified existence that capitalism brings about – in opposition to the 
commodity, it reunites form and content, subject and object, as each of its elements is at 
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once autonomous yet subordinated to the law of the whole. In the many-sided totality of the 
artefact, individual particulars are mediated through the structure of the whole, becoming 
universal with no damage to their sensuous specificity.  
Lukács’s aesthetics, although it somehow opened the way to Marxist criticism, was 
nonetheless too structurally faithful to bourgeois aesthetics not to be refuted by the historical 
materialist philosophers to come. Among them, Walter Benjamin’s aesthetic thought disrupts 
the very possibility of thinking in terms of bourgeois ‘totality’ or even of Marxist teleological 
hope. In such a materially and spiritually bankrupt world as that which caused Nazi-fascism 
and the Second World War, only a fragmentary, chaotic work of art can hold a significant 
relation towards reality precisely by foregrounding the torments of its time. Benjamin’s 
notion of “constellation” blasts open the continuum of a history that is actually collapsing 
into fragments, and whose meaning can be ripped only from its ruins rather than its fake 
harmonious unity. Benjamin’s revolutionary aesthetics is in fact intrinsically political: the art 
he envisions, deviant and discarded from the continuum of history, is the attempt to explore 
and explode the contradictions of a commodified present. The fragmentary work of art, while 
subverting traditional categories such as beauty, harmony, unity, aims at stopping the 
totalising, dominative relation between humanity and the world exasperated by the 
contemporary political situation.  
Adorno’s re-elaboration of the idea of art as an autonomous semblance is especially 
relevant to this matter. According to it, the artwork’s form, while differentiating it from 
empirical reality, is nonetheless the result of the very cultural moment that produced it. As 
Adorno explains,  
 
an emphasis on autonomous works is itself socio-political in nature. […] it is to works of art 
that has fallen the burden of wordlessly asserting what is barred to politics. […] This is not a time for 
political art, but politics has migrated into autonomous art, and nowhere more so than where it seems 
to be politically dead.20 
 
While – and because – not explicitly political, art for Adorno carries significant 
political implications. Since the aesthetic relations immanent to artworks are in a dialectical 
relationship with their opposite (that is, the social relations of empirical reality), in the 
aesthetic form “social development is reproduced without being imitated.”21 It is precisely in 
the resistance of their form to society that artworks “reveal themselves as the wounds of 
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society; […] The socially critical zones of artworks are those where it hurts; where in their 
expression, historically determined, the untruth of the social situation comes to light.”22 The 
work of art, with its the negation of the dominative ‘identity principle,’ implies then the 
destabilization of any totalising visions of reality, so that “[a]bstaining from praxis, art 
becomes the schema of social praxis: Every authentic artwork is internally revolutionary.”23 
The socially critical essence of the artwork becomes visible only in the cultivation of 
consciousness – in Adorno’s historical situation, it is the consciousness of the wounds 
inflicted on humanity by its own predatory reason that art has to create or to keep alive.  
  
Such a materialist view of aesthetics is the starting point of Hugh Grady’s 
considerations, according to whom “art’s sensuousness and playfulness allow it to 
interrogate the practices of the present and its iron cages of distorting ideology. Art’s very 
playfulness allows it to be a means of political, social, and cultural critique.”24 While its 
separateness from the material world could make us think of art as a secular religion, the 
absence of any conceptual truth-claims implied by ordinary discourse makes its status totally 
fictive, imaginary, and playful. Precisely because of its non-assertiveness or playfulness, art 
is perceived as dream-like, socially harmless, and is thus allowed to be the depositary of all 
kinds of ‘dangerous’ (not purely aesthetic) material – a sort of licensed space where the non-
aesthetic can be ‘safely’ contained and performed. The idea that art’s proper reception is one 
of disinterested aesthetic pleasure, a state of total denial of ‘real’ matters, leads in its turn to 
the idea that the aesthetic is a privileged placeholder for those residues of material reality 
otherwise displaced or repressed.25 Although the artwork is constitutionally exempt from 
any form of ideological policing, it not only draws materials from its larger social context, 
but also gives voice to aspects of reality that escape conceptualization, or cannot be 
represented by denotative or ordinary language. 
In relation to this vision, Grady talks about the occurrence of an “impure aesthetics”, 
which “contains the ugly as well as the beautiful, and references rather than denies reality 
while acknowledging an element of domination within it as well as one of emancipation.”26 
Taking the hint from the Marxist approach to aesthetics of the Frankfurt School 
philosophers, Grady’s argument is part of a larger discourse that reverses the post-
structuralist tendency to decontextualize art from its social milieu, purposes, and 
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intertextuality. His position actually opposes the reduction of art either to a version of 
ideology (typical of Communist-influenced critical writings), or to an irrationalist practice 
(typical of contemporary Postmodernist critics). Grady supports this vision by pointing out 
that art’s irrationality and its radical separation from existing reality is valid only if 
aesthetics is considered as a narrow discourse about beauty and unity, which denies rather 
than challenges what is outside the aesthetic realm.27  
Grady refers to Nietzsche’s comment on the relation of the aesthetic to rationality as 
groundbreaking in this regard. In his very earliest work, The Birth of Tragedy, the 
philosopher defined its two opposing tendencies as the Apollonian and the Dionysian: the 
Apollonian is the mode of order, logic, rationality, and visual images; whereas the 
Dionysian is the surging passion, the will-to-power at the heart of Being. Both are crucial 
aspects of the aesthetic, which find a perfect balance, for instance, in the tragedies of 
Aeschylus and Sophocles. As Nietzsche’s argument develops, it becomes clear that the 
Apollonian is actually an illusion of order and rationality, while the Dionysian stands for the 
true chaos and irrationality of reality. This fundamental Nietzschean insight has been picked 
up and expanded with Marxist ramifications above all by Adorno, in whose conception art 
becomes “a revelation of Dionysian forces uneasily contained in Apollonian forms”28; as the 
philosopher eloquently argued:  
 
The definition of aesthetics as the theory of the beautiful is so unfruitful because the formal 
character of the concept of beauty is inadequate to the full content […] of the aesthetic. If aesthetics 
were nothing but a systematic catalogue of whatever is called beautiful, it would give no idea of the 
life that transpires in the concept of beauty.29  
 
In opposition to the unity of the artwork promoted by classical aesthetic writers, 
Adorno re-discovered the aesthetics of disunity, of incompleteness and fragmentation 
constructed by contemporary Post-modernist art and critical theory. According to the 
philosopher, 
 
Art must take up the cause of what is prescribed as ugly, though no longer in order to 
integrate or mitigate it or to reconcile it with its own existence through humour, that is more 
offensive than anything repulsive. Rather, in the ugly, art must denounce the world that creates and 
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reproduces the ugly in its own image, […]. [A]rt decries power […] and stands witness for what 
power represses and disavows.30 
 
Some of Adorno’s remarks review the Kantian concept of sublime also serve the 
negative dialectics of his aesthetic. Transferring the natural sublime to art, the philosopher 
creates analogies between the two realms, according to which 
 
[w]orks in which the aesthetic form, under pressure of the truth content, transcends itself, 
occupy the position that was once held by the concept of the sublime. In them, spirit and material 
polarise in the effort to unite. Their spirit experiences itself as sensually unrepresentable, while on the 
other hand their material, that to which they are bound external to their boundary, experiences itself 
as irreconcilable with the unity of the work.31   
 
Kant’s doctrine of the sublime is applied to the very concept of art emerging from 
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory – that is, “an art that shudders inwardly by suspending itself in 
the name of an illusionless truth content, though without, as art, divesting itself of its 
semblance character.”32 Originating in nature’s escape from the ruling law of spirit, the 
sublime is thus reinterpreted as eternal dissonance speaking against domination. 
Accordingly, for Adorno, “[t]he ascendancy of the sublime is one with art’s compulsion that 
fundamental contradictions not be covered up but fought through in themselves; 
reconciliation for them is not the result of the conflict but exclusively that the conflict 
becomes eloquent”33 – which paves the way to an artistic form that reveals reality’s own 
dissonance.   
Following Adorno’s challenge to the notion that what the Romantics called “organic 
unity” is the sole aesthetic form, Grady focuses on an expansion of the term ‘aesthetics’ 
beyond its traditional attributes, the purely beautiful and the organically unified. The main 
function of older classical emphasis on unity is to create an Apollonian aesthetic, one that 
imposed order by suppressing or marginalising the Dionysian, ‘dangerous’ content of art. 
On the contrary, as argued by Jonathan Dollimore, the more recent development in critical 
practice of a hermeneutics that celebrates disunity has opened the text up to reveal its 
fissures, its faultlines, its ‘other’.34 A challenge to the idea of aesthetic unity is the essential 
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in order “to think of the artwork as disunified, as constituted by internal clashes of discourse, 
and by the insubordination of repressed materials.”35 As the history of aesthetics itself 
demonstrates,  
 
the idea of the aesthetic, like all our concepts, is a social construct, a signifier whose 
signified derives from a series of intricate networks, within itself, and with the fragmented world of a 
complex new, ‘modern’ society. For these reasons, […], the aesthetic is intrinsically ‘impure’ – it is 
a place-holder for what is repressed elsewhere in the system; it develops as an autonomous practice 
but participates in the market economy, the social-status system, the political world, the religious 
communities, and private life.36  
 
Opposed to the classical Apollonian aesthetic and its emphasis on beauty and unity, 
this kind of aesthetics is ‘impure’ in that it is made of Dionysian incompleteness and 
fragmentation, which reject any totalising formal order. This kind of aesthetics manifestly 
fails to cohere, and consists of fissures and faultlines instead, which expose the artwork’s 
constitutional “openness”, and allow its continuous reworking. Such works of art cannot be 
self-sufficient, an ideal whole, because their form is made by gaps, silences and absences. 
As Pierre Macherey argues in his Theory of Literary Production, 
 
When we explain the work, instead of ascending to a hidden centre which is the source of 
life (the interpretive fallacy is organicist and vitalist), we perceive its actual decentred-ness. […] The 
literary work gives the measure of a difference, reveals a determinate absence, resorts to an eloquent 
silence.37 
 
In other words, the inside of such artworks is defined by their outside, by what they 
are not, so that they inform us of “the precise conditions for the appearance of an utterance, 
and thus its limits, giving its real significance.”38 History, Macherey argues, is not in an 
external relation to the work;  
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it is present in the work, in so far as the emergence of the work required this history, which is 
its only principle of reality. […] Thus, it is not a question of introducing a historical explanation 
which is stuck onto the work from outside. On the contrary, we must show a sort of splitting within 
the work: this division is its unconscious, in so far as it possesses one – the unconscious which is 
history, the play of history beyond its edges, encroaching on those edges: this is why it is possible to 
trace the path which leads from the haunted work to that which haunts it.39 
 
More than that, we may say that any work of art is “history itself.”40 For instance, 
Macherey observes that literary language 
 
imitates the everyday language which is the language of ideology. We could offer a 
provisional definition of literature as being characterised by this power of parody. Mingling the real 
uses of language in an endless confrontation, it concludes by revealing their truth.41  
 
This way, literature “reveals the gaps in ideology.”42 As a matter of fact, the gaps 
and faultlines of the artwork manifest moments at which its ideological project is under 
special strain. As Nicos Poulantzas observed, “ideology has the precise function of hiding 
the real contradictions and of reconstituting on an imaginary level a relatively coherent 
discourse.”43 Impure aesthetics may thus be considered the other side of ideology – as a 
discourse that reads for incoherence, inextricably connected to a worldview that constantly 
threatens disruption and to its unresolved issues.   
 
The “cinematic sublime” I am going to develop relies on this idea of an ‘impure’ 
aesthetic, and demonstrates the dismantling effects and intentions it implies. As we have 
concluded in the previous chapter, “[t]he sense of the sublime is the name of the 
dismantling”44: accordingly, such a concept finds its concrete sources precisely in the work’s 
formal disunity, incompleteness and fragmentation, as given by the negation of traditional 
rules and canons; the subversion of pre-established categories, and those aesthetic 
manifestations which make disorder and disproportion their founding elements. The 
disruptive power of the sublime is triggered through the rejection of the “norms of the 
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beautiful life” and the shocking emergence of “those things repressed and denied”45 in art as 
well as in society. By admitting displaced, marginalised or repressed material in its form, art 
acknowledges the existence of the Dionysian incompleteness and fragmentation in reality 
too, contributing to the break from the uneasy Apollonian illusion of unity. As we shall see, 
the sublime within the work of art proceeds by questioning pre-established rules and given 
categories, by destroying the illusion of a rational unity between the concept and the 
sensible, by reproducing reality’s cracks and fissures, and bringing the split further into the 
viewer’s consciousness. Both form and subject of such works of art consist of fissures and 
faultlines, which challenge totalising visions of reality.  
Cinema is the field in which I am going to explore the exchange between the work of 
art and the material context of both its production and reception. In light of the 
“dismantling” function that the sublime has historically assumed in such a relationship, my 
interest is to retrace how this notion can work within the cinematic medium – in particular, 
when it adapts or appropriates Shakespeare’s plays. The further step in order to retrace the 
“cinematic sublime” in filmic adaptations of this kind, then, is outlining the fundamental 
features of the passage from the Shakespearean source to the cinematic medium. 
 
2.2 Adapting and Appropriating Shakespeare 
 
Etymologically rooted to the Latin verb adaptare (“to adjust”; “to alter”; “to make 
suitable”46), adaptation is understood as the process of making a text “fit” for a different 
generic, temporal, geographical or cultural context. It can be a simple transpositional 
practice, recasting a text from a specific genre into another, or making it closer to new 
audiences by means of temporal, geographical, cultural or linguistic shifts (“proximation” or 
“updating”). Adaptation can also be an amplificatory procedure, more profoundly engaged 
with the source text either by commenting on its politics, revising it or offering analogues 
and supplements by means of alteration or addition (“re-writing”; “re-vision”).47 In many 
cases, adaptations involve the transition to a different medium (“re-mediation”), with the 
intersemiotic transposition of the text from one sign system to another (“transmutation” or 
“transcoding”),48 because, as Benjamin put it, “[t]he medium through which works of art 
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continue to influence later ages is always different from the one in which they affect their 
own age.”49 
The practice of appropriation, on the other hand, is distinguished from that of 
adaptation on the basis of its affecting “a more decisive journey away from the informing 
source into a wholly new cultural product and domain.”50 The source text is moved from one 
cultural realm or interpretive frame to another, which often radically alters or re-shapes its 
meaning to different (sometimes opposite) ends. Whereas adaptations usually signal their 
relationship with an informing source text (as with Olivier and Branagh’s Henry V), 
knowledge or awareness of the ‘original’ may not even be necessary in order to enjoy the 
product of appropriation as an independent, stand-alone work (although they would certainly 
deepen and enrich our understanding of it; such is the case of My Own Private Idaho by Gus 
Van Sant). The word “appropriation” itself (“to make one’s own”) implies not just a 
transposition, but also “an exchange, either the theft of something valuable (such as property 
or ideas) or a gift, the allocation of resources for a worthy cause […]”51, by which the source 
material becomes one’s own. Springing from Marxist criticism, the term retains the 
connotation of a struggle in order to reclaim or wrest something of value from unwilling or 
hostile hands.52 
But setting aside issues of ‘ownership’ like originality, authorship and intellectual 
property rights, the practices of adaptation and appropriation could also be thought of as 
forms of collaboration across time and sometimes across culture or language that results in 
manifestly “hybrid”, multi-layered works of art or intertexts, similar to “meeting places of 
different species.”53 The source text, produced in one medium and in one historical and 
social context, and later transformed into another text, produced in a different context and 
relayed through a different medium, forms thus “a dense informational network, a series of 
verbal cues which the adapting […] text can then selectively take up, amplify, ignore, 
subvert, or transform.”54 Being the creation and reception of a work of art a material, social 
and economic matter as much as a cultural, personal, and aesthetic one, the change in the 
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material production is bound to a whole series of alterations – like shifting cultures and 
therefore sometimes shifting languages or ideological systems, historical and therefore also 
socio-political situations – that can reveal much about the work’s new context. For instance, 
works of art can acquire different meanings and have a certain cultural and social impact 
other than that of the source text, sometimes depending on the specific impulses and 
ideologies (personal and historical) that moved their re-creation. In Hutcheon’s words, 
 
[a]daptation, like evolution, is a transgenerational phenomenon. […] Stories do get retold in 
different ways in new material and cultural environments; like genes, they adapt to those new 
environments by virtue of mutation – in their “offspring” or their adaptations.55 
 
Adaptation, in this sense, is a process whereby a source text is reinterpreted through 
new grids and parameters which, in revealing aspects of the period and culture of the source 
text in question, also tell us something about the ambient and the moment of its re-
creation.56 By giving visible, audible and perceptible form to the objective, material 
conditions among which the work has been reimagined, “adaptations engage the discursive 
energies of their time,” becoming “a barometer of the ideological trends circulating during 
the moment of production.”57 As Bakhtin wrote, “[e]very age reaccentuates in its own way 
the works of [the past]. The historical life of classic works is in fact the uninterrupted 
process of their social and ideological reaccentuation.”58 
 
The transition of texts to different contexts or ‘owners’ that takes place with the 
process of adaptation/appropriation raises, in the first place, the fundamental ontological 
question of the nature and identity of the source text itself. This is basically what happens 
with Shakespeare, whose works are always being made new, re-made, by this process, for 
“[a]s long as there have been plays by Shakespeare, there have been adaptations of those 
plays.”59 His works’ availability for rewriting means that they are texts in constant flux and 
metamorphosis within the re-interpretation and re-creation that adaptation entails. As a 
matter of fact, the ongoing discourse that adapts or appropriates Shakespeare has been 
valuable or even useful over time as a way of handling each era’s own dilemmas:  
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Shakespeare is a powerful cultural token. He is already where meaning is produced, and 
people therefore want to get him on their side – to hijack him, we might say – as they do Madonna or 
the pope. […] The “universal” Shakespeare usually means the one we want to recruit as ratification 
for our point of view; with stunning presumption, we suppose that we have discovered the true 
version, whereas earlier generations were merely partial.60 
 
As many scholars have observed, the scarcity of information about the ‘historical’ 
Shakespeare is one of the things that make his plays extremely open to interpretation and 
appropriation.61 It is all the more so when we consider not only the poet’s physical absence 
(his corpse missing – probably stolen – from his grave), but also his authorial absence from 
the moral universe of his plays – what Michael D. Bristol calls “Shakespeare’s radically 
disembodied and culturally promiscuous character.”62 The notion of an ‘authentic 
Shakespeare’, as that of an authentically Shakespearean text, is actually always a social 
construct that depends on the historical and contemporary standards of cultural institutions, 
on their audiences and on their interpretative conventions as well.63  
So, far from functioning as an objective yardstick against which to measure the 
supposed accuracy or ‘faithfulness’ of adaptations, Shakespeare’s works are utterly unstable 
and subject to change, continually taking shape over time. The ‘original’ text is not a fixed 
and stable entity that clearly pre-exists the process of adaptation and thus can offer a secure 
and stable ground for it; on the contrary, it goes through an ongoing development which 
takes place within adaptations themselves, up to the point that “[t]he potentially infinite 
series of variations by means of which the work is ‘ontologised’ (Grigely 110) bears witness 
to the status of the work as an irreducibly unfinished entity.”64 Thus, not only do adaptations 
emblematise “an iteration that […] invokes and displaces a textual ‘origin’”65, but they also 
“articulate a process whereby the ‘original’ is (retroactively) produced and re-marked as that 
which is being surrogated, and just as it is being surrogated, which confounds the boundaries 
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between ‘before’ and ‘after’, ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.”66 The very 
possibility of adaptation/appropriation seems to contaminate the essence of a work, in that it 
is (de-)structured from within by reproducibility and iterability67: adaptations are in fact 
texts generated by and generating other texts in an ongoing whirl of intertextual reference, 
transformation and transmutation that has no clear point of origin nor ending. 
 
As a matter of fact, the identity of Shakespeare’s works is intimately related to 
adaptive issues: Shakespeare himself was an active adaptor/appropriator of myth, fairy tale, 
and folklore, as well as of the works of various specific writers like Ovid, historians like 
Plutarch or chroniclers like Hall and Holinshed.68 He then had to transfer the stories he 
gathered from his (usually written) sources to the stage and so make them fit for a new kind 
of strategies, as well as for a new kind of audience. There is a huge difference, though, 
between recording history in books and representing history in the theatre. On the one hand, 
both individual and cultural memories inevitably shape the past in accord with present 
desires. Records of events are consequently not neutral, objective facts, but texts, 
etymologically products of the process of texere (Latin verb for “to intertwine”; “to 
fabricate”; “to compose”69), which implies the non-homogeneous mixture of different 
elements. Marjorie Garber, for instance, underlines the deformed nature of texts by pointing 
out that a writing hand is at the same time the instrument and the most visible sign of the 
interrelationship between time and deformation.70 According to the critic, “that which is 
written is deformed, twisted out of shape, imbued with ‘strange defeatures’”71 – a word 
meaning both “undoing, ruin” and “disfigurement; defacement; marring of features.” “De-
feature” alludes to the double effect of writing, since to deprive one of his/her features is 
also to cause one’s defeat or ruin. Accordingly, the deforming or de-featuring power of 
writing is at its most with what one age will call ‘history writing’ and another ‘propaganda’, 
often marking political defeat. 
On the other hand, turning a written text into a theatrical performance takes much of 
such de-featuring power away. Plays do not tell facts, but make them happen again, enliven 
them, making the past present and allowing audiences vicarious emotional participation; 
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“[o]n the stage it is always now; the personages are standing on the razor-edge, between the 
past and the future, which is the essential character of conscious being. […] The theatre is 
supremely fitted to say: ‘Behold! These things are.”72 The liveliness of the theatrical 
representation, its being always here and now, allows an active and critical response by the 
audience interacting emotionally with the characters and events; moreover, people watching 
a play are obviously more ready to express doubts about the credibility of actors playing 
their parts on a stage than about a printed, authoritative book. In short, theatrical 
performance implies the transformation of historical facts into fiction (or μύθος), a process 
through which history itself can be exposed in its questionability and denounced as a partial 
and distorting representation. 
Therefore, the peculiar ability of Shakespeare’s work to cross the boundaries of 
historical, cultural and linguistic difference is first of all due to the unstable nature of drama 
itself, for which every single performance could be considered a specialized form of 
translation or an adaptation already. Generically situated at the intersection between text and 
performance,  
 
every drama text is an incomplete entity that must be ‘translated’ by being put on stage. 
Adaptation is, therefore, only an extreme version of the reworking that takes place in any theatrical 
production […]. Theatre is always a form of reworking, in a sense the first step toward adaptation.73  
 
As an inherently adaptive art, the dramatic form encourages incessant re-imagining 
and reworking, up to the point that each staging, as a collective interpretation, changes over 
time, and often (more or less openly) works so as to acknowledge contemporary issues or 
concerns. As for Shakespeare’s drama, its use of history and other sources is itself part of a 
process of adaptation that begins with a critical reinvention of so-called ‘given’ facts. 
Shakespeare’s plays are far from serving as a reliable history, because they do not attempt in 
any exacting way to recollect or rehearse the past, so that no totalising model of history 
emerges from them: they do not uniformly enact God’s providential design, nor do they 
inevitably assert the truth of a Machiavellian Realpolitik. Even the different formal strategies 
experimented (such as homiletic tragedy, saturnalian comedy, epic history) are often 
entangled in unconventional combinations that bring discordant visions of history into 
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contact and conflict, oscillating between tragedy and comedy.74 Historical material is itself 
often reordered or even ignored; events are selected, sometimes invented, so that the 
playwright does not merely dramatize what he finds on the pages of the chronicle, but 
dresses history with dramatic purpose or power, structuring it in order to give it a shape that 
cannot be found in the historical records. Shakespeare’s use of history consists in selecting, 
shaping, amplifying, and frequently in adding to chronicle material, up to the point that his 
adaptation of history to theatre results in a dialectical confrontation with matters such as 
human political behaviour, the desire for power, or men’s response to gaining and to being 
deprived of it.75 Shakespeare’s dramatic reinvention of his sources, through processes of 
selection and manipulation, brings out clashes and contradictions, disrupting the totalising 
visions of apparently seamless ideologies like Providence or the State. The aesthetic form of 
Shakespeare’s drama thus inscribes itself more clearly within the dimension of μύθος as 
opposed to that of λόγος: its representation of characters and events is unbound from the ties 
of rational and moral certainties, projecting the spectator among obscure and 
incomprehensible forces from which no rational order of things can be drawn.  
 
The adaptiveness of Shakespeare’s plays is still more evident if we consider how 
their texts are not even stable in their documented tradition, but maintain the incompleteness 
or openness of texts that have to be performed, and so constantly modified so as to be 
adapted. Although it is sometimes assumed that the printed text of Shakespeare’s plays 
provides the fixed, ‘original’ point against which to monitor theatrical production, such 
appeals are hindered by the inability to determine what actually and practically constitutes 
that text. Certain irregularities in the text (as in Hamlet or A Midsummer Night’s Dream) 
seem to be evidence of multiple, perhaps revised versions; incongruences in (to name but a 
few) spelling, layout, word choice, word order, and punctuation can be found between 
different editions of a single play, such as the earliest quarto and the Folio editions; or even 
variations among copies of a single edition (such as the 1623 Folio) can be due to major 
improvement of the early modern printing system – these are just some examples 
underlining the unstable textual condition of Shakespearean drama. To these, current 
processes of editorial emendation, regularization, and modernization have to be added, 
because they influence and determine substantially modern editions that circulate today.76 
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Shakespeare’s own apparent unconcern for publishing his plays during his lifetime may 
suggest that he was less interested in preserving them as ‘original’ texts than in simply 
providing material for performances – which are by definition only immediately relevant 
and therefore ephemeral. In a way, each of Shakespeare’s plays confirms Kidnie’s 
definition, according to which “a play, for all that it carries the rhetorical and ideological 
force of an enduring stability, is not an object at all, but rather a dynamic process that 
evolves over time in response to the needs and sensibilities if its users.”77 
 
Shakespeare’s theatre, then, finds its sovereign force in the performative act, as it is 
not simply a kind of histrionic practice which “recaptures or restates the authority of the 
text”78, but an ‘opened-up and expanded’ transformation of it also by virtue of a dynamic 
exchange with the audience. Thanks to the literary, rhetorical or compositional quality of 
Shakespeare’s text (a text which is not complete in itself, but constitutionally open and in 
need of the player’s active interpretation), the performance of his plays was able to create a 
link between the playwright’s words and the audience, and contribute to the socially relevant 
condition of the theatrical institution in the Elizabethan age. The openness of Shakespeare’s 
plays and the ambiguity of their language allow first of all a dialectical relationship with the 
social and cultural context in which they were produced, by which they were capable of 
uncovering and exacerbating the crises emerging during the Elizabethan and Jacobean Age. 
As Alan Sinfield underlines, Shakespearean texts, like other texts, are profoundly embedded 
in the thick of the cultural production of their time and the histories from which they derive. 
Shakespeare did not envisage full or even coherent subjectivities nor historical events, but 
actually caught those ambivalent or partial signs of modernity as they were beginning to 
emerge in the Early-Modern period. His plays seem to lay out the very process by which the 
modern subject gets constituted, and by which the modern era is rising – accordingly 
resulting ‘unformed’, lacking of coherence and unity. 
 
Indeed, it is because of this that we can appropriate them [Shakespeare’s texts] so 
conveniently – it is the mismatch with present-day assumptions that allows us to make what we will 
of them. […] The inventiveness of directors and the subtleties of critics are designed, precisely, to 
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bridge the historical gap. Shakespeare keeps going because these strategies keep him going; he is 
relevant because he is perpetually interfered with.79   
 
Shakespeare’s texts may be a powerful tool for the emergence of certain issues 
simply because he did not sort them out in what we would call ‘modern terms’ properly, 
which makes them fall short of a unitary or univocal vision.80 Writers such as Shakespeare 
don’t manifest a static and unchanging truth; rather, every reading of a Shakespeare play 
already invites an appropriation, an active process which involves both its re-interpretation 
and then its re-creation.  
As a matter of fact, the playwright’s availability is his most appreciated cultural 
value, thanks to which “each new generation attempts to redefine Shakespeare’s genius in 
contemporary terms, projecting its desires and anxieties onto his work.”81 Re-inventing 
Shakespeare according to the different understandings and media typical of each age is a 
process which already began with the publication of his collected works in the 1623 First 
Folio, a volume that claimed to transpose (faithfully) Shakespeare’s plays from the stage to a 
printed book. For the following 300 years, Shakespeare was divided between page and 
stage, which did not just co-exist but also competed for cultural supremacy. The old 
exchange between page and stage was altered with the cinematic re-invention of 
Shakespeare’s work in the twentieth century, which brought about a whole new series of 
cultural meanings.82 In the case of contemporary adaptations/appropriations of 
Shakespearean plays to the cinematic medium, the generic transposition invariably makes 
the source text fit also for different historical, cultural, linguistic or socio-political contexts. 
The resulting work is always in a reciprocal relation to the Shakespearean source, for both 
the subject and the object are changed in the adaptive process.83 Shakespearean content has 
in fact been defined as “freely commutable from medium to medium, period to period”84 – it 
is neither media- nor historically specific:  
 
On the twentieth century, for example, Henry V has been re-envisioned as a play about the 
Second World War, Vietnam, the Falklands crisis, and more recently the two Gulf wars. If drama 
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embodies within its generic conventions an invitation to reinterpretation, so the movement into a 
different generic mode can encourage a reading of the Shakespearean text from a new or revised 
point of view.85 
 
Retracing Shakespeare’s circulation through different ages and places requires thus 
an engagement with both literary and socio-political history, for “in a sense all Shakespeare 
films are translations,” creative attempts “to recast and reimage a work conceived in a 
different language and for a different culture.”86 Issues of remediation are then inseparably 
accompanied by issues of historical and ideological recoding: the changes in the genre, 
narrative, characters, tone or language of the Shakespearean source reveal the lines of 
cultural force at play in a particular historical moment. Beside situating us in history, 
moreover, adaptation also shapes and organises the most private aspects of experience, so 
that acts of appropriation can be intensely personal as well as political: “[t]o the extent that 
appropriation is a performance of identity, it offers possibilities for cracking the codes of 
ideology and provides glimpses of realities that as yet have no name.”87 The subversive 
quality of Shakespeare’s genius is then simultaneously aesthetical and political; as John 
Joughin points out, “in the process of helping to situate and contest existing contemporary 
cultural norms concerning truth, value and meaning it follows that, just as Shakespeare 
becomes aesthetical, he becomes political and contentious too.”88 Accordingly, the dialogic 
interaction between the source text and the new contexts in which adaptation situates it is 
not only generated by, but also generates in its turn ideological implications. Since my main 
interest is to examine the specific impulses and concerns, both personal and historical, 
involved in various acts of adaptation and appropriation of Shakespeare’s works, I shall first 
underline the role that the cinematic medium has in bringing them out.  
 
2.3 “The Written Language of Reality” 
 
As for medium specificity, filmic adaptations/appropriations re-interpret and re-
invent Shakespeare by their own cinematic nature. With the move from written text to film, 
from telling to showing mode, the audience is caught in an unrelenting, forward-driving 
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story that involves the realm of direct sensuous perception. Visual, aural and kinetic 
representations always have a visceral impact, provoking affective responses in the 
audience: the world that cinematic technology mediates (or re-creates) for us is materially 
present before our eyes and our ears; yet, it is devoid of its essence, for we cannot physically 
enter that reality nor act within it. Much of the hostility that early cinematic theorists and 
spectators have manifested towards the cinematic medium comes precisely from the latter 
quality, and goes a long way back in Western thought: rooted in the Platonic debasement of 
the world of phenomenal appearance, the fear and distrust of images is usually motivated by 
their supposedly dangerous power to corrupt the mind by overwhelming reason and thus 
raising ‘lower’, sensuous passions. Far from the invisible and true realm of Ideas, visual 
forms are traditionally considered ontologically unstable and the material affects that they 
excite all the more illusory and suspect. Even more related to the problem of cinema’s status 
is Jean-Louis Baudry’s reading of Plato’s allegory of the cave as a prototype of the 
cinematic apparatus itself: as Plato’s prisoners in the cave mistake the shadows projected on 
the wall for reality, so do cinema spectators equate screen projections with the real world.89 
Film images, like the shadows in the cave, are considered as a simulated, hallucinatory 
“impression of reality”90, “vacuous, degraded, and insubstantial projections” that, “by a kind 
of ideological-optical illusion”, inflame the spectator with a “regressive, fantasmatic 
desire.”91 
In traditional film theory, cinematic images are then accused of being empty and 
impotent, unable to support the articulations of discourse or to embody the truth: bodies 
without souls, they are flat and insubstantial, devoid of interiority and substance, unable to 
express anything beyond themselves. For this reason, the cinematic image is most of the 
time described in terms of a lack: as Kaja Silverman puts it, “[f]ilm theory has been haunted 
since its inception by the spectre of a loss or absence at the centre of cinematic production, a 
loss which both threatens and secures the viewing subject,” and which is in the first place 
one of “the absent real and the foreclosed site of production.”92 Images are thought to be 
untrue, then, because of their distance from the actual situations which they claim to 
represent. They are likewise detached from the material conditions of their production – 
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nonetheless, they persevere in furnishing deceptive “reality effects” and “compensatory 
fantasies of plenitude and possession.”93 
Such a prejudicial iconophobia is, at the same time, a demonstration of just how 
powerfully and unwarrantedly the ‘mere’ and fictitious image of material reality can affect 
the human mind and senses. Contrary to the general trends of cinema theory, on the practical 
side, as spectators, it is difficult to deny that the object of images is quite never felt as 
missing, neither distant nor absent from them. As Maurice Blanchot suggests, the image – 
unlike the word or other signs – does not offer a representational substitute for the object, 
but, rather, is the material trace or residue of the object’s failure to vanish completely: “[t]he 
apparent spirituality, the pure formal virginity of the image is fundamentally linked to the 
elemental strangeness of the being that is present in absence.”94 Like a ghost, “[t]he image is 
not a symptom of lack, but an uncanny, excessive residue of being that subsists when all 
should be lacking. It is not the index of something that is missing, but the insistence of 
something that refuses to disappear.”95 The apparent emptiness or superficiality of images 
could be redefined as a consequence of their residual and iterative nature, which obviously 
resists any kind of limit imposed by being ‘here and now’, circumscribed into the definition 
of space and time. ‘In between’ truth and illusion, presence and absence, being and non-
being, images do not ontologically exist, yet they are under our eyes all the time, re-
appearing in an endless repetition. Their fleeting and empty iterations threaten to get back at 
and confound those very bounds holding together the ‘thing’ which they reproduce as 
residual simulacra of it, blurring the difference between ‘original’ and ‘copy’, essence and 
shadow, reality and imagination. Far from manifesting Bazin’s “transference of reality from 
the thing to its reproduction”96, reality itself is neither transferred nor preserved; rather, it is 
irreversibly altered by the very act of reproduction and repetition.97 This “hypermimetic 
simulation”, to follow Deleuze and Guattari, disqualifies both the original and the copy, for 
“[i]t carries the real beyond its principle to the point where it is effectively produced.”98 The 
same goes for sounds, which, like images (and images in movement) are isolated by 
mechanical recording devices from the dominant order of discursive comprehension. Speech 
acts in film are likewise ‘deterritorialised’, disarticulated, freed from their referents, 
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becoming material scraps of sound which reacquire the pure materiality that the 
abstractedness of the linguistic system had taken away from them. As with moving images, 
the reproduction and consequent iteration of sounds allow the technology of mechanical 
reproduction to substitute “a plurality of copies for a unique existence. And in permitting the 
reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the 
object reproduced.”99 Images and sounds alike are then “reactivated”, intensified in their 
effect (and affect) on the real precisely by being cut off from the referential frame of 
everyday life and by being remade as part of a (mechanically reproducible) work of art. 
 
Cinema, maybe more than any other art forms, demonstrates how works of art do not 
merely signify or represent, but ultimately re-produce within their formal laws the same 
processes of the material reality behind them. This implies that cinematic perception is of a 
different kind from ‘natural’ perception: what we see and hear on the screen short-circuits 
the processes of signification by which we identify and give name to things. Hegelian 
cognition is substituted by raw, artistic sensation, disengaged from the transcendental 
conditions supposed to ground and organise it, as well as from the referential coordinates 
that allow us to locate and preserve it: “[s]heer appearance precedes any possible act of 
cognition; film shows before it says.”100 As Pier Paolo Pasolini observes,  
 
mentre la comunicazione strumentale che è alle basi della comunicazione poetica o filosofica 
è già estremamente elaborata, è insomma un sistema reale e storicamente complesso e maturo – la 
comunicazione visiva che è alla base del linguaggio cinematografico è, al contrario, estremamente 
rozza, quasi animale. Tanto la mimica e la realtà bruta quanto i sogni e i meccanismi della memoria, 
sono fatti quasi pre-umani, o ai limiti dell’umano: comunque pre-grammaticali e addirittura pre-
morfologici (i sogni avvengono al livello dell’inconscio, e così i meccanismi mnemonici; la mimica 
è segno di estrema elementarità civile ecc.). Lo strumento linguistico su cui si impianta il cinema è 
dunque di tipo irrazionalistico: e questo spiega la profonda qualità onirica del cinema, e anche la sua 
assoluta e imprescindibile concretezza, diciamo, oggettuale.101 
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Irreducible to cognitive meanings and instrumentalities, the cinematic image 
liberates the spectators from the contingencies of their own existence, so that, both 
metaphysically and ideologically alienated, they are projected into a world of sheer 
sensation. Cinematic perception, composed of the unconscious epiphenomena of empirical 
experience sublated and denied by cognition, is multiple and anarchic, nonintentional and 
asubjective: “the sensory exploration of the world through film [is] the exploration of the 
chaos of visual phenomena that fills space.”102 Chaos itself is, according to Pasolini, the 
source for the cinema author, who, instead of pre-coded signs, is allowed to choose among 
infinite possibilities or shadows of an automatic, direct and oniric communication.103 The 
infinite possible images cinema shares with dreams, memories and fantasies are the most 
common and at the same time the most private experience one has of reality: as with 
dreaming, cinema picks up and combines fathom-like reproductions of the world everybody 
sees everyday into a new, highly subjective compound which is then objectively reproduced. 
As Pasolini puts it,  
 
i processi dei sogni e della memoria, sia involontaria che, soprattutto, volontaria, sono degli 
schemi primordiali di una lingua, cinematografica, intesa come riproduzione convenzionale della 
realtà. Quando noi ricordiamo, proiettiamo dentro la nostra testa, delle piccole, interrotte, contorte o 
lucide sequenze di un film. Ora tali archetipi di riproduzione del linguaggio dell’azione, o tout court 
della realtà (che è sempre azione), si sono concretati in un mezzo meccanico e comune, il 
cinematografo. Esso non è dunque che il momento “scritto” di una lingua naturale e totale, che è 
l’agire nella realtà. Insomma il possibile e non meglio definito “linguaggio dell’azione” ha trovato 
un mezzo di riproduzione meccanica, […] che ne rispetterebbe la totalità, è vero, ma anche il mistero 
ontologico, l’indifferenziazione naturale ecc.: una specie di memoria riproduttiva senza 
interpretazione.104    
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As a most intimate re-creation of reality, cinematic images share the immediate basis 
of subjectivity of memories and dreams: the filmmaker’s choice of possible images is more 
or less unconsciously determined by his/her own ideological and poetical vision of reality, 
so that cinema corresponds primarily to an act of communication with oneself or self-
expression, which would define it as what Pasolini calls “una lingua di poesia”105 ( “a 
language of poetry”). On the other hand, the common background from which these images 
are taken as ‘shadows’ or ‘ghosts’ of the real thing makes them also brutally elementary and 
objective, belonging to a type of ‘communication with others’, immediate and direct. These 
two essential and oxymoronic aspects of cinema are inseparably bound together both in the 
moment of creation and in that of reception.  
 
As a matter of fact, film’s objective reproduction is inextricably mingled with an 
utterly subjective response. Being a work of mechanical reproduction, film is able to break 
with traditional hierarchies of representation and penetrate with no mediation the matter of 
life in its constant flux, allowing what Georges Bataille calls “the direct interpretation, 
excluding all idealism, of raw phenomena.”106 When mechanically reproduced, the real is 
fragmented; beings and things get separated, and their component parts become independent 
from one another. Any distinction between subject and object, observer and observed is 
likewise extinguished; categories, parameters and laws are irreversibly altered in the 
cinematic reproduction of reality.  
While being a new, displacing (re-)construction of the real, completely devoid of 
consistence and mechanically reproduced, film affects in an unmediated and visceral way 
the spectator’s body and mind. In the moment of its reception, a film – physically seen and 
heard – has a real, concrete impact on the senses: it affects our stomach, heart and skin, and 
is re-elaborated through neural structures and visuo-motor schemata. When watching a 
movie, images excite the retina 24 times a second: such a speed is slow enough for stimuli to 
be impressed and recorded, but it is too fast to allow the viewer to be conscious of such a 
process. Perception becomes thus unconscious: like dreams, cinematic images are 
incessantly imprinted upon the retina in such a way as to never allow them to be absorbed 
                                                                                                                                                                  
its natural lack of differentiation, etc.: a sort of reproductive memory without interpretation.” (The translation 
from Italian to English is mine) 
105 Id., “Il ‘Cinema di Poesia’”, cit., p. 180. 
106 Georges Bataille, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939, trans. and ed. by Allan Stoekl, 




into aware and immediate processes of comprehension.107 The world we see through the 
movie camera is violently imposed upon us spectators, so that it cannot be viewed 
unaffectedly or from a safe distance as a cognitive, graspable object. Leaving behind the 
intellectual engagement of the cognitive faculties, perception becomes only a matter of 
bodily affection and alteration, instead of developing into a series of representations for the 
spectator to recognise. The experience of watching a movie is obstinately immediate, 
concrete and pre-reflexive; the spectator is invited, or compelled, by the immediacy, speed 
and rawness of this image and this sound to indulge within the orbit of the senses, thus 
threatening to disrupt his/her frame of reference. Whereas the ‘conscious’, objectifying 
contemplation obeys a law of separation that keeps the intense and intolerable presence of 
Otherness at a safe distance, film ignores (and so subverts) the master-slave relationship 
between the subject and its world. It compels us to be face to face with that Otherness which 
can never be incorporated nor expelled, forcing its immediate, affective and non-
conceptualizable contact on us. By abolishing the distance between my body and the 
multiple, changing bodies of Otherness, “the cinematic affect” dissolves any other kind of 
boundary and outline too. The new, blinding contact with the Real that cinema thus creates, 
overcoming the acquisitive mastery of the gaze, threatens to rupture also the relations of 
power it generates. The radical juxtaposition of discontinuous elements created through the 
editing process, for instance, undermines any possibility of a fixed centre of perception, and 
the related laws of spatial contiguity, linear temporality and causal succession.   
 
What Benjamin (1969) calls “the physical shock effect” (p. 238) of film viewing disrupts the 
traditional, historically sedimented habits and expectations of vision; it undoes the transcendental 
and phenomenological structures that claimed to regulate perception and to ground and unify the 
ego. 108 
 
Again similarly to dreams, films affect the spectator by driving him or her into such 
an excessive intimacy that the contours of the ego are dissolved and the requirements of 
coherence and closure that govern phenomenal and intellectual experience are transgressed. 
What engages in a cinematic experience is no longer a ‘subject’, for the “tactile”109, visceral 
contact with images and sounds in which the spectator is drawn tends to efface fixed 
identities and to blur boundaries between inside and outside, self and other. Within the 
                                                 
107 See Robert Stam, op. cit., p. 6; and Steven Shaviro, op. cit., pp. 50-51. 
108 Steven Shaviro, op. cit., p. 33. 




spatial and temporal flux that cinema creates, any static reference, identification and 
objectification becomes impossible. At once desirable and threatening, the cinematic 
experience dislocates any self-identity and stability of meaning, and substitutes them with 
the incessant metamorphoses of inconsistent appearances. Such a process is precisely what 
allows cinema to be in constant interaction with the real; because, as Benjamin puts it, film 
penetrates into material reality non in spite of, but directly as a result of, its constructedness: 
 
In the film studio the apparatus has penetrated so deeply into reality that a pure view of that 
reality, free of the foreign body of equipment, is the result of a special procedure – namely, the 
shooting by the specially adjusted photographic device and the assembly of that shot with others of 
the same kind. The equipment-free aspect of reality has here become the height of artifice, and the 
vision of immediate reality [has become] the Blue Flower in the land of technology […].Hence, the 
presentation of reality in film is incomparably the more significant for people of today, since it 
provides the equipment-free aspect of reality they ate entitled to demand from a work of art, and 
does so precisely on the basis of the most intensive interpenetration of reality with equipment.110  
 
As the product of distorting techniques such as photographic representation, camera 
movement and – above all – editing, the aspect of reality offered through cinematographic 
artifice is free of all the cognitive, ideological “equipment” that could obtrude a raw, 
contingent and multiple approach to sensation. Film has the potential, in other words, not so 
much to penetrate reality as to penetrate the phantasmagoria that distorts and conceals reality 
from the human sensory and cognitive capacities; it captures the basic, raw conditions of life 
and speaks directly to the spectators’ unconscious. It does so by furthering “insight into the 
necessities governing our lives,” by accentuating “hidden details in familiar objects,” by 
exploring “commonplace milieu,” and by assuring us of “a vast and unsuspected field of 
action.”111 
 
Our bars and city streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our 
factories seemed to close relentlessly around us. Then came film and exploded this prison-world with 
the dynamite of the split second, so that now we can set off calmly on journeys of adventure among 
its far-flung debris. With the close-up, space expands; with slow motion, movement is extended. And 
just as enlargement not merely clarifies what we see indistinctly “in any case,” but brings to light 
entirely new structures of matter, slow motion not only reveals familiar aspects of movements, but 
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discloses quite unknown aspects within them – aspects “which do not appear as the retarding of 
natural movements but have a curious gliding, floating character of their own.”112 
 
The deepening of apperception inside the structures of the physical world brought 
about by cinema is possible thanks to the substitution of a space informed by human 
consciousness with the unconscious, since “[i]t is through the camera that we first discover 
the optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through 
psychoanalysis.”113 With its capacity to isolate, disrupt and deform an object, the camera 
includes aspects of reality which lie outside the normal spectrum of sense impressions, and 
whose uncanniness is thus appropriated by collective perception. Given that for Benjamin 
the cinematic medium gives expression to those fundamental transformations in the domains 
of form, perception, and even experience that are the signature of a new era, its political 
ramifications are unambiguous. Thus, his critical attention towards film is not least 
motivated by film staging most dramatically the interface of aesthetics and politics:  
 
The technical revolutions – these are fracture points in artistic development where political 
positions, exposed bit by bit, come to the surface. In every new technical revolution, the political 
position is transformed – as if on its own – from a deeply hidden element of art into a manifest one. 
And this brings us ultimately to film. Among the points of fracture in artistic formations, film is one 
of the most dramatic.114  
 
According to Benjamin, the shock-quality of film poses a twofold challenge: on the 
one hand, in its refusal of facile continuity, it corresponds to a collective, distracted model of 
reception that serves as an alternative to the individual absorption and contemplation 
characteristic of the bourgeoisie’s cult of art. The iconic and privileged status of the 
individual work of art in Western tradition is founded on the recognition of its uniqueness, 
authenticity and authority. Its main feature is what Benjamin calls “aura”, by which he 
means “a strange tissue of space and time: the unique apparition of a distance, however near 
it may be.”115 A work of art may be said to have an aura if it claims a unique status based 
less on quality, use value, or worth per se than on its figurative distance from the beholder: a 
kind of psychological inapproachability, or authority, claimed for the work only on the basis 
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of its position within a tradition. For Benjamin, integration into the Western tradition or 
canon is equivalent to an integration into cultic practices, according to which the work of art, 
as it is transmitted in time, is also fetishized. 
When contemplated as a fetish, a distanced and distancing object that exerts an 
irrational and incontrovertible power, the work of art attains a cultural position that lends it a 
sacrosanct inviolability, as well as keeping it in the hands of a privileged few. The “auratic” 
work of art exerts claims to power that parallel and reinforce the larger claims to political 
power of the class for whom such objects are most meaningful – that is, the ruling class, for 
whom the theoretical defence of auratic art is central to the maintenance of their power. The 
auratic work of art, with its ritually certified representational strategies, not only does not 
pose any threat to the dominant class, but with the sense of authenticity, authority, and 
permanence it projects it also represents the cultural validation of their claims to power. The 
fact that the cinematic work of art is mechanically reproduced, on the contrary, shatters 
away its aura and enables a whole different kind of reception (based on perceptive 
closeness) in a whole new kind of spectatorial space (the masses):  
 
It might be stated as a general formula that the technology of reproduction detaches the 
reproduced object from the sphere of tradition. By replicating the work many times over, it 
substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction to reach the 
recipient in his or her own situation, it actualizes that which is reproduced.116 
 
Thus, mechanical reproducibility confers to cinema not only a social significance, 
but a fundamental political potential in its “liquidation of the value of tradition in the 
cultural heritage”117: the “simultaneous collective reception” 118 of the work of art which has 
been denied its aura – its uniqueness, authenticity and authority – allows the cathartic 
destruction of the cultural validation of the traditional ruling class. With the liberation of the 
work of art from canonical and elitist control, it follows as a consequence that the new 
spectators, the masses, can now get ‘closer’ to works of art, so as to be culturally and then 
politically empowered.119  
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On the other hand, the filmic experience of shock is able to “routinize” the spectator 
for the staccato sense-perceptions that are so pervasive in late industrial culture, thereby 
serving as a sort of “training” for the new tempo and quality of experience in late capitalist 
urbanism. Since, according to Benjamin, “[t]he function of film is to train human beings in 
the apperceptions and reactions needed to deal with a vast apparatus whose role in their lives 
is expanding almost daily”120, cinema’s sensorial recalibration, seen in this light, can be read 
as a still more urgent practical and political empowerment. As a matter of fact, while it 
rehearses on a second level the interplay between nature and humanity, film (more than 
other art forms) is potentially able to “release them from their enslavement to the powers of 
the apparatus only when humanity’s whole constitution has adapted itself to the new 
productive forces which the second technology has set free.”121 This achievement, Benjamin 
goes on to note, has great appeal for the masses, whose humanity is subjugated by 
apparatuses daily in urban factories and production jobs:  
 
In the evening these same masses fill the cinemas, to witness the film actor taking revenge 
on their behalf not only by asserting his humanity (or what appears to them as such) against the 
apparatus, but by placing that apparatus in the service of his triumph.122  
 
Benjamin retraces a progressive moment within the reification brought about by 
cinema by reading in the shock training of film a preparation for a new technical mastery 
that could, at least potentially, function in the service of a revolutionary project. Film 
becomes the field of action in which a cinematic audience is transformed – through 
“simultaneous collective reception” – into a mass in movement, a political body that bears 
the potential for social change. Benjamin ascribes to what he calls “the optical unconscious” 
not just the power of disenchantment (the unmasking of “the necessities governing our 
lives” and with them of “phantasmagoria”), but the power to instruct masses of viewers 
about the political force that is embodied in themselves. Such a political force is derived 
from discovering the uncommon aspects and the revolutionary potential of those ordinary 
and apparently meaningless things, connected to an every-day, yet tactile and immediate 
experience of the modern world.123 In a modernity where perception has increasingly been 
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shaped by the technology of mechanical reproduction, Benjamin sees the paradox according 
to which “[t]he representation of human beings by means of an apparatus has made possible 
a highly productive use of the human being’s self-alienation”124 – for, according to the 
philosopher, it is with film that 
 
a new realm of consciousness comes into being. To put it in a nutshell, film is the prism in 
which the spaces of the immediate environment – the spaces in which people live, pursue their 
avocations, and enjoy their leisure – are laid open before their eyes in a comprehensible, meaningful, 
and passionate way.125 
 
Following Benjamin’s path, what Pasolini also sees in the cinematic medium is a 
way out from the blind pragmatism through which reality itself is seen and controlled in 
everyday life. In his words, cinema is “the written language of reality”: “Il cinematografo 
(con le altre tecniche audiovisive) pare essere la lingua scritta di questo pragma. Ma è forse 
anche la sua salvezza, appunto perché lo esprime – e lo esprime dal suo stesso interno: 
producendosi da esso e riproducendolo.”126 Being neither arbitrary nor symbolic, cinema 
reproduces reality through reality itself – it does not interrupt its continuum, but, on the 
contrary, becomes itself a fluid and potentially incessant part of it, so that (at once a passive 
and active process) it is both the result of the collective forces of its time and one of their 
causes.  
 
[S]iccome il cinema riproduce la realtà, finisce col ricondurre allo studio della realtà. Ma in 
un modo nuovo e speciale, come se la realtà fosse stata scoperta attraverso la sua riproduzione, e 
certi suoi meccanismi espressivi fossero saltati fuori solo in questa nuova situazione “riflessa.”127 
 
Following Pasolini’s suggestion, the cinematographic medium is revolutionary in its 
exchange with reality, because it brings into consciousness a language – that of reality – 
which had always been ‘natural’, and unconsciously recreated. The “written language of 
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reality” will inevitably make us aware, first of all, of what the “language of reality” is, and 
will at last turn into a conscience of it, for which physical relations with reality will be 
substituted with cultural ones.128 At least, that is one of the possible social and cultural 
effects brought about by mechanically reproduced works of art. The risk that, instead of 
taking conscience of reality from multiple and possibly infinite perspectives, mechanical 
reproduction could rapidly exclude conscience altogether, substituting cultural relations with 
physical ones, is for Pasolini always at hand:  
 
Le tecniche audiovisive sono gran parte ormai del nostro mondo, ossia del mondo del 
neocapitalismo tecnico che va avanti, e la cui tendenza è rendere le sue tecniche, appunto, 
aideologiche e ontologiche; renderle tacite e irrelate; renderle abitudini; renderle forme religiose. Noi 
siamo degli umanisti laici, o, almeno dei platonici non misologi, dobbiamo batterci, dunque, per 
demistificare l’“innocenza della tecnica”, fino all’ultimo sangue.129 
 
As a matter of fact, while mechanically recreating the very processes of the real 
world, film not only allows a new way of encountering them, but is itself caught up in the 
dynamic transformations that constitute the material and social real. Film, in being the 
“expression of experience by experience”130, not only deploys kinetic, haptic and sensuous 
modes of embodied existence, but becomes part of embodied existence itself. The filmic text 
is utterly engaged with reality in both its directions: in its production, it involves real, fleshly 
enacted characters, as well as real locales or props. The actual process of making films 
demands the involvement of practical matters such as the technologies, the material 
infrastructures and the budget in order to shoot them and the commercial strategies to 
produce, distribute and possibly make a profit out of them. Apart from technological and 
budgetary constraints or possibilities, making a film involves issues of collective work, 
eligible and available actors, studio or producer politics, censorship in terms of performers, 
screenwriters, editors, and so forth. As a material force of (artistic) production in its own 
right, then, cinema is an integral part of the net of economic, social and cultural relations 
like any other modern art form. Its entire practical mechanism – social and economic 
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organization, modes of production and distribution, as well as technology – is shaped on the 
basis of certain dynamics of the body and seems to work only in relation to it. When the 
opposite situation happens, and it is such material contingencies, on the contrary, that 
determine and shape the fundamental materiality of the filmic text, then its 
“embodiedness”131 or (direct) engagement with bodies can also work the other way around: 
the spectators’ bodies can be addressed in a way that, instead of liberating them from it, 
enslaves them even more to the alienation of the apparatus. In today’s cultural panorama, the 
second consequence is probably what takes place most of the time nowadays, where it is our 
bodies and our perceptions that have been decisively altered by, and sometimes modelled 
on, the mass media of mechanical reproduction. Such a relationship can be inverted and 
human perception can keep on shaping motionless technical matter only if “[t]he inert 
materiality of ‘delivery technologies’, or the streaming of media content,” is “continually 
reanimated and/or reassembled by the active ‘liberal’ subject/consumer – sometimes the 
collective subject/consumer of ‘participatory culture’ –, a subject that remains sovereign and 
present to itself in spite of its repeated interfacing with (new) media environments.”132  
 
The concept I called “cinematic sublime” is intended as a series of aesthetic choices 
within the cinematic medium that activates such a ‘participatory’ response in the audience. 
As we have seen, the fundamental quality of Shakespeare’s texts to lack an organic principle 
assembling the parts of a whole is already relatable to the ‘impure’ aesthetic of the sublime – 
where formal dissonances allow the critical representation or reproduction of reality’s own 
dissonance. The use of a source such as Shakespeare, then, already works towards the 
dismantlement of given truths and the uncovering of their fragmentary and uncertain nature. 
The cinematic adaptations/appropriations I shall consider, instead of suppressing or 
marginalising the texts’ discrepancies and disproportions creating appeasement and 
relaxation in the audience, bring Shakespeare’s own dismantling power further. In such 
works, the “cinematic sublime” undoes the Apollonian unity of the whole by means of 
cinematographic techniques and devices that create disharmony and distortion within the 
filmic form, question the pre-established rules of representation, and subvert the traditional 
categories of fiction. While the resulting cinematic aesthetic actively involves the audience 
with its astonishing or shocking effects that bring them closer to sensuous reality, such a use 
of the cinematic medium is also capable of ‘elevating’ their consciousness, leading to the 
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awareness of reality’s own Dionysian disorder. Relying on the theoretical and practical 
conditions of the “cinematic sublime” I outlined, I shall retrace the connections that specific 
cinematic adaptations/appropriations of Shakespeare’s plays entail with the new social and 







Orson Welles’s Chimes at Midnight 
 
The first example of cinematic sublime that I am going to consider is Orson Welles’s 
1965 adaptation, Chimes at Midnight. Starting from what has been judged as the “incredible 
unevenness”1 of the film, I shall analyse the apparent aesthetic and technical erring as what 
originates a sublime aesthetic in the film, considering the way it re-interprets the conflicts 
and ambiguities of the Shakespearean texts and exposes them to an interaction with 
contemporary issues.  
 
3.1 Framed within Nostalgia  
 
Drawing on more than just one of Shakespeare’s plays, Welles’s film reworks 
primarily Henry IV, Parts I and II, with brief borrowings from Richard II, Henry V, and The 
Merry Wives of Windsor. With Chimes at Midnight, the director manipulates Shakespeare’s 
texts even more than with the previous filmic adaptations (Macbeth, 1948, and Othello, 
1952), disassembling the source material and then combining it together into a new, 
“kaleidoscopic revisualization.”2 The original text is heavily cut, most scenes are set in new 
sequences, others made of lines from elsewhere in the plays, some of the characters 
eliminated, and short selections from Holinshed’s Chronicles are added. Given the 
institutional and economic constraints governing the production of almost every one of 
Welles’s films (especially his Shakespeare films), rewriting and condensing the texts was 
partly imposed by the process of adaptation as well as the current policy of filmmaking. 
Welles’s operation, though, seems to go beyond contingent motivations: he radically re-
organizes and re-combines lines from the five different plays, erasing borders between them, 
in order to reinvent them into a personal cinematic compound that would tell Falstaff’s 
story. This extensive textual revision and rearranging is evident from the film’s opening 
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sequence, which aims at shifting the thematic emphasis away from Hal and toward Falstaff. 
More than that, it can be considered as the main process upon which a sublime aesthetic is 
built in the film, originating those ‘faultlines’ that open up the cinematic work of art to its 
context.  
 
Chimes at Midnight starts with a partial, open-ended frame on a winter landscape, 
where two black figures are struggling their way uphill across a barren, snowy landscape, 
with a large dead tree towering over them. After entering a timbered, heavy-beamed room, 
we see the two old men – one thin and nervous, the other fat and placid – settle themselves 
before an immense roaring fire, where they keep on reminiscing “the days that we have 
seen”:  
 
Shallow: Jesus, the days that we have seen! Do you remember since we lay all night in the 
Windmill in Saint George’s Field? 
Falstaff: No more of that, Master Shallow. 
Shallow: Ha, ’twas a merry night! Is Jane Nightwork alive? 
Falstaff: She lives, Master Shallow. 
Shallow: Doth she hold her own well? 
Falstaff: Old, old, Master Shallow.  
Shallow: Nay, she must be old, she cannot choose but be old; certain she’s old, and had 
Robin Nightwork by old Nightwork before I came to Clement’s Inn. Jesus, the days that we 
have seen! 
Ha, Sir John, said I well? 
Falstaff: We have heard the chimes at midnight, Master Robert Shallow. 
Shallow: That we have, that we have, that we have; in faith, Sir John, we have. Jesus, the 
days that we have seen!3  
 
The dialogue, borrowed from near the end of 2 Henry IV (III.ii.187-2114), is recast 
within a new, nostalgic scenario, from which the film’s narration departs as an extended 
flashback focused on Falstaff and his relationship with Prince Hal. Along with the initial 
lines, the film borrows from the source text the radical instability of its structure, which, by 
pulling apart the equilibrium between the central characters and the different realms to 
which they belong in 1 Henry IV, seems to create a “circumstantial and strategic” sense of 
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“constriction.”5 By beginning with lines from near the end of 2 Henry IV, Welles locates the 
whole film within the darker world of a play that seems to suggest a more distrustful view of 
history and power, based on crass individualism and selfishness rather than heroism. 
Although 2 Henry IV apparently recapitulates the structure and the themes of Part I, it does 
so mostly by revising characters and events through a more pessimistic tone, which points 
out contradictions and questions the validity of a unique interpretation, retrospectively 
casting shadows on the stylistic and thematic balance of 1 Henry IV. Moreover, Welles’s 
choice to reposition those lines as an introduction, besides assuring centrality to the 
character of Falstaff, seems to underscore the darker tone of the source material, lending a 
weary, desolate atmosphere to the whole movie. According to the director, it is precisely “by 
focusing on Falstaff” that the “Shakespearean material leads him into dark colours”6: as the 
opening, pre-credit long shot of the two old men struggling across a barren landscape 
suggests, the film centres on “Falstaff’s winter which dominates the texture of the film, not 
Hal’s summer of self-realization.”7 
As a matter of fact, Welles’s Falstaff seems to be associated with a pervasive sense 
of loss and instability, condensed in the reluctant reply that gives the film its title8: “We have 
heard the chimes at midnight, Master Robert Shallow.” The most immediate meaning of the 
line is that Falstaff and Shallow have been awake, literally and figuratively, when others 
were asleep, apparently implying that they have lived life fully. But this seeming celebration 
of life is at the same time a lamentation for just how much it belongs to the past – as the 
insistent use of the past tense, of time references and of the iterated adjective “old” suggests. 
Not only is Jane Nightwork “old”, as are Falstaff and Shallow, but they are all probably 
overdue for death: the phrase “chimes at midnight,” “which is given further resonance by the 
repeated intoning of bells throughout the film, is associated for the audience with sadness 
and mortality more than with youthful carousal.”9 Whatever were their past glories, they 
seem now replaced by nostalgia for something that can never be restored (love and youth), 
and anxiety over further losses that are about to come.10 “Chimes at Midnight” thus evokes a 
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7 Ibid. 
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sense of impending loss, increased by the fact that, when this open frame occurs again later 
on in the film, it is followed by the news of Henry IV’s death and Hal’s coronation: in 
retrospect, therefore, all that remains for Falstaff from that point on is rejection and 
(eventual) death.  
The elegiac tone of the line seems to be underlined in the following sequence: the 
credits roll against a long shot where vigorous knights on galloping horses (probably going 
to war) are rapidly replaced by a long, straggling procession of weary marching soldiers 
(who could be either going to or coming back from war) and ominous corpses hanging in the 
background (maybe following on the peace-time restoration of order). To the bleakness of 
the images it is juxtaposed, by contrast, the dynamic pace of a jaunty, festive score. This 
second open-ended frame (which could be seen as either a sum of what precedes the film’s 
own narration or a prolepsis of what is going to happen) seems to condense the external, 
political events of the film, and to link them inextricably with the film’s core – Falstaff’s 
story and its gloomy atmosphere of impending death. As the sequence comes to an end, in 
fact, we literally hear the “chimes” tolling like death-bells: they foreshadow the motifs of 
farewell and rejection that dominate Falstaff’s relationship with the future Henry V, as well 
as the loss of youth, affections and, ultimately, of life he is about to experience. 
 
On the one hand, the elegiac tone that dominates the movie responds to the director’s 
artistic and intellectual intent. According to his own explanation, Chimes at Midnight is an 
elegy for the loss of an older world, “a season of innocence, a dew-bright morning of the 
world”; a sort of “lost paradise” of which Falstaff is “its perfect embodiment.”11 
 
The film was not intended as a lament for Falstaff, but for the death of Merrie England. 
Merrie England as a conception, a myth which has been very real to the English-speaking world and 
is to some extent expressed in other countries of the Medieval epoch: the age of chivalry, of 
simplicity, of Maytime and all that. It is more than Falstaff who is dying. It’s the old England dying 
and betrayed. […] In the case of Chimes at Midnight, [an era/the sense of moral values has been 
destroyed] by the interests of power, of duty, of responsibility, of national grandeur, all that kind of 
thing.12 
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Welles’s interpretation of Falstaff is sustained by his belief that Shakespeare’s works 
show that the author was standing ‘in between’ two ages and two worldviews, but that he 
was indeed closer to the antecedent ones:  
 
He was standing in the door which opened onto the modern age and his grandparents, the old 
people in the village, the countryside itself, still belonged to the Middle Ages, to the old Europe... his 
humanity came from his links to the Middle Ages... and his pessimism, his bitterness – and it’s when 
he allows them free rein that he touches the sublime – belong to the modern world, the world which 
has just been created.13 
 
In this kind of nostalgia for a lost ‘innocent’ world, Welles felt an affinity for what 
he thought was Shakespeare’s own world perspective: “I think that he was profoundly 
against the Modern Age, as I am. I am against my Modern Age, he was against his. And I 
think his villains are modern people, just as they’re likely to be continental.”14 According to 
Welles, Falstaff’s role is thus not simply that of a clown or a jolly knight, but rather that of 
defending the force of the old England that is going down; and he can assume such a role 
precisely because  
 
he is the greatest conception of a good man, the most completely good man in all drama. His 
faults are so small and he makes tremendous jokes out of little faults. […] The more I played it, the 
more I felt that I was playing Shakespeare’s good, pure man.15  
 
As “a kind of refugee from that world,” Falstaff “has to “live by his wits, he has to 
be funny” and “get a laugh out of his patron”, in order to “get a place to sleep”, to survive:  
 
So it’s a rough modern world that he’s living in. But I think you have to see in his eyes, 
that’s why I was also very glad to be doing it black and white, because if it’s in colour, you must 
have blue eyes, you know? You’ve got to see that look that comes out of the age that never existed 
but exists in the heart of all English poetry.16 
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His jolliness would thus be the result of a constant acting in order to manufacture the 
appropriate, expected response from his audience. While he plays the clown to please or 
placate Hal and the other characters (as well as the cinematic spectators), he is actually 
living a personal and historical tragedy. As a matter of fact, Welles claimed to Peter 
Bogdanovich that “the closer I thought I was getting to Falstaff, the less funny he seemed to 
me. […] I found him only occasionally, and then only deliberately, a clown.”17 Behind 
Falstaff’s comic mask, Welles saw his inner desperation and the tragedy into which his 
relationship with Hal would turn; so, he could not let comedy really dominate the film: 
 
I can see that there are scenes which should be much more hilarious, but I directed 
everything and played everything with a view to preparing for the last scene, so the relationship 
between Falstaff and the Prince is no longer the simple comic one that it is in Shakespeare’s Henry 
IV, Part One, but always a preparation for the end. And as you see, the farewell is performed about 
four times during the movie, as a preparation for the tragic ending: The death of Hotspur, which is 
that of Chivalry, the death of the King in his castle, the death of the Prince (who becomes King) and 
the poverty and illness of Falstaff. These are presented throughout the film and must darken it. I do 
not believe that comedy should dominate in such a film.18 
 
On the other hand, the stylistic and thematic sense of loss and nostalgic regret 
resulting from Welles’s manipulation of his source texts is also able to create a dialectic 
communication with the actual context in which the film was shot. First of all, the textual 
rearrangement or reinvention of Chimes at Midnight is rooted into Welles’s Five Kings, a 
theatrical adaptation of “the whole sweep of the English history plays”, in which he 
condensed the Shakespearean material later used for Chimes (the two parts of Henry IV, 
Henry V, and additional lines from Richard II and The Merry Wives of Windsor). The 
adaptation premiered in Boston as early as 1939, and periodic revisions of it followed over 
the decades up until 1960, when a production of Chimes at Midnight was performed in 
Dublin and later defined by Welles as “a sort of tryout for the movie.”19 At the time the film 
was made, Welles had been residing for extended periods in various locales around Europe 
in a (more or less) voluntary exile. Practically blacklisted by Hollywood after his very first 
film, he tried to escape from public scrutiny as well as from his own tarnished myth in 1950s 
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USA, where “the proscription of intellectual filmmaking […] went hand in hand with 
punitive anti-Communism.”20 Once again unable to rely on financial security for the 
production of his films, Welles had to trick Spanish producer Emiliano Piedra into financing 
a cinematic version of Treasure Island (more liable to be commercially successful, but of 
which not a single scene was actually shot), alongside which he would shoot his 
Shakespeare film. So, with mainly Spanish money behind the production, Chimes at 
Midnight was shot in various locales in Spain between 1964 and 1965, while the country 
was still in the throes of Francisco Franco’s military dictatorship. Although, as we have 
seen, its textual and theatrical origin long predated the director’s Spanish sojourn, the film 
can reveal connections to Welles’s intellectual nomadism as well as to the contemporary 
political scenario.  
 
As a matter of fact, critics and biographers have always been quick to provide all 
kinds of psychoanalytic explanations for Welles’s choice to reinterpret Falstaff’s story and 
also play that character once again at that time of his life and in those circumstances. Jack 
Jorgens, in particular, observed that perhaps Welles “saw too much of himself in Falstaff,” 
and made the parallels between the film and Welles’s personal experience explicit:  
 
To a man who directed and starred in a masterpiece and has since staggered through three 
decades of underfinanced, hurried, flawed films, scores of bit parts, narrations, and interviews which 
debased his talent, dozens of projects which died for want of persistence and financing, the story of a 
fat, aging jester exiled from his audience and no longer able to triumph over impossible obstacles 
with wit and torrential imagination might well seem tragic.21 
 
Chimes at Midnight has actually been described on a number of occasions as 
Welles’s own “testament”, and the director himself always mentioned it as his favourite and 
most personal film. Keith Baxter, from his vantage point of having worked directly with 
Welles on the film, was ready to point out that “[i]t was his [Welles’s] life’s ambition to 
make this film and also to play Falstaff […].”22 As a matter of fact, Welles might have self-
referentially identified with Falstaff’s status as a mock king, remarking how as an actor he 
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himself was a “royal bum” with a crown of “tin”, and seeing in the king’s betrayal and 
rejection of the character a mirror of Hollywood’s own attitude against him.23 Such an 
interpretation has been so strongly felt that it also goes the other way round, up to the point 
that subsequent adaptations of the Falstaff plays have been hugely influenced not just by 
Chimes at Midnight (like Gus Van Sant’s My Own Private Idaho), but by Orson Welles 
himself (as with Kenneth Branagh’s flashback portrayal of Falstaff in his 1989 Henry V). As 
Joss Ackland reports, his 1982 performance of Falstaff was inspired by  
 
the real Orson Welles. […] As a man Welles exploded brilliantly, and then didn’t know 
where to go. Like Falstaff, I believe he could have achieved so much, but it was frittered away. He 
gives everyone a lot to laugh about and he can laugh at it too. But inside he is crying.24  
 
Although it is hard not to feel that “there was a great deal of him in Falstaff – this 
sort of trimming one’s sails, always short of money, having to lie, perhaps, and to cheat”25, 
the way Welles’s personal experience has contributed to permeate with nostalgia his re-
interpretation of Falstaff deserves some more profound considerations.  
At the time he shot Chimes at Midnight, Welles’s sense of intellectual and political 
alienation was certainly an issue, which the fact that the location for his erratic filmmaking 
was now Franco’s Spain may well have redoubled. When he had been virtually exiled from 
the industry of Hollywood, with which his nation’s filmmaking was identified, he had also 
experienced a parallel disengagement from his country’s political life. After his outspoken 
support of progressive politics during the Roosevelt years, Welles’s name and political 
activities were not so welcome anymore. As the “Red Scare” began to rise, the director was 
also reported in the Red Channels (1950), the anti-Communist publication that contributed 
to ban left-wing actors, writers, musicians and journalists suspected of ‘communist 
subversion’, fuelling the already flourishing Hollywood Blacklist. By 1964, Welles had been 
in virtual exile in Europe for several years, and he might have felt even more “quixotic”26, 
once again prepared to uphold his artistic fight in the face of low budgets and intellectual 
solitude, and in a country dominated by political oppression. Artistically and politically 
detached from both his home and host countries, Welles might be considered as one of those 
                                                 
23 See Kenneth S. Rothwell, op. cit., p. 86. 
24 Joss Ackland, quoted in an interview with Jack Tinker, What’s On in London, June 4, 1982; cited by Barbara 
Hodgdon, Shakespeare in Performance: Henry IV, Part II, Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1993, p. 99, in Michael Anderegg, op. cit., p. 140. 
25 Keith Baxter in “Interview with Keith Baxter”, cit., p. 82.  




“transnational” filmmakers who, having undergone the “crises and tensions of exilic 
migrancy,” have transformed their “liminality and interstitiality” into “passionate sources of 
creativity and dynamism.”27 The director’s filmmaking strategies as well as the film’s 
technical flaws, in fact, testify for a radical ‘in-betweenness’, which might well be at the 
roots of the thematic and stylistic nostalgia of Chimes at Midnight. But Welles’s being 
neither ‘here’ nor ‘there’ is what paradoxically allows his film to address a double audience 
– the one left behind and the present one28 –  along with their double issues. The 
Shakespearean source, reinvented through the lens of Welles’s camera in mid-60s Spain, can 
thus speak not only for the filmmaker’s own experience and feelings of alienation, but also, 
as we are going to see, for the historical context in which it was produced and then received.  
 
3.2 The Voice of History 
 
Shakespeare’s Henriad, in tracing the origins of the modern, centralised nation-state, 
deals with recurrent patterns of violence following Henry IV’s illegitimate conquest of the 
crown, as well as the strategies of this new kind of power to maintain order and contain 
subversion. In fact, order and subversion are hardly distinguishable from each other: on the 
one hand, while Henry IV’s usurpation of Richard II’s throne has led to political unrest, he 
now needs to defend his power from the threat of further civil broils by those very lords who 
helped him to the crown and feel they have not been rewarded enough. On the other hand, 
the heir to the throne designated by Richard II, Edmund Mortimer, is still kept in prison by 
the present King, who thus violates and tries to defend the divine right of kings at the same 
time. Welles’s film presents this historical situation immediately after the opening flash-
forward, with a prologue-like voice-over narration based on Holinshed’s Chronicles, a major 
source for Shakespeare’s own history plays: 
 
King Richard II was murdered, some say at the command of the Duke Henry Bolingbroke, in 
Pomfret castle on February 14, 1400. Before this the Duke Henry had been crowned King, though 
the true heir to the realm was Edmund Mortimer, who was held prisoner by the Welsh rebels. The 
new king was not hasty to purchase his deliverance, and to prove this Mortimer’s cousins, the 
Percys, came to the King unto Windsor. There came Northumberland, his son Henry Percy called 
Hotspur, and Worcester, whose purpose was ever to procure malice and set things in a broil. 
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Official history in the film is reduced to a voice (namely, Ralph Richardson’s): like 
the voice-of-God narrator of documentary, history’s presence is authoritative, invisible, 
apparently imposing facts whose validity seems undeniable by means of clear, assertive 
statements. Yet, the impossibility to locate or materialise this voice makes the historical 
narrative also abstract, external and extraneous to the events shown, turning it into 
something ob-scene. This “obscene” narration of the origin of Henry IV’s authority can be 
significantly related to the “obscene” origin of authority itself and of the law: both of which, 
“being unable by definition to lean finally on anything but themselves, […] are themselves a 
violence without basis.”29  
Following Derrida’s interpretation, the very act of foundation cannot be understood 
within the logic of what it founds, which opens the institution from the start to an ongoing 
relation to the violence in and against which the foundation took place. There follows that 
the institution remains marked or haunted by the violence of the act from which it emerged, 
which becomes the “essence” of the political as such. Such a paradox is  increased by the 
fact that the founding act, since it precedes the institutional law to which it gives rise, is 
neither legal nor illegal. But the repetition of that act, by taking place within the institution 
violently and pre-legally founded, is both legal and illegal, and, while confirming the 
legality and legitimacy of the institution, shows up at once its illegality and illegitimacy. 
Since the founding moment of institutions can never be itself “institutionalised”, it haunts 
them as a reminder of their non-legal foundation, and exposes them to the constant risk of 
being destroyed (or self-destroyed). Institutions are thus corrupted and made fragile from the 
start by the violence of their foundation, which is at the same time the only measure of their 
legitimacy.30 Such a factual truth about the violent origin of institutions – and so of political 
authority – must therefore always remain “obscene” and be kept as a secret within the state 
itself if authority is to be maintained.31 
 
Fundamentally rooted to an “obscene” violence, Henry IV’s sovereignty needs then 
to justify and preserve itself. According to political philosophers like Carl Schmitt, 
“[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception”32, and the film’s representation of Henry 
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IV’s public image and behaviour can reveal the consequences of such an assumption. As a 
matter of fact, during the off-scene prologue the film does show the places and the 
protagonists of this history – a castle (probably Pomfret castle) and Henry IV’s enthroned 
figure (John Gielgud). Similarly to Holinshed/Richardson’s voice, they both look like they 
are cut off and isolated from the ‘real’ world: the castle sitting atop a mountain, where, as 
the voice narrates, Richard II was murdered, seems abandoned or dead too; Henry IV, sitting 
on a throne on a high stone platform, illuminated by shafts of light falling from the windows 
above, is as otherworldly as a statue in a church. The set for his cold stone court is in fact the 
Spanish cathedral at Cardona, where, through the camera’s low-angle perspective, he looks 
enclosed, almost imprisoned, detached from the nobility around and in front of him. 
Gielgud’s haughty Henry IV is in fact separated from anything corporeal, and reduced to a 
nearly disembodied voice, which sounds solemn, almost sepulchral. Although he is hardly 
ever left alone, he seems to talk only to himself: his words apparently fail at every attempt to 
communicate, because, as we are going to see, neither can his (verbal) reproaches govern his 
son, nor can his (verbal) promises tame the rebels. On the contrary, the King’s speech – the 
means and symbol of his authority – is parodied several times throughout the film; Hotspur, 
Falstaff and Hal all in their turn imitate Henry/Gielgud’s grave and theatrical voice. The 
result is that his richly sculpted, highly rhetorical soliloquies, while meant to hide his own 
insecurities and fears, finally serve to the exact opposite.33 
As a matter of fact, king Henry IV is the only character in the film whose speeches 
are allowed the same weight and tone they have in Shakespeare’s texts; still, the king’s 
solemn and sepulchral voice as well as his hieratic posture betray a profound discomfort 
from the very beginning, which becomes an actual illness as the film goes on. The king’s 
sickness can be seen as the metonymical embodiment of the guilt of usurpation lying heavy 
over his conscience, and so of the violence on which sovereignty is founded and by which it 
can be led to self-destruction. As such, not only does it need to be obscured, but also 
diverted by the state of exception which would justify sovereignty, because “the decision on 
the exception is a privilege of the sovereign,” and “the sovereign is a sovereign precisely in 
virtue of his capacity to decide.”34 But for the status of sovereign to be 
(juridically/technically and not ontologically) authentic, the exception needs to be genuine 
too – which is in its turn only guaranteed by the sovereign’s own “genuine” decision. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Notes on Schmitt’s Word that Sovereign is he who decides on the Exception”, Glossator, Volume 1, Fall 2009,  
p. 23. 
33 See Michael Anderegg, op. cit., p. 133. 




Whereas Schmitt’s ontological approach takes this “genuineness” for granted, one of the 
implications of this paradox, as Gullì has pointed out commenting on Schmitt’s Political 
Theology, is that 
 
the exception itself can be a mere fabrication of the sovereign, which acquires dubious 
legitimacy on the basis neither of ethics nor of a violence travestied as force of law, but of mere and 
raw violence. In this case, it is not the exception, the state of emergency, which calls forth the 
sovereign decision, but the other way around, the sovereign decision creates the exception, or state of 
emergency. Then, the state of emergency is not, in Benjamin’s sense, a real one.35 
 
If we get away from Schmitt’s ontological (and theological) dimension, according to 
which the sovereign is the exception, and we see the exception functionally, as the predicate 
of the sovereign, it may not be the case that the sovereign realizes that there is an objective 
state of need and thereupon he acts decisively. In fact, the sovereign can also choose which 
state is to be raised to the level of the exception, or simply fabricate it.36 
 
Following this theoretical basis, we can see Henry IV constantly fabricating the state 
of exception that would legitimate his sovereignty: the very sickness that afflicts him 
(signifying the violence on which his sovereignty is founded) is strategically rejected 
outside, turning people around him into a threat for the order and safety of the realm. From 
his very first appearance in the film’s abridged revision of 1 Henry IV, I.iii, we hear the king 
blasting the true heir to the throne, whose deliverance from the Welsh rebels he “was not 
hasty to purchase”: 
 
Shall our coffers, then, 
Be emptied to redeem a traitor home? 
[…] No, on the barren mountains let him starve! 
For I shall never hold that man my friend 
Whose tongue shall ask me for one penny cost 
To ransom home revolted Mortimer.37 
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Further on in the film, in a bold mixture of lines from Richard II, 2 Henry IV and 1 
Henry IV, after briefly exposing the malady of his country (“Then you perceive the body of 
our kingdom,/ How foul it is, what rank diseases grow” 2 Henry IV, III.i.37-38), the king 
seems to place the blame not so much on Hotspur, as on his son Henry’s behaviour (“Whist 
I, by looking on the praise of him,/ See riot and dishonour stain the brow/ Of my young 
Harry. […]” 1 Henry IV, I.i.84-86; “[…] he – young wanton, and effeminate boy – / Takes 
on the point of honour to support/ So dissolute a crew.” Richard II, V.iii.10-1238). The same 
strategy recurs during his first encounter with Hal when, while rebuking his son for his 
irresponsible behaviour which might cost him the crown, Henry IV soon goes on to 
attributing a similar unworthy behaviour to the king he dethroned and probably murdered:  
 
The skipping king, he ambled up and down 
With shallow jesters and rash bavin wits, 
Mingled his royalty with cap’ring fools; 
Grew a companion to the common streets, […] (1 Henry IV, III.ii.60-68) 
 
Henry IV’s rhetorical strategy to legitimise his power by creating external enemies 
seems, instead, only to deviate and make impossible real communication, depriving his 
words of effectiveness and increasing his isolation. As a matter of fact, his promise of peace 
before the battle of Shrewsbury, sounding void and threatening, is all too easily intentionally 
misinterpreted by Worcester and transformed into a menace by Hotspur and the rebels. After 
the battle, when rebellion, the malady of his realm, should have been extirpated, the king’s 
own sickness becomes more and more evident, as the brief narration from Holinshed’s 
Chronicles testifies: “From the first, King Henry’s reign was troubled with rebellion, but in 
the year of our Lord 1408 the last of his enemies had been vanquished. The King held his 
Christmas this year at London, being so vexed with sickness.” When Henry IV himself 
believes to be ailing, he delivers a richly forged, but deeply anguished soliloquy on the 
burdens represented by the crown lying on a pillow by his head:   
 
How many thousand of my poorest subjects 
Are at this hour asleep! O sleep, O gentle sleep, 
Nature’s soft nurse, how have I frighted thee, 
That thou no more wilt weigh my eyelids down, 
                                                 
38 The edition considered is William Shakespeare, Richard II, ed. by Stanley Wells, Harmondsworth: Penguin  




And steep my senses in forgetfulness? 
Why rather, sleep, liest thou in smoky cribs, 
Upon uneasy pallets stretching thee, 
And hushed with buzzing night-flies to thy slumber 
Than in the perfumed chambers of the great, 
Under the canopies of costly state, 
And lulled with sound of sweetest melody? 
O thou dull god, why li’st thou with the vile 
In loathsome beds, and leav’st the kingly couch 
A watch-case, or a common ’larum-bell? 
Wilt thou upon the high and giddy mast 
Seal up the ship-boy’s eyes, and rock his brains 
In cradle of the rude imperious surge, 
And in the visitation of the winds, 
Who take the ruffian billows by the top, 
Curling their monstrous heads, and hanging them 
With deafing clamour in the slippery clouds, 
That with the hurly death itself awakens? 
Canst thou, O partial sleep, give thy repose 
To the wet sea-boy in an hour so rude, 
And in the calmest and most stillest night, 
With all appliances and means to boot, 
Deny it to a king? Then happy low, lie down. 
Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown. (2 Henry IV, III.i.4-31) 
 
The soliloquy, which Welles keeps in its integrity, maintains the tone of “a private 
meditation, the innermost thoughts of a troubled, weary man”39 of the Shakespearean source. 
According to Greenblatt’s explanation, the speech contributes to the ideological justification 
of kingship that 2 Henry IV apparently assures. The king’s lack of sleep, as a symbol of 
corporeal suffering, is the cost of power, and so it ratifies his preeminent position, ennobling 
or even cleansing the crimes upon which such a position depends.40 However, Gielgud’s 
stagy tone in delivering the soliloquy, as well as the presence of an on-screen audience (the 
king’s dignitaries), seem to betray the intimacy of those lines and remind us of their 
theatricality, or rather, meta-theatricality. The theme of sleeplessness, in fact, is also 
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notoriously recurrent in a play like Macbeth, where it is associated to the crime of regicide 
and the chaos it brings among both the political and natural order (“Macbeth: Methought I 
heard a voice cry, ‘Sleep no more!/ Macbeth does murder sleep’ – the innocent sleep, 
[…]”41; “Lady Macbeth: You lack the season of all natures, sleep.” III.iv.140; “Doctor: Not 
so sick, my lord,/ As she is troubled with thick-coming fancies/ That keep her from her rest.” 
V.iii.37-39). Watched in its meta-theatrical connection with Macbeth, the soliloquy scene, 
beyond the apparent, ultimate legitimation of Henry IV’s power, can also open up to a 
confession of the betrayal and regicide he committed to get to the crown, which is then the 
ultimate symbol of the burden of guilt lying on his head.  
 
Opening up the film to the context in which it was shot, the voice-over narration 
from Holinshed’s Chronicles, on the one hand, may have sounded like a recapitulation of all 
too recent history to those who heard it in its original Spanish release in December 1965. On 
the other hand, Henry IV’s soliloquies expose the burdens of (illegitimate) kingship to such 
a point that, “[h]ad he been more alert, Franco might well have noted the parallels between 
his situation and that of Gielgud’s Henry IV, the latter as overburdened by what is within his 
head as that which sits atop it, […].”42 And had the Spanish audience been more alert as 
well, they might have read in Richardson’s and Gielgud’s detached voices the displaying of 
the same political strategies they had been hearing from their leader since 1939. Like 
virtually all of 20th-century national leaders and/or dictators, Franco’s speeches are grounded 
on a mystifying rhetoric very similar to Henry IV’s grandiose and self-shielding soliloquies.  
With his voice amplified, made thundering by sound machines, and coming either 
from the distance of a radio broadcast or from the heights of a balcony in order to reach the 
whole nation, Franco’s speeches were as disconnected from material reality and alien to 
‘real’, dialogic communication as Henry IV’s meta-theatrical monologues. Like him, 
Franco’s sovereignty also originated from usurpation and murder: the 1936 overthrow of the 
democratically elected Second Republic by the Nationalist forces he guided, and the 
following civil war (1936-39) led to the latter’s victory and the inauguration of Franco’s 
military dictatorship (April 1, 1939). He too, then, needed to legitimate his own sovereignty 
by fabricating a “state of exception”, which is already depicted in the speech that 
accompanied his military coup:  
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The nation calls to her defence all those of you who […] swore to defend her to the death 
against her enemies. The situation in Spain grows more critical every day; anarchy reigns in most of 
the countryside and towns; government-appointed authorities encourage revolts, when they do not 
actually lead them; murderers use pistols and machine guns to settle their differences and to 
treacherously assassinate innocent people, while the public authorities fail to impose law and order. 
Revolutionary strikes of all kinds paralyze the life of the nation, destroying its sources of wealth and 
creating hunger, forcing working men to the point of desperation. The most savage attacks are made 
upon national monuments and artistic treasures by revolutionary hordes who obey the orders of 
foreign governments, with the complicity and negligence of local authorities.43 
 
Franco’s rhetorical strategy, like Henry IV’s, projects outside on an external enemy 
the violence on which his authority is founded, and makes himself and his Nationalist forces 
the defenders of order against the legitimate government; but at the very same time they are 
overthrowing it, causing a civil war. We can find a further instance of this strategy displayed 
in his victory speech (broadcasted on May 20th, 1939), where he turns the defenders of the 
Second Republic into barbarous (ferocious, but also, etymologically, foreign) tyrants: 
 
In Madrid, the martyr city now freed from the tyranny of the Barbarians, you have witnessed 
[…] Spain a captive, subjected to a barbarous foreign yoke and sullied with Marxist crime. The 
martyrdom of Madrid is the gravest charge that can be brought against the Red leaders who, after 
being beaten in all the battles and hopelessly defeated, sacrificed the capital in vain by shielding 
themselves behind the non-combatant population, and delivered her over to the perverse methods of 
Russian Communism.44  
 
After the civil war, once Franco’s fascist regime has been established, we can still 
perceive the need for his authority to keep the state of exception alive: 
 
When the Russian Comintern was about to make the country prey of communism, it was a 
national movement that saved it and gave hopes for the revolution, its channel and direction. […] If 
we fought hard on our crusade, we would fight even harder if the new danger of new war should 
threaten us. We know that with us is life, without us, death.45  
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Reading Franco’s speeches in juxtaposition to Henry IV’s soliloquies is a subsequent 
step in my reconstruction of Welles’s cinematic sublime. Starting from the Shakespearean 
textual source itself, and its dealing with the recurrent patterns of violence following an 
illegitimate conquest of the crown, the film can be significantly opened up to the historical 
context in which it was produced. As a matter of fact, the problematic representation of 
history and power it proposes might well have had lively resonances in a country where the 
scars of a military coup and the following civil war were presumably still pulsating fresh 
behind Franco’s fascist ‘order’. But more than that, as noted by Anthony Guneratne, 
“Welles appears to have contrived a work even more consonant with those of later Spanish 
directors who, […], were soon to create an oppositional cinema at once subtle (in its 
undermining of official discourse) and richly nuanced.”46 The film’s peculiar use of visual 
and aural devices and techniques, as we have seen, while uncovering Henry IV’s rhetorical 
strategies, is able to dismantle their validity. Such a challenging aesthetics, in its dialectic 
exchange with the contemporary context, can thus allow us to question the univocal image 
that any form of power gives of itself. 
 
3.3 The Reality of the Image 
 
Further aesthetic challenges to official discourse in Chimes at Midnight can be found 
in the almost overwhelming presence of unofficial history as a carnivalesque parody of the 
former: the world of Falstaff and his “band of outsiders”, characters of lower rank engaged 
in minor offences, who ramble among taverns and other rustic settings in striking contrast 
with Henry IV’s cold and stony court. Stylistically, the world of history’s outsiders is linked 
to a frenetic visual rhythm guaranteed by peculiar cinematic techniques as well as technical 
flaws – such as the use of a freewheeling camera, the juxtaposition of shots of uneven 
length, and a poorly synchronised, sometimes incomprehensible soundtrack. For instance, 
actors often deliver their lines as they, or the camera (or both) are in rapid motion or from 
the depth of an extreme long shot; the recording is technically faulty and a number of actors 
have been dubbed by Welles himself; jarring editing patterns, at last, easily distract the 
audience from the spoken word.47 These stylistic idiosyncrasies all contribute to an uncertain 
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or uneven relationship between sound and image, and are analysed as a further contribution 
to the cinematic sublime in Chimes at Midnight.  
The disturbing action of the image in the film goes up to the point that “[h]istory and 
(verbal) rhetoric are constantly displaced, replaced by Welles’s nervous, erratic, decentred, 
unstable visual and aural style, a flow of images and sounds that thoroughly dismantle 
Shakespeare’s text, […].”48 The consequent downplaying of words in favour of images is 
thus the downplaying of the whole world of official history, where words are the main 
means of expression but also the main means to conquer and keep power.   
As a matter of fact, within Falstaff’s “tavern world”, words degenerate into the 
“incoherent babbling of poseurs, cynics, and fools”49: Falstaff’s “incomprehensible lies” (1 
Henry IV, I.ii.175) are so incongruous that everybody can all too easily see through them; 
Master Shallow’s “every third word”, according to Falstaff, is “a lie”; Ancient Pistol’s high-
flown speeches are reduced to a meaningless verboseness; Master Silence is afflicted with 
such a severe stutter that he barely speaks, and Shallow must annoyingly complete his 
sentences. Welles’s own acting style seems to disparage his notoriously loud and clear vocal 
delivery by deliberately “throwing away” words, lines and even entire speeches in a 
vernacular accent that parodies proper Shakespearean diction.50 The ‘tavern world’, in its 
mistrustful toning down of words, tends to be dominated by the sheer physicality of the 
image instead, starting from Falstaff’s huge figure or often his face alone, which sometimes 
takes over the entire frame. Although he enters the film as a small, round object in the 
distance of an extreme long shot, Falstaff becomes progressively bigger as he gets closer to 
the camera, until his face alone covers over three-fourths of the frame, and the wooden space 
around him always seems too narrow for his passage. The way Welles elaborates on the 
inescapable physical presence of Falstaff, his girth as well as his old age, seems to suggest 
that he and the world outside history are “all flesh”51 (and also, because of that, all the more 
susceptible to destruction and perishing), thus implying the dominance of the image over 
words, with a consequent even more tactile or ‘real’ impact on the audience.  
 
Welles’s strategy to undermine words through the sheer physicality of the image 
contaminates the representation of characters who belong to the world of the court and of 
official history as well. To begin with, Hotspur’s bath sequence is a satirical overturning of 
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history’s pressing demands, which – announced by the sound of trumpets and galloping 
horses – turn the young man away from everyday life and twist his language, turning it into 
a bombastic and belligerent rhetoric: 
 
“The purpose you undertake is dangerous” – why, that’s certain! ’Tis dangerous to take a 
cold, to sleep, to drink; but I tell you, my lord fool, out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this flower, 
safety. “The purpose you undertake is dangerous, the friends you have named uncertain, the time 
itself unsorted, and your whole plot too light […]. Say you so […]? I say unto you again, you are a 
shallow, cowardly hind, and you lie. […] By the Lord, our plot is a good plot as ever was laid; our 
friends true and constant: a good plot, good friends, and full of expectation; an excellent plot, very 
good friends. What a frosty-spirited rogue is this! (1 Henry IV, II.iii.1-19) 
 
But as he storms out asking for a horse and crying: “That roan shall be my throne” (1 
Henry IV, II.iii.68), Hotspur, with what was meant to be an elegant oratorical gesture of the 
arm, accidentally drops the towel in which he was draped and, turning away from the 
camera, reveals his bare behind. Hotspur’s rhetoric and historical pretensions are thus 
literally laid bare and comically undermined, so that, retrospectively, the whole sequence is 
more similar to a comic intermission. On a closer look, Hotspur’s words were already being 
mocked by the trumpeters, whose fanfares sound like echoes to his belligerent pompousness; 
as well as by his wife’s chuckles and lack of attention for his pugnacious rantings. While 
Hotspur talks of war, in fact, Kate tries to engage him in a facetious, semi-serious exchange 
about marital obligations. While she apparently imitates and ridicules her husband’s 
excessive talk of war (even in his sleep, so that war becomes a sort of rival to his wife), he 
still replies opposing warlike, heroic values to her sexual innuendos. In light of Hotspur’s 
declaration to choose war over sexuality, the dropped towel may signal, as Anderegg argues, 
“the return of the repressed”, the revelation of the body he tries to deny or push aside by 
asserting the word:52  
 
Lady: For what offense have I this fortnight been 
A banished woman from my Harry’s bed? 
[…] In thy faint slumbers I by thee have watched, 
And heard thee murmur tales of iron wars, 
Speak terms of manage to thy bounding steed, 
Cry ‘Courage! To the field!’ And thou hast talked 
                                                 




Of sallies and retires, of trenches, tents, 
Of palisadoes, frontiers, parapets, 
Of basilisks, of cannon, culverin, 
Of prisoners’ ransom, and of soldiers […] 
[…] But hear you, my lord. 
Hotspur: What say’st thou, my lady? 
Lady: What is it carries you away? 
Hotspur: Why, my horse, my love – my horse! 
Lady: Out, you mad-headed ape!  
[…] I’ll know your business, Harry; […] 
[…] if you go –  
Hotspur: So far afoot, I shall be weary, love. 
Lady: […] In faith, I’ll break thy little finger, Harry, 
An if thou wilt not tell me all things true. 
Hotspur: Away, away, you trifler! Love? I love thee not; 
I care not for thee, Kate. This is no world 
To play with mammets and to tilt with lips. 
We must have bloody noses and cracked crowns, 
[…] 
Lady: Do you not love me? Do you not indeed? 
[…] Nay, tell me if you speak in jest or no. 
Hotspur: Come, wilt thou see me ride? 
And when I am a-horseback, I will swear 
I love thee infinitely. But hark you, Kate: 
[…] I know you wise, but yet no farther wise 
Than Harry Percy’s wife; constant you are, 
But yet a woman; and for secrecy, 
No lady closer, for I well believe 
Thou wilt not utter what thou dost not know, 
And so far will I trust thee, gentle Kate. 
Lady: How? So far? 
Hotspur: Not an inch further. But hark you, Kate: 
Whither I go, thither shall you go too; 
[…] Will this content you, Kate? 





Hotspur’s belligerent rhetoric, after being comically overturned, is once again fatally 
going to fail him – and any other character as well – when the war he was so enthusiastically 
looking forward to culminates in the battle at Shrewsbury. The power of Welles’s ‘tactile’ 
image to destabilise words and the related world of official history is especially at work in 
the long battle sequence placed at the film’s core. Hotspur’s mindless enthusiasm for 
violence (“Harry to Harry, shall hot horse to horse,/ Meet and ne’er part till one drop down a 
corse”, 1 Henry IV, IV.i.122) and the initial air of jollity carried forward in the processions 
of soldiers mustering for the battle along with a martial soundtrack is promptly replaced by 
ominous shots of battlefield preparation, which is a re-play of a shot with mounted soldiers 
and galloping horses we see in the opening sequence. As they remind us of the grim 
conclusion of the opening sequence (where they are promptly followed by ominous hooded 
soldiers and hanged men in the background), it is as if the audience were already aware of 
the battle’s own grim outcome. One is reminded of such crude reality also in some of the 
(apparently) comic moments; for instance, heavily armoured knights are lowered from trees 
and derricks on to their horses, while Falstaff, hoisted to the top of the pulley looking like an 
enormous armadillo, is let fall before a horse can be got under him, and then is seen puffing 
along well to the rear of the central action or hiding behind a bush. This sight, as well as 
Falstaff’s speech on “honour” later on, besides the apparent comic release, is a crucial 
reminder of a world which, under its fickle chivalric ideals, is fatally made of flesh and 
bones. As a matter of fact, Falstaff’s “catechism” paradoxically unveils the concept of 
honour as a mere word or “air”, futile and inconsistent; he especially deconstructs its 
hollowness by underlining its lack of practical and even bodily usefulness, to the living as 
well as to the dead: 
 
Well, ’tis no matter; honour pricks me on. Yea, but how if honour prick me off when I come 
on? How then? Can honour set to a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wound? No. 
Honour hath no skill in surgery then? No. What is honour? […] Air – a trim reckoning! Who hath it? 
He that died a Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No. […] ’Tis insensible then? Yea, to the dead. But will 
it not live with the living? No. Why? Detraction will not suffer it. Therefore I’ll none of it. Honour is 
a mere scutcheon – and so ends my catechism. (1 Henry IV, V.i.129-140) 
 
By positioning this speech right before the battle begins, the film introduces the 
deconstruction of chivalric notions into the following action, thus already depriving war of 
any ideological justification, and presenting it as a power struggle disguised by empty ideals 




Henry IV with unmitigated directness as an overwhelming physical experience, a climactic 
explosion of primal, omni-directional violence, chaotic and meaningless. After the opposing 
armies meet, the scene is totally filled with muddy soldiers brutally killing each other in 
utterly unheroic hand-to-hand combat with any kind of weapon, from wielded clubs to 
swinging chain slings, and spiked maces and swords. In an unrelenting savagery, high-angle 
shots show groups of archers shooting their arrows with clean efficiency and skill, followed 
in turn by rapid close-up glimpses of men pierced through with arrows and of horses 
impaled and collapsing in convulsions.  
For the battle action, Welles employed a variety of shooting techniques: some shots 
are photographed with a handheld camera, others filmed with wide-angle lenses; some are in 
slow motion or even static, others instead are speeded up or shot from a continuously 
moving point of view. The images are accompanied by different layers of a ‘wordless’ 
soundtrack, in which the slow, stressed beats of a dissonant choral accompaniment sung by 
treble voices is juxtaposed with the frantic rhythms of the battle (whinnying horses, the clash 
of sword against sword, armour against armour, screams and shouts, gasping, panting, and 
cracking bones).53 Welles’s use of soft focus silhouette in his close-up concentration, 
moreover, does not allow a clear identification, so that the raw brutality of man and weapon 
is isolated from any partisan sentiment. Denuded of all language and rhetoric, the sequence 
is only made of shocking images of relentless bloodshed, where no distinction – neither 
between loyalists and rebels, nor between men and mud – is possible anymore. The 
sequence was at first recorded in long, uninterrupted takes to allow the actors to warm up in 
the battle, and was subsequently cut up in over 200 separate shots which were then edited 
together through a tight montage. As Welles himself explained: 
 
On the first day I tried to do very short pieces, but I found that extras didn’t work as well 
unless they had a longer thing to do. They didn’t seem to be really fighting until they had time to 
warm up. That’s why the takes were long, since there was no way of beginning the camera later and 
cutting. But I knew I was only going to use very short cuts. For example, we shot with a very big 
crane very low to the ground, moving as fast as it could be moved against the action. What I was 
planning to do – and did – was to intercut the shots in which the action was contrary, so that every 
cut seemed to be a blow, a counter blow, a blow received, a blow returned. Actually it takes a lot of 
                                                 




time for the crane to move over and back, but everything was planned for this effect and I never 
intended to use more than a small section of the arc in each case.54 
 
As a matter of fact, Welles’s use of “very short cuts” and his shooting with a moving 
camera drags the spectator into a muddy no-man’s land that reminds the spectator of World 
War I trenches, where a blurry mass of flesh and iron is either fighting over it or uprooting 
it. Everything is sewn together in such a rapid and fragmented editing that the viewer feels a 
sense of claustrophobia, of being trapped within a nightmarish sequence of deaths from 
which no one will be able to recover, thus forming “a major aesthetic disruption from which 
neither the tone of the film nor the perceptive mood of the spectator returns to its former 
equilibrium.”55 When the pace of the battle slows down after nearly ten minutes of haptic 
fight, soldiers seem to have become one thing with mud, from which it is impossible to rise, 
in an apocalyptic regression to the slime from which man emerged. The end of the conflict 
does indeed visualise a repeat of the gloomy last image from the opening sequence: framing 
the battle within repeated images from the introduction may thus suggest not only a repeat of 
the pattern rebellion-war-punishment, but also that such pattern is one of history’s recurring 
experiences. In light of the following displaying of Henry V’s foreign policy, in fact, Henry 
IV’s final remark, “Thus ever did rebellion find rebuke,” echoed by the narrator with “At 
last all enemies [were] defeated,” may retrospectively sound as a far too optimistic 
consideration – if not tragically ironic.  
 
The film’s destabilization of words through the overwhelming presence of the image 
concerns Prince Hal as well. Ambling in between ‘two fathers’ (King Henry IV and Falstaff) 
and liminal to both of their worlds, the tavern and the court, Hal (played by Keith Baxter), 
like his father the King, is mainly associated with words, which betrays his fundamental 
non-belonging to Falstaff’s world; yet, surrounded by a dimension of sheer physicality, his 
words are deprived of relevance (and sometimes of consistence). For instance, when 
delivering the “I know you all” soliloquy, Hal is not left alone as in Shakespeare’s text, but 
has a very inattentive audience in Falstaff standing trustingly in the background; besides, his 
words are at times whispered in such a low voice that some of them are almost inaudible. 
Not only does the meta-theatricality of the scene, being itself a way to remind us of the 
fictitious nature of the character and of what he says, unmask the rhetorical constructedness 
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of the Prince’s words; but the presence of an audience that does not seem to pay attention or 
even listen to them also proves their ineffectiveness within the ‘real’ world: 
 
I know you all, and will a while uphold 
The unyoked humour of your idleness. 
Yet herein will I imitate the sun, 
Who doth permit the base contagious clouds 
To smother up his beauty from the world, 
That, when he please again to be himself, 
Being wanted, he may be more wond’red at 
[…] If all the year were playing holidays, 
To sport would be as tedious as to work; 
But when they seldom come, they wished-for come, 
[…] So, when this loose behaviour I throw off 
And pay the debt I never promisèd, 
[…] My reformation, glitt’ring o’er my fault, 
Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes 
Than that which hath no foil to set it off. 
I’ll so offend to make offense a skill, 
Redeeming time when men think least I will. (1Henry IV, I.ii.185-207) 
 
Hal’s winking at Falstaff at the end of the soliloquy before running away – a gesture 
that usually implies understanding and complicity – seals, on the contrary, his solitary 
promise to finally betray him, of which Falstaff remains totally unaware and unsuspecting. 
The Prince’s soliloquy, like his father’s, is more of a failed attempt at communication, in 
which his schemes remain unheard or unbelieved. As a matter of fact, while the audience is 
prepared to Hal’s rejection of Falstaff by the several farewell scenes in which he rehearses 
verbally his ultimate betrayal, his words remain totally ineffective on Falstaff himself and in 
his world distrustful of rhetoric.  
On assuming the crown, Hal is definitely absorbed into the realm of ‘official history’ 
and verbal rhetoric as his father Henry IV. His first act as Henry V – the rejection of Falstaff 
– is actually “a rhetorical act, the new king of England’s maiden speech, the son’s entrance 
into the symbolic world of his father”56:  
 
                                                 




I know thee not, old man. Fall to thy prayers. 
How ill white hairs become a fool and jester! 
I have long dreamt of such a kind of man, 
So surfeit-swelled, so old, and so profane; 
But being awaked, I do despise my dream. 
Make less thy body hence, and more thy grace. 
Leave gormandizing; know the grave doth gape 
For thee thrice wider than for other men. 
Reply not to me with a fool-born jest. 
Presume not that I am the thing I was, 
For God doth know, so shall the world perceive, 
That I have turned away my former self; 
So will I those that kept me company. 
When thou dost hear I am as I have been, 
Approach me, and thou shalt be as thou wast,  
The tutor and the feeder of my riots. 
Till then I banish thee, on pain of death, 
As I have done the rest of my misleaders, 
Not to come near our person by ten mile. (2 Henry IV, V.v.46-64) 
 
Hal’s elaborate and majestic speech, though, is far less eloquent than the expression 
on Falstaff’s own face, where, in a storm of feelings, the dominant one seems to be disbelief 
for the words just pronounced by the newly crowned King.57 It is as though Falstaff is able 
to see through them and cannot help remaining sceptic in front of their apparent rhetoric 
(“This that you have seen is but a colour58… I shall be sent for soon at night”, he confides 
heavy-heartedly but hopefully to Shallow). On our first sight of Hal after the ceremony of 
coronation, moreover, he will declare war against France with apparently no reason given 
but for a sentry’s cry of “No king of England, if not king of France!” Like his father, who 
had usurped the crown from Richard II and had had to cover the illegitimacy of his kingship 
with a war that would vanquish internal rebellion, Hal’s war does not respond to a higher 
imperative, but is solely a wilful political manipulation. Following the advice his father gave 
him on his deathbed, war becomes for Henry V too a way to keep minds busy with an 
external enemy rather than focusing on their own king’s conduct:  
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God knows, my son, 
By what bypaths and indirect crook’d ways 
I met this crown; […] 
For all my reign hath been but as a scene 
Acting that argument. And now my death 
Changes the mood, for what in me was purchased 
Falls upon thee in a more fairer sort; 
[…] Yet though thou stand’st more sure than I could do, 
Thou art not firm enough, since griefs are green,  
And all thy friends – which thou must make thy friends –  
Have but their stings and teeth newly ta’en out; 
By whose fell working I was first advanced, 
And by whose power I well might lodge a fear 
To be again displaced; […] 
Therefore, my Harry, 
Be it thy course to busy giddy minds 
With foreign quarrels, that action hence borne out 
May waste the memory of the former days. 
More would I, but my lungs are wasted so 
That strength of speech is utterly denied me. 
How I came by the crown, O God forgive, 
And grant it may with thee in true peace live! (2 Henry IV, IV.v.313-349) 
 
Like Henry IV (whom Hal now resembles uncannily also in his cold, solemn voice 
and towering, ascetic posture), the future king has to keep the state of exception that would 
guarantee his sovereignty and justify the violence on which not only his father’s power, but 
also his own, is founded. In Welles’s film, however, Henry V’s witty rhetoric is punctually 
juxtaposed with its harsh material consequences: paradoxically, the young king’s words act 
like deeds on Falstaff (and the people belonging to his world), whose sudden death is 
straightforwardly attributed to his rejection (“The king has killed his heart”, says Hostess 
Quickly in Henry V, II.i.8659). After the Hostess’s laconic account of Falstaff’s last 
moments, we see her watching the funeral procession that bears his coffin to the desolate 
countryside. The closing sequence culminates the film’s dominant strategy to displace words 
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with the concrete directness of images by juxtaposing the image of Falstaff’s coffin passing 
away in the distance with the narrator’s voice reading from Holinshed’s Chronicles:  
 
Determined to put on the shape of a new man, this Henry was a captain of such prudence and 
such policy that he never enterprised anything before it forecast the main chances that it might 
happen.  So humane withal, he left no offence unpunished, no friendship unrewarded. For 
conclusion, a majesty was he that both lived and died a pattern in princehood, a lodestar in honour, 
famous to the world always. 
 
Holinshed’s panegyric of Henry V – which once again represents the voice of history 
– cannot help being utterly spoiled or betrayed by the spectacle of Falstaff being buried in 
the midst of a desolate wasteland. In a final irony, this ultimate contrast between word and 
image completes the whole film’s operation to re-inscribe the rhetoric of official history into 
the crude material reality. As a matter of fact, the ironic discrepancy between them conveyed 
through the representation of the battle, of the purgative aftermath that follows and of the 
unrelenting struggle for the crown could find striking resonances in the world-wide situation 
in which the film was shot and released.  
 
To begin with, the battle sequence at Shrewsbury, in which Welles’s soldiers are 
more like unfortunate wretches who exhaustingly and inelegantly have to clobber one 
another with their axes, clubs, spears and chains, has always been put in strong opposition to 
the colourful pageantry at Agincourt in Laurence Olivier’s Henry V (1944), where 
immaculate cavaliers on dashing horses “rid[e] out of the castle, and suddenly they are on a 
golf course somewhere charging each other.”60 In a crudely realistic illustration of Falstaff's 
understanding that war’s appetite is fed by “mortal men,” and that war can make all of us 
“food for powder”, the sequence puts the human cost of war in the limelight. Like Falstaff’s 
own “catechism” on honour, in fact, Welles’s black-and-white, muddy, wearing wrestling 
match unmasks the ‘heroic’ motives that call men to war as empty and grotesquely inhuman 
ideology. If Olivier’s propagandistic rendering of the battle of Agincourt as Hal’s unsullied 
triumph is framed within the patriotic necessity to support England’s military effort against 
Nazi-fascism, Welles’s slow, painful, exhausting depiction of a primal destructive rite at 
Shrewsbury is built instead on the ruins of those wars from which Spain and the rest of 
Europe had recently been rising – which were nevertheless still visible at the horizon. While 
                                                 




Chimes was being shot, in fact, an official interdiction in Spain prohibited representations of 
the civil war61; still, a Spanish audience in 1965 could easily be affected by this sequence as 
a crude reminder of the recent horrors. The rest of 1965-66 Europe too, which had just come 
out of two world wars and was entering the second decade of a Cold War, could not have 
remained indifferent at such a view. Within the conflictual climate of the mid-’60s, 
particularly with the growing escalation of the war in Vietnam, the Shrewsbury sequence in 
Chimes at Midnight has been interpreted by many commentators as an anti-war statement 
that brought Welles (and Falstaff) close to the growing youth counterculture.62  
Beside Europe, then, it is the North American audience Welles had left behind that 
might have felt vibrantly alive issues like the harsh reality beyond what was presented as a 
crusade against a dangerous (external) enemy. At the time Chimes was released in the 
United States (17 March 1967), the country’s involvement in Vietnam, begun right after 
World War II (September 1950) in support of the French colonial army in what was then 
French Indochina, had rapidly turned into one of the wars of the Western Bloc in order to 
contain the spread of Communism. U.S. involvement escalated further in 1964 when, with 
the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin” incident and the following “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution”, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson was given authorization to increase the American military 
presence in South-Vietnam. The reasons President Johnson had adduced for committing his 
country to (an undeclared) war, if not omitted like Hal’s reasons to invade France in the 
film, were at least as arbitrary, and sometimes the result of a wilful manipulation. The Gulf 
of Tonkin incident – in which the destroyer USS Maddox was said to have been attacked 
twice by North Vietnamese torpedo boats – was in fact used as a deliberate justification for 
sending U.S. combat units, which glossed over the American interest in preventing a 
Communist takeover of South-Vietnam and preserving its control over South-East Asia. As 
the evidence collected for an internal National Security Agency report demonstrated much 
later (2005), the second Gulf of Tonkin incident Johnson is talking right after never actually 
happened, and in the first one it was the USS Maddox to have opened the fire first on North 
Vietnamese boats, while the Johnson administration had stated the opposite:  
 
[R]enewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin 
have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply. The 
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initial attack on the destroyer 'Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile 
vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. […] In the larger sense this new act of 
aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in the United States the 
importance of the struggle for peace and security in southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the 
peaceful villagers of South Viet-Nam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas 
against the United States of America. The determination of all Americans to carry out our full 
commitment to the people and to the government of South Viet-Nam will be redoubled by this 
outrage.63 
 
Similarly to the strategy Henry IV suggests to Hal, further legitimacy for the military 
action in Vietnam was gained over the years through a constant propaganda that would build 
up an external enemy out of the North-Vietnamese government and the Communist threat it 
represented in South-East Asia as well as all over the world: 
 
If we are driven from the field in Vietnam, then […] [i]n each land the forces of 
independence would be considerably weakened, and an Asia so threatened by Communist 
domination would certainly imperil the security of the United States itself.64 
 
Vietnam is also the scene of a powerful aggression that is spurred by an appetite for 
conquest. It is the arena where Communist expansionism is most aggressively at work in the world 
today – where it is crossing international frontiers in violation of international agreements; where it 
is killing and kidnapping; where it is ruthlessly attempting to bend free people to its will.65 
 
Besides justifying Johnson’s foreign policy in South-East Asia and omitting his 
change of strategy from defence to aggression, a further discrepancy between ‘words’ and 
‘actual reality’ in the context of the Vietnam war came from the “policy of minimum 
candour” the Pentagon employed in its dealings with the media. In official statements, 
military information officers emphasised stories that portrayed progress in the war that 
openly contradicted the media’s coverage of the war, up to the point of creating a so-called 
“credibility gap” between the government’s claims and the actual situation:  
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[A]re the Vietnamese – with our help, and that of their other allies – really making any 
progress? Is there a forward movement? The reports I see make it clear that there is. Certainly there 
is a positive movement toward constitutional government. […] There is progress in the war itself, 
steady progress considering the war that we are fighting; rather dramatic progress considering the 
situation that actually prevailed when we sent our troops there in 1965; when we intervened to 
prevent the dismemberment of the country by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. The 
campaigns of the last year drove the enemy from many of their major interior bases. The military 
victory almost within Hanoi’s grasp in 1965 has now been denied them. The grip of the Vietcong on 
the people is being broken.66 
 
By 1967, in fact, not only had public trust in government pronouncements begun to 
be damaged, but a period of great social upheaval was about to start in the U.S.A., in which 
the hippie counterculture of the forthcoming “Summer of Love” carried on more and more 
protests against the war in Vietnam and allowed anti-war feelings to reach critical mass in a 
short time. Aware, by then, of the human price they were paying for their crusade against 
Communism, part of the American audience might have related to people on ‘the other side 
of history’, like Falstaff, who is actually killed by words. More than that, a movie like 
Chimes at Midnight, in which rhetoric is distrusted and displaced by the immediate 
physicality of the image, could easily be associated to the growing counterculture in the 
U.S.A. that denounced the actual horrors of war against the dominant military propaganda. 
Commentators like Douglas Brode have carried the connection between the film and the 
growing youth movement even further: 
 
Filmed during the mid-sixties, mostly in Barcelona and Madrid, Falstaff fits the tenor of 
those times. Welles’s vision of the rift between Henry IV […] and Hal […] is formed by the 
generation-gap conflict, with Falstaff as an aged hippie guru, part Timothy Leary (“sack” 
substituting for LSD) and part merry prankster Ken Kesey, while the tavern itself is depicted as a 
virtual commune, an Elizabethan Alice’s Restaurant. Battle scenes, brilliantly realized in 
unglamorous black and white, were aimed squarely at the youth audience during that era of divisive 
war in Vietnam.67  
 
The director himself, after the film’s release, began to make slight connections to 
contemporary events: “[Falstaff]’s good in the sense that the hippies are good […] He’s just 
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shining with love; he asks for so little, and in the end, of course, he gets nothing.”68 On the 
“Dean Martin Show” in 1968, Welles went as far as to call Falstaff a “swinger”: “He [Sir 
John Falstaff] was a… well, he was a… he was what you might call a “swinger”, only 15th 
century they didn’t call them “swingers”, but they swung, and nobody more so than Sir 
John.”69 As a matter of fact, Falstaff’s disparaging and mocking of authority has often been 
interpreted as the ultimate aspect that can make such a character socially relevant, especially 
within the growing youth movement of the mid-’60s. Falstaff’s ‘anti-conformism’ was also 
very easily connected to Welles’s own artistic and personal biography (particularly in 
relation to his lifelong challenge towards the Hollywood filmmaking norm and his manifest 
leftist political views), so that when Bosley Crowther in his harsh review of Chimes asked of 
Welles’s Falstaff: “[h]as he, deep down, a spirit of rebellion against stuffy authority? Or is 
he merely what he looks like – a dissolute bumbling, street-corner Santa Claus?”70 he is very 
likely to be speaking about Welles himself. As if to confirm such a comparison, while in 
Europe he had “entered the treacherous domain of the avant-garde”71 and achieved the status 
of international auteur, of a cineaste at the top of the pantheon, Welles was (just like 
Falstaff) considered as a waste of talent, and once again and definitely rejected by his home 
country’s ‘authorities’. Although American reviews of Chimes were, all in all, more 
favourable than it might have been expected, some of the negative ones (like Crowther’s) 
were still so influential as to contribute to the unfortunate release and distribution of the film 
all over the United States.72 
Thus, part of the American audience was not only discouraged, but also prevented in 
a way from watching Chimes at Midnight on its first release.73 Those very qualities that 
made critics like Crowther call the film “a confusing patchwork of scenes and characters” 
with a “fuzzy and incomprehensible”74 dialogue track are here interpreted precisely as the 
faultlines that bring about the dismantling potential of the sublime in the film’s aesthetics. 
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Welles’s visual style in Chimes at Midnight is a continuous challenge to the audience’s 
judgement: through the visibly distorting presence of the camera, the viewer shifts away 
from the logicality of the events and actions depicted to focus instead on the incoherence 
between sound and image displayed on the screen. The result is that the film “approaches 
something resembling pure cinema, images and sounds, that have an emotional and 
intellectual resonance apart from rational discourse”75, with a consequent direct, sensory and 
astounding impact on the audience. Shakespeare’s words are deprived of any rhetorical force 
by being filtered through a disjointed filmic material, whose disassembling action also 
determines the exchange between the work of art and the material conditions of its 
reception. Accordingly acting on the audience, the “incredible unevenness”76 of the film, 
more than a mere flaw, could be working as a means to awake a parallel process within the 
spectators’ mind, which would lead them to question univocal, pre-established 
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Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?  
by Pier Paolo Pasolini 
 
The following chapter is dedicated to Pier Paolo Pasolini’s short film Che Cosa Sono 
le Nuvole? (What Are the Clouds?), a 1968 appropriation of Shakespeare’s Othello. 
Although it was released as one of the six episodes of the feature film Capriccio all’Italiana 
(Caprice, Italian Style, dir. Mauro Bolognini, Mario Monicelli, Pier Paolo Pasolini, Franco 
Rossi, Steno, Pino Zac, 1968), Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole? was conceived by Pasolini as a 
fragment of a larger project, “un grosso film fatto di episodi, ora lunghi ora brevi, tutti 
comici. Doveva intitolarsi Che cos’è il cinema?, addirittura, oppure, più modestamente, 
Smandolinate.” (“a [long-feature] film made up of episodes; some long, some short, but all 
comical. The title was supposed to be What is Cinema?, or, more modestly, Smandolinate 
[Flattery].”1) In Pasolini’s intention, such a project should have been a film made up of 
fairy-tales (“un film che fosse fatto di favole”2), a sequence of four comic-grotesque or 
picaresque short films, all of which should have been interpreted by a young Roman non-
professional actor, Ninetto Davoli, and the Neapolitan comic icon Totò (stage name of 
Antonio de Curtis). The latter’s sudden death in April 1967, right after the shooting of 
Nuvole, was what actually impeded the realization of the project, for which only two 
episodes (La Terra Vista dalla Luna and Nuvole) were completed. As one of the titles the 
director already had in mind suggests (Che Cos’è il Cinema?, “What is Cinema?”), such a 
film was meant to mark a brand new step in his exploration of the potentialities of the 
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4.1 Adaptation as Incorporation 
 
Pasolini’s cinematographic inspiration was born in clear opposition to the naturalistic 
or documentary poetics of the dying Italian Neo-realism, which at the beginning of the 
1960s he found historically overcome and inadequate to express his own “philosophical and 
reverential love”4 for reality:  
 
La mia ispirazione cinematografica, sorta nel cuore degli anni Cinquanta, che si è sviluppata 
ed è in via di costante trasformazione, è nata dalla poetica di Gramsci e dalla sua idea di una grande 
letteratura nazionalpopolare. Questo ha fatto sì che superassi le posizioni del neorealismo, troppo 
strettamente liriche e documentarie, in favore di un tentativo di maggiore epicità, che non è l’epicità 
brechtiana, è un tipo di epicità più latina, classicheggiante. Fondandomi si quest’idea 
nazionalpopolare di Gramsci, ho dato al realismo una svolta personale che definirei mitica o epica.5  
 
Pasolini’s rejection of mimetic realism or naturalism in favour of an artistic form that 
reconstructs or reproduces reality through a self-referential process of “contaminatio, a 
plurality of superimposed styles” 6 was going to find in the cinematic adaptation a very 
appropriate instrument. As a form of art that entails the coming together of multiple 
perspectives, adaptation already embodies Pasolini’s strategy to create artworks that display 
the constructedness of their form – which is further developed through the proliferation 
(typical of the whole of his filmography) of meta-pictorial, meta-theatrical and meta-
cinematic devices. Though it runs for barely 22 minutes, Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole? is not 
only exemplary in this sense, but also points to a further progress in Pasolini’s conception of 
the self-referentiality of the work of art. Nuvole, more than a simple adaptation or 
appropriation, can be seen as an overall act of artistic ‘cannibalism’ or ‘incorporation’, made 
in its turn of several other acts of cannibalism. The choice of such words can be explained 
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with a brief reference to Pasolini’s previous film, Uccellacci e Uccellini (Hawkes and 
Sparrows, 1966), where a black crow (the incarnation of the Marxist intellectual, like 
Togliatti or Pasolini himself) preaches to its disciples (already interpreted by the father-son 
couple Totò-Ninetto Davoli) that “i professori sono fatti per essere mangiati in salsa 
piccante” (“masters are meant to be eaten in a spicy sauce”7) before they dutifully proceed to 
eat their own master, the crow. As Pasolini himself commented,  
 
I due compiono un atto di cannibalismo, quello che i cattolici chiamano comunione: 
ingoiano il corpo di Togliatti (ossia dei marxisti) e lo assimilano; dopo averlo assimilato proseguono 
per la loro strada, così che anche se uno non sa dove la strada porta, è ovvio che hanno assimilato il 
marxismo. […] Prima di essere mangiato il corvo dice: “I maestri sono fatti per essere mangiati in 
salsa piccante.” Devono essere mangiati e superati, ma se il loro insegnamento ha un valore ci resterà 
dentro.8 
 
Taking the hint from Jacques Derrida’s observations in an interview with Jean-Luc 
Nancy, real and symbolic incorporation or cannibalism has been defined as a fundamental 
cultural practice related to the dominant “carnivorous” and “sacrificial” structure of the 
human subject: “The subject does not want just to master and possess nature actively. In our 
cultures he accepts sacrifice and eats flesh.” Playing on the double meaning of the French 
word chef  (i.e., chef as the head of the kitchen; chef as the political head of a state), Derrida 
adds: “The chef must be an eater of flesh (with a view, moreover, to being ‘symbolically’ 
eaten himself).”9 What the philosopher suggests is that dominion, including that over one’s 
self, has to do with eating the “other,” and that this incorporation, as both a real and 
symbolic operation, is by its very nature made of repeated performances. Like any other act 
that aims at the foundation of power, incorporation is in fact not achieved once and for all, in 
the first place because it is compellingly haunted by the spectre of that which is being 
incorporated, which makes it potentially reversible.10 Derrida’s discourse on incorporation 
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implies the psychoanalytic concept of unheimlich, or uncanny, defined by Freud as “a class 
of morbid anxiety” that derives from “something repressed which recurs. […] [T]his 
uncanny is in reality nothing new or foreign, but something familiar and old-established in 
the mind, that has been estranged only by the process of repression.”11 The Freudian 
uncanny delineates the “other” as immanent to the self, bringing it back from the Outside 
and recognising it in the Within, implying repeated shifts among boundaries that radically 
dissolve them. Incorporation, as an empowering process through which a subject takes over 
an object by materially or symbolically eating it, can thus give way to the uncanny. As 
Derrida himself points out, the very compelling repetitiveness of incorporation makes it 
potentially reversible: if the primary intention of such a process is that of mastering 
otherness by dissolving its difference into an unique, enhanced self, the repeated crossing of 
boundaries actually suspends the difference between ‘self’ and ‘other’. What actively eats is 
thus at the same time passively eaten itself, and the empowered self is one thing with the 
disempowered other.  
Incorporation, as intended by Pasolini, can be basically connected to representation 
as a form of power. More than that, we could define it precisely an empowerment-
disempowerment process which relies on the relentless, always renewed coming back of 
what is incorporated. As he briefly explained talking about Uccellacci e Uccellini, the 
masters’ bodies (for instance, Jesus’s for the catholic, Togliatti’s for the communist) need to 
be eaten and overcome, but in a way they are compelled to leave a residue which always 
comes back to haunt, renewing and disturbing power relations. Translated to a textual level, 
this very process of incorporation seems to structure Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?, where 
Shakespeare’s Othello is similarly “eaten and assimilated”: it is killed, torn into pieces, and 
then reborn through a new creation, a re-composition within a rich web of visual and verbal 
citations. Such a process, viewed as a kind of religious sacrifice that brings new life out of a 
death, is ideologically based on the continuity between death and life themselves; as Pasolini 
described it: “L’ideologia di fondo è un’ideologia picaresca, la quale, come tutte le cose di 
pura vitalità, maschera un’ideologia più profonda, che è l’ideologia della morte.” (“The 
basic structure is picaresque, which, like all things representing pure vitality, masks 
something deeper, namely, the ideology of death.”12)  
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The short film opens with an outline of this very ideology of life and death: the 
opening sequence shows a garbage man (interpreted by Domenico Modugno, an extremely 
popular Italian singer, immediately recognisable both by a 1960s and a contemporary 
audience), who sings a passionate love song while collecting a huge trash can filled with the 
outtakes of an edited film. In alternate shots, it also shows a puppeteer (played by the poet 
Francesco Leonetti) crafting a human-sized puppet, whose chocolate-coloured face already 
tells us he is Othello (Ninetto Davoli). The newborn puppet is soon grouped with the other 
semi-human puppets (more precisely, they are “pupi”, Sicilian Marionettes), among which 
we can distinguish the puppets of Iago (Totò), with his bright-green-painted face and red 
tongue; a doll-like and childish Desdemona (Laura Betti); Cassio (Franco Franchi) and 
Brabantio (Carlo Pisacane). Othello is awakened to his life as a puppet by the garbage 
collector’s passionate love song, which charms him with an inexplicable joy: “Otello il 
Moretto arde dal desiderio di parlare con qualcuno, di esprimere qualcosa che ha dentro, che 
non sa cosa sia, ma lo rende espansivo come un cagnolino… Si rivolge al più vicino, alla 
dolce faccia verde di Jago.”13 (“Othello the handsome/little Moor14 craves to talk to 
somebody, to express something he feels inside. He doesn’t know what it is, but it makes 
him expansive like a little dog… He turns to the puppet next to him, to the sweet green face 
of Iago.”)  
 
Othello: Come so’ contento!  
Cassio: Eh, beato te! 
Desdemona: [laughs] Quant’è carino! 
Othello: Perché so’ così contento? 
Brabantio: Perché sei nato! 
Othello: Perché? Che vor di’ che so’ nato? 
Iago: Vuol dire che… ci sei. 
Othello: Ah…! [he hears the garbage man singing] E questo che è? 
Iago: L’immondezzaro che canta. 
Othello: L’immondezzaro? E che fa? 
                                                 
13 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?”, in Walter Siti, Franco Zabagli (eds.), Pier Paolo Pasolini:  
Per il Cinema: Sceneggiature (e trascrizioni); Commenti per documentari; Sceneggiature in collaborazione e 
materiali per film altrui; Idee, soggetti, trattamenti; "Confessioni tecniche" e altro; Interviste e dibatitti sul 
cinema, Vol. 1, Milano: Mondadori, 2001, p. 936.  
14 Pasolini here creates a pun based on the ambivalence of the Italian word “moretto”: colloquially, it means 
 “dark-haired boy” and is used in Roman slang to address handsome boys in a familiar or informal way.  





Iago: E’ uno che viene, e se ne va. Sì, viene, prende i morti, prende i morti e se ne va.15 
 
In the first dialogue, the joyous, naïve Othello is taught by a wise, paternal Iago 
about life and death: while his unwitting merriment comes from his mere “being there”, that 
is, by his presence in the world (still limited to the theatre), the singing voice of the garbage 
man coming from outside signals the existence of a reality beyond the theatre itself – 
namely, death, which comes and goes taking the dead puppets away. While introducing the 
thematic connection between life and death, the opening sequence also presents how the 
film’s ideological basis translates into the structural appropriation or incorporation of a 
multiple, fragmented source ‘coming back to life’ as a new, personal compound. The love 
song that the garbage man sings from the very beginning of the film (which takes the title 
from the film itself, was written by Pasolini and put into music by Modugno) can be 
recognised as a revision of some of the lines from the Italian translation of Othello’s text: 
 
Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole: Ch’io possa esser dannato 
       Se non ti amo. 
           E se così non fosse 
           Non capirei più niente. 
 Othello (Italian translation): (Otello) Straordinaria creatura! Ch’io sia dannato 
             Se non ti amo; e quando più non ti amerò 
         Sarà di nuovo il caos.16  
 Othello: (Othello) Excellent wretch, perdition catch my soul, 
    But I do love thee, and when I love thee not, 
    Chaos is come again. (III.iii.91-93) 
 
 Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole: Tutto il mio folle17 amore 
                                                 
15 All quotes from the dialogues in Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole? are taken directly from the film throughout the  
chapter,. “Othello: I’m so happy! Cassio: Lucky you! Desdemona: He’s so cute! Othello: Why am I so happy?  
Brabantio: Because you’re born! Why? What does it mean that I am born? Iago: It means that… you are there.  
Othello: Ah…! And what’s this? Iago: It’s the garbage man who’s singing. Othello: The garbage man? And  
what does he do? Iago: He’s one who comes and goes. Yes, he comes, picks up the dead, picks up the dead  
and goes away.” Where not otherwise indicated, the translation of quotes from the film is mine. 
16 William Shakespeare, Othello, trans. by Sergio Perosa, Milano: Garzanti, 2010, p. 103. All of the further 
quotes from both Othello and its Italian translation refer to this edition. 
17 As Anna Maria Cimitile observes, “[s]ince the nineteenth century, Italian translations have rendered ‘fond  
love’ as alternatively ‘folle amore’ or ‘tenero amore’. In a twentieth-century translation that would have been 
available to Pasolini, Emilio Cecchi and Suso Cecchi D’Amico translated ‘fond love’ as ‘folle amore’ (Otello, 
in Shakespeare, Teatro, Vol. III, a cura di Mario Praz, Firenze, Sansoni, 1964, p. 160). The Italian expression 
turns ‘fondness’ into ‘folly’, as it can also refer to an excessive, literally mad or crazy (‘folle’) love, and the 
translators who have adopted it somehow make Othello’s remark anticipate the tragic outcome of his feeling, 




           Lo soffia il cielo 
           Lo soffia il cielo 
           Così… 
 Othello (Italian translation): (Otello) Tutto il mio folle amore lo disperdo  
        Nell’aria, con un soffio… è svanito. (p. 127) 
Othello: (Othello) All my fond love thus do I blow to heaven,… 
   ’Tis gone. (III.iii.452-453) 
 
 Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole: Ah! Malerba soavemente delicata 
           Di un profumo che dà gli spasimi 
           Ah, ah! Tu non fossi mai nata! […] 
 Othello (Italian translation): (Otello) O nera gramigna, leggiadra a vedersi, 
                      Profumata da far dolere i sensi, 
         Se tu non fossi mai nata! (p. 165) 
Othello: (Othello) O thou black weed, why art so lovely fair? 
   Thou smell’st so sweet, that the sense aches at thee,  
   Would thou hadst ne’er been born! (IV.ii.69-71) 
 
 Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole: Il derubato che sorride 
           Ruba qualcosa al ladro 
           Ma il derubato che piange 
           Ruba qualcosa a se stesso, 
           Perciò io mi dico 
           Finché sorriderò 
           Tu non sarai perduta. 
 Othello (Italian translation): (Doge) Il derubato che ci ride su, deruba il ladro stesso: 
             Indulgere a un vano dolore è derubar se stesso. (p. 37) 
 Othello: (Duke) The robb’d that smiles, steals something from the thief,  
    He robs himself, that spends a bootless grief. (I.iii.208-209)          
 
 Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole: Ma queste son parole 
           E non ho mai sentito 
           Che un cuore, un cuore affranto 
           Si cura con l’udito. […] 
 Othello (Italian translation): (Brabanzio) Ma le parole volano, e non ho mai sentito 
                                                                                                                                                                  





             Che dall’orecchio si curi il cuor ferito. (p. 37) 
 Othello: (Brabantio) But words are words; I never yet did hear 
    That the bruis’d heart was pierced through the ear. (I.iii.218-219) 
 
Pasolini thus literally cuts and pastes what he deems significant scraps of 
Shakespeare’s text to make a passionate love song out of them, which, sung while the 
garbage man (death) takes the rubbish away, is at once part of a funeral rite. The first stanza 
and the refrain select the lines which play a central role in the economy of the source text 
(Act III, Scene iii); namely, lines 91-93, while lyrically giving voice to Othello’s love for 
Desdemona, also suggest the prolexis of his destructive folly, the coming back of “chaos”. 
On the other hand, the refrain (lines 452-453) marks the accomplishment of Iago’s 
poisoning of Othello’s ear with the insinuation of doubt about Desdemona’s fidelity, his 
defeat and blind acceptance of Iago’s point of view. The lines that make up the second 
stanza (IV.ii.69-71) are pronounced by Othello as a curse on Desdemona and her deceitful 
appearance; whereas the third and fourth stanzas go back to the exchange between Brabantio 
and the Duke in Act I, Scene iii, following Desdemona’s betrayal of her father. In answer to 
Brabantio’s lamentations, the Duke points out the futility of despair and regret (lines 208-
209), while Brabantio replies underlining the ineffectiveness of words after a loss (lines 218-
219).18 
By picking up words from the source text in such a way as to entwine Othello’s vital 
“fond love” with the necessity to kill Desdemona, the garbage man’s song announces that 
the cyclical connection between death and life sustains Nuvole both thematically and 
structurally. Seen as a prelude to the film, the song may first of all allude to the fact that 
Othello’s text is ‘killed’ by being torn into pieces. Besides, including a brief reflection on 
the vanity of words may suggest that a verbal text generally loses importance by being 
reassembled with music, as well as within the cinematographic medium. As a matter of fact, 
Pasolini himself wrote in relation to poetry that “in ogni poesia si ha una dilatazione 
semantica, dallo scarto tra il senso della parola e il suo suono” (“in each poem there is a 
semantic dilation, produced gap between the meaning of the word and its sound”), and that 
“[è] il suono che deraglia, deforma, propaga per altre strade il senso” (“It is the sound that 
derails, deforms, propagates the meaning through other paths”).19 There follows that the 
                                                 
18 See Lino Belleggia, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole? di Pier Paolo Pasolini”, in Agostino Lombardo (ed.),  
Shakespeare e il Novecento, Roma: Bulzoni Editore, 2002, pp. 244-245. 





same process is increased when music is added to the word as in a song, since it “destroys 
the sound of the word and substitutes it with another one,”20 namely its own, thus creating 
an even more significant “semantic dilation.” The fact that the interpreter of the song is 
Domenico Modugno adds to Pasolini’s ‘creative destruction’ of Shakespeare’s text and to 
the consequent distance of meaning from words. Modugno’s very personal, passionate 
singing style links the song inextricably to his performance, where his unique voice and 
music envelop the words, submerging them in a wave of emotions that muddles their 
semantic value adding a new meaning of their own. This very process is transposed onto a 
wider level when we consider the song and its performance as part of a cinematographic 
work of art. In fact, interposing the shots of the singing garbage man with those of the 
(silent) creation of the puppet Othello may also suggest that we are going to assist to a re-
birth of Shakespeare’s text within a medium that uses not only words, but the actions of 
reality as a whole as its means of expression. This incorporation of one or more texts within 
cinema as the “written language of reality”, with its potentially infinite levels of 
representation, entails the coming together of a multitude of perspectives, as the second 
introductory frame in the film demonstrates.  
As the camera cuts from the back room where the puppets are stored to the outer wall 
of the theatre, it focuses on four posters advertising recent and future shows. The first one, 
lying on the ground covered in dust and partly torn, says: “Ieri: La Terra Vista dalla Luna” 
(“Yesterday: The Earth Seen from the Moon”); hanging on the wall there is a 
“Prossimamente: Mandolini” (“Coming Soon: Mandolins”); next to which a poster that says: 
“Domani: Le Avventure del Re Magio Randagio e il suo Schiavetto Schiaffo (“Tomorrow: 
The Adventures of the Stray Wise Man and his Little Slave Schiaffo”); whereas the one on 
the background tells us that the show of today is Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole? Shifting from a 
meta-theatrical to a meta-cinematographic level, the titles of the shows actually advertise the 
four short films which should have been part of Pasolini’s project Che Cos’è il Cinema? or 
Smandolinate. As the sequence of the posters highlights, La Terra Vista dalla Luna has 
already been made, while Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole is the movie we are watching “today”, 
right now; the remaining two posters announce the two episodes which, in Pasolini’s 
intention, should have followed in a short time, but that he never actually completed. To the 
meta-theatrical and meta-cinematographic levels, Pasolini adds a third one, namely, a meta-
                                                                                                                                                                  
1997, p. 1597. The English translation in quoted from Daniela Bini, “High and Low Art, Inadequacy of Words, 
and Self-referentiality in Pasolini’s Che cosa sono le nuvole?”, Italica, Vol. 90, No. 2 (Summer 2013), pp. 
227-244, p. 238. 
20 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Il cinema e la lingua orale” first published in Cinema nuovo, 201, September-October  




pictorial one, since all of the four posters show reproductions of some of the works by the 
17th-century Spanish painter Diego de Silva y Velázquez: El bufón don Diego de Acedo, el 
Primo (1645) for La Terra Vista dalla Luna; El príncipe Baltasar Carlos con un enano 
(1631) for Mandolini; the portrait of Felipe IV en Fraga (1644) for Le Avventure del Re 
Magio Randagio e il suo Schiavetto Schiaffo. At last, the show we are about to watch, Che 
Cosa Sono le Nuvole? is introduced by one of Velázquez’s most famous paintings, Las 
Meninas (1656).  
As far as we know, the last painting may have been brought to Pasolini’s attention by 
Michel Foucault’s Les Mots et les Choses, which, published in 1966 and translated into 
Italian the next year, Pasolini had probably been reading right before shooting Nuvole.21 
Foucault’s philosophical study opens with a detailed focus on Las Meninas, analysed as one 
of the clearest examples of ‘representation of a representation’, as it shows Velázquez 
himself in the very act of portraying the royal couple Felipe IV and Mariana of Austria. 
While we can see the painter next to a large canvas, his models stand outside the ‘real’ 
painting, and we can see only their image reflected in a mirror in the background. What we 
do see is a group of apparently secondary characters: the young infanta Margarita Teresa 
with her entourage of maids of honour, chaperone, bodyguard, the dwarves Mari Bárbola 
and Nicolasito Pertusato, and a dog, who are there to observe the portraying of the royal 
couple’s ‘official’ painting. The subject of the real painting is thus the background of the 
official one, or what stands behind the act of representation itself, which brings marginal 
characters like dwarves and maids of honour to the centre of the picture and pushes the royal 
couple out of focus. Dwarves were also the subject of the paintings by Velázquez previously 
shown, alone or accompanying the official portraits of royal subjects, which could be 
consistent with Svetlana Alpers’s observation that “[a]t court, as in a picture, order is 
produced by acts of representation.” In her essay on Las Meninas, in fact, she argues that 
“pictorial representation, an aesthetic order, engages also a social one”22:  
 
Seen one way, Las Meninas is a picture about the role of framing: frames in the form of 
pictures, a mirror, doors and windows measure out the walls at the back and to the right, while the 
                                                 
21 In a 1966 essay entitled “La fine dell’avanguardia” (“The end of the avant-garde”; Nuovi Argomenti, 3-4, 
July-December 1966; now in Pier Paolo Pasolini, Empirismo Eretico, cit., pp. 128-149), Pasolini mentions “un 
nuovo libro di Foucault che non ho ancora letto” (“a new book by Foucault which I haven’t read yet”); from 
which we can assume that he began to read Foucault’s Les Mots et les Choses a short time after that, between 
the end of 1966 and the beginning of 1967. 
22 Svetlana Alpers, “Interpretation without Representation, or, The Viewing of Las Meninas”, Representations,  





edge of the large canvas intrudes at the left. The king, queen, and their daughter the princess who is 
posing for them, are known by being framed. But there is contrary testimony offered by the picture 
as a whole. It is, […], distinctly unframed, admitting of no bounds and thus with its odd disruption of 
significant size it contradicts the order established in the framing of the court.23 
 
If it is true that “[t]he nature and condition of the social order continued to puzzle 
Velázquez,”24 and that “[t]he dwarfs and fools at court, like the painted peasants or foundry 
workers, display a certain misrule,”25 the disruption of bounds within the painting may have 
interested Pasolini far more than the potential subversion of court hierarchies. According to 
Foucault’s analysis of the painting, by being pushed out of focus, Felipe IV and his wife are 
what all the characters in the picture are looking at, and so they are the point around which 
the whole representation is organised. This way, the whole painting contemplates a picture 
for which it is, in its turn, a picture to contemplate. In fact, as Carl Justi reported in his study 
Diego Velázquez und sein Jahrhundert (Diego Velázquez and His Times, 1888), Las 
Meninas may have been born thanks to Felipe IV’s observation that the infanta and her 
maids assisting to the making of the royal couple’s portrait looked like a picture themselves, 
hence his request to Velázquez to make a painting of them too.26 This second painting would 
thus represent a court scene within a court scene, which we can look at from the point of 
view of the king (whose image appears in the mirror on the opposite wall next to that of the 
queen) as though we were looking from a stage to the audience27: “[t]he observer sees what 
the royal couple see, not what the painter sees, for he would see his meninas in a mirror 
hanging opposite him.”28 As a consequence, the invisible point outside the painting where 
the royal couple, object of the ‘painting within the painting’, stands, coincides with the 
onlooker’s own point of view:  
 
From the eyes of the painter to what he is observing there runs a compelling line that we, the 
onlookers, have no power of evading: it runs through the real picture and emerges from its surface to 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 39. 
25 Ibid., p. 40. 
26 See Marco Antonio Bazzocchi, I Burattini Filosofi: Pasolini dalla Letteratura al Cinema, Milano and 
Torino: Bruno Mondadori, 2007, p. 94. 
27 See Carl Justi, Velázquez e il Suo Tempo (1933), trans. by Mina Bacci, Firenze: Sansoni, 1958, p. 776 ss., in  
Marco Antonio Bazzocchi, op. cit., p. 94. 




join the place from which we see the painter observing us; this dotted line reaches out to us 
ineluctably, and links us to the representation of the picture.29  
 
The painter’s gaze, being able to capture all the figures standing outside the painting, 
turns the onlooker too into the object, rather than just the recipient, of representation: 
 
As soon as they place the spectator in the field of their gaze, the painter’s eyes seize hold of 
him, force him to enter the picture, assign him a place at once privileged and inescapable, levy their 
luminous and visible tribute from him, and project it upon the inaccessible surface of the canvas 
within the picture. He sees his invisibility made visible to the painter and transposed into an image 
forever invisible to himself.30  
 
The presence of a round mirror hanging from the back wall adds to the effect of an 
exchange between the object of the painting and its spectator. Unlike Dutch painters, who 
introduced mirrors in their paintings to emphasise the mimetic power of their art, the murky 
surface of Velázquez’s mirror gives no mimetic effect nor any additional perspectives on the 
characters in the painting, but could suggest an interaction with what is outside it. While the 
onlooker is led to believe that the painter’s models reflected in the mirror might be Felipe IV 
and his wife, the indefinite reflection in it may also suggest that the mirror could be 
capturing the onlooker’s own image.31 As Foucault explains: 
 
[The mirror’s] motionless gaze extends out in front of the picture, into that necessarily 
invisible region which forms its exterior face, to apprehend the figures arranged in that space.  […] 
The unexpected mirror holds in its glow the figures that the painter is looking at […] but also the 
figures that are looking at the painter. […] For the function of that reflection is to draw into the 
interior of the picture what is intimately foreign to it: the gaze which has organised it and the gaze 
for which it is displayed.32 
 
Foucault’s analysis thus at first points out “Velázquez’s apparent resistance to his 
royal patrons by making himself the central figure of Las Meninas, standing at his ‘full 
height,’ transforming his spectator into an element within the text and the royal entourage 
                                                 
29 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1989, p. 4, in Sonia Massai, op. cit., p. 98. 
30 Ibid., pp. 4-5, in Sonia Massai, op. cit., p. 99.  
31 See Sonia Massai, op. cit., p. 99. 




into his props.”33 According to such interpretation, the ‘representation within the 
representation’ of Velázquez’s painting activates an exchange of roles between object and 
recipient of a work of art, which can blur the boundaries between what is inside and outside 
representation, and, ultimately, between fiction and reality. As his analysis of Velázquez’s 
painting proceeds, though, the French philosopher goes on to revealing the orchestration of 
its elements as a manifestation of the power that belongs to the faces in the mirror in the 
central axis, those of King Felipe IV and Queen Mariana. Thus placed, the royal couple 
becomes the true spectator, which makes representation itself part of an organised system in 
which even aesthetic innovation can only reflect and magnify an act of royal permission. 
The observer, as a mere witness to this, is granted the illusion of active spectatorship only to 
be incorporated into the hermetic, officially sanctioned message. 34 
Through Foucault’s mediation, Pasolini must have seen in Las Meninas the perfect 
manifesto for his own film, where, as in the painting, the different levels of representation 
can be intertwined up to the point of fusing one into the other. At the same time, Pasolini 
might have used the reference to the painting also more critically, as a way to develop a 
discourse on power that would come to opposite conclusions than Foucault’s. As a matter of 
fact, framing Nuvole within a musical rewriting of part of Shakespeare’s Othello and the 
meta-pictorial quotation of Las Meninas, anticipates the strategy of incorporation of the 
play-within-the film we are going to watch. By ‘eating and assimilating’ a variety of verbal 
and visual quotations, the film becomes a hybrid creature that exposes the liability of the 
boundaries defining representation. The “otherness” which is being incorporated, in fact, 
while coming back uncannily to dissolve those boundaries, testifies to the possibility not just 
to reverse incorporation, but also to resist it, creating a residue that refuses to be 
‘incorporated’ and relentlessly comes back to haunt.35 The following analysis retraces the 
incorporation of intertexts that structures Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?, underlining the role of 
the cinematographic medium not only in going beyond the source text(s), but also in 
challenging the traditional order of representation with the subversion of the pre-established 
rules and delusive categories of fiction. I shall consider Pasolini’s filmic adaptation “as a 
process of selective and partial incorporation of that which cannot be fully consumed,”36 
which finally gives shape to those haunting remainders that totally escape representation. In 
doing this, my aim is to interpret the reversion of incorporation operated by cinema within 
                                                 
33 See Anthony Guneratne, op. cit., p. 230. 
34 See Michel Foucault, op. cit., pp. 3-16, in Anthony Guneratne, op. cit., p. 230. 
35 See Maurizio Calbi, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 




the dialectic of the sublime, as a way to resist mimetic form and let pure content speak 
through it in its immediate, astounding materiality.  
   
4.2 “Un Sogno dentro un Sogno”  
 
The marionette show begins with Iago sneaking on a poor stage, smiling and 
addressing complicit the working-class audience with a Neapolitan-inflected catchphrase: 
“Adesso vi faccio vedere a questo come lo frego!” (“Now I’ll show you how I’ll make a fool 
out of him!”) While he winks at them trying to win their attention and sympathy, the one 
who is going to get fooled, Roderigo (Ciccio Ingrassia), walks in, and, following quite 
closely the Shakespearean plot, Iago entraps him in his plan against Othello: 
 
Iago: Ah! Tu non ci credi che io a Otello lo odio? Non ci credi, eh? E invece sai dove lo 
tengo io? Lo tengo qui, sulla bocca dello stomaco!  
Roderigo: Ma perché, che ti ha fatto Otello il Moro? 
Iago: Che mi ha fatto? Osi domandarmi che cosa mi ha fatto? Ha nominato luogotenente 
Cassio al mio posto! 
Roderigo: Chi? 
Iago: Cassio, quel cuore di stracci, quello che si profuma come una vecchia bagascia, e che 
si lava i denti quattro volte al giorno! 
Roderigo: Ma tu sei il suo servo, sei l’uomo di fiducia. 
Iago: Sì, eh? Ebbene sì, lo servirò, ma di barba e capelli! Morto lo voglio vedere, quel moro 
maledetto! Puah! Puah! Puah! Te’! Te’! Te’!37 
 
The text is of course heavily cut, translated into different regional varieties of Italian: 
Neapolitan for Iago; Roman for Othello; Sicilian for Cassio. The register is lowered not just 
because it is a marionette show in a small, poor theatre for a working-class audience, but 
also through the use of idiomatic expressions, puns and a comical mimicry, as we can see 
from the very first appearance of Iago and his exchange with Roderigo. As I already 
mentioned, the puppet of Iago is played by Totò, a very popular Neapolitan actor whose 
                                                 
37 “Iago: Ah! So you don’t believe that I hate Othello! You don’t believe it, do you? But I’m telling you, he  
gets in my hair! Roderigo: But why? What did Othello the Moor do to you? Iago: What did he do to me? You  
dare ask me what he did to me? He chose Cassio rather than me as his lieutenant! Roderigo: Who? Iago:  
Cassio, that coward, who puts on perfume like an old slut, and brushes his teeth four times a day! Roderigo:  
But you follow him truly. Iago: Yes I do, and I will follow him to serve my turn upon him! I want to see that  
damned Moor dead! Pfui! Pfui! Pfui!” Iago’s last exclamations of despise are accompanied by typical  




unique comical, mask-like style had turned him, as Pasolini himself described him, into “un 
attore costruito da lui stesso e dagli altri fino a diventare un tipo, […]”38, whom a 1960s 
Italian audience could unmistakably recognize through the whole of his prolific theatrical 
and filmic production. That was precisely the reason why Pasolini had chosen him: 
 
Non scelgo mai un attore per la sua bravura di attore, cioè non lo scelgo mai perché finga di 
essere qualcos’altro da quello che egli è, ma lo scelgo proprio per quello che è: quindi ho scelto Totò 
per quello che è. Tanto in Uccellacci e Uccellini quanto in La Terra Vista dalla Luna volevo un 
personaggio estremamente umano, cioè che avesse quel fondo napoletano e bonario, e così 
immediatamente comprensibile, che ha Totò. E nello stesso tempo volevo che questo essere umano 
così medio, così “brava persona” avesse anche qualcosa di assurdo, di surreale, cioè di clownesco, e 
mi sembra che Totò sintetizzi felicemente questi elementi.39  
 
Totò, among the great comical actors of Italian cinema, was known and appreciated 
maybe more than any other for his peculiar use of verbal language, which was not properly 
Neapolitan dialect, but a variety of Italian with a regional inflection typical, for instance, of 
Neapolitan immigrants in Northern Italy.40 His language was a unique mixture of Neapolitan 
idiomatic expressions, puns, or simply distorted words, proverbs and ways of saying, 
accompanied by an exceptional ability for both face and body mimicry, which has often 
been described as puppet-like – all traditionally used by comic masks “to deflate the rhetoric 
of power.”41 Totò’s absurd, almost surrealistic language and his overwhelming body 
language were in fact very clearly part of a ‘mask’, and at the same time they made his 
character all so human, naïve, normal and clownish, as Pasolini himself noted.42 The choice 
of an actor/person both surrealistic and neo-realistic43 like Totò as the human puppet playing 
Iago already tells us something about the film’s exploration of a double or multiple 
                                                 
38 Pier Paolo Pasolini in Pier Paolo Pasolini, Jon Halliday, op. cit., p. 121. “An actor whose image had been  
built by himself and by other people up to the point that he became an archetypal figure, […].”   
 
39 Pier Paolo Pasolini in Luciano De Giusti (ed.), Pier Paolo Pasolini: Il Cinema in Forma di Poesia, 
Pordenone: Cinemazero, 1979, p. 54, in Emanuela Patriarca, Totò nel Cinema di Poesia di Pier Paolo Pasolini, 
Firenze: Firenze Atheneum, 2006, pp. 140-141. “I never choose actors for their acting skills, I mean I never 
choose them because I’ll have them pretend they’re someone else, but I choose them exactly for what they are: 
so I chose Totò for what he is. For both Hawks and Sparrows and The Earth Seen from the Moon I wanted an 
extremely humane character, who possessed that Neapolitan, good-tempered quality so immediately 
comprehensible, the same as Totò’s. At the same time, I wanted such a common, “good-natured” human being 
to possess something absurd too, something surreal, clownish, and I think Totò sums up all of these elements.”  
40 Totò was actually in a similar condition, since he had left Naples and had been living in Rome since his 
early twenties and until his death in 1967. 
41 Daniela Bini, op. cit., p. 228. 
42 See Pier Paolo Pasolini in Pier Paolo Pasolini, Jon Halliday, op. cit., p. 137. 




dimension, also underlined by the interjection in the first sequence of the play-within-the 
film of countershots from outside the stage. They display alternately the audience 
applauding Iago (at first), the puppeteers moving the strings from above, and the puppet of 
Othello watching the play from behind the scenes with a sad and interrogative face.  
The extras who play the fictive audience are non-professionals, like many of the 
interpreters of Pasolini’s films. Adopting in his own peculiar way a neo-realistic cliché, the 
director selected these non-actors (street-actors) in the Roman slums to play what they 
actually were: a group of urban proletarians, entire families but also old fishwives and street 
boys.44 This working-class audience is very likely to settle down to an afternoon of family 
fun such as the one that a little marionette theatre can guarantee. It is not an unwarranted 
response, especially if we consider that, within a meta-theatrical and meta-cinematographic 
level, “[t]he play’s action up until the reunion of Othello and Desdemona in Cyprus (2.1) is 
a perfect comic structure in miniature”45, and that they may recognize Iago as Totò, the 
trickster of Italian comedy. Although they do not appear in the film, the Brabantio scenes 
were included in the original script, thus offering a sort of rudely comic interlude at the 
expense of the black outsider based on racist puns or wordplays. For instance, Iago sums up 
centuries of disputes about Othello’s ethnic background by calling him “Otello il 
Marocchino! Pardon: il Moro, il Moro! (“Otello the Moroccan!46 Pardon me: the Moor, the 
Moor!”)47, whereas an outraged Brabantio (Carlo Pisacane) goes straight for “cannibale!” 
(“cannibal!”)48. With the Doge’s calling of Othello to defend Cyprus from the Turks, which 
interrupts the scene we actually did not get to see, the character of Cassio breaks on the 
scene, interpreted by Franco Franchi. Together with Ciccio Ingrassia (who plays Roderigo), 
he was part of a Sicilian comic duo very popular among a 1960s Italian audience for their 
appearance in cheap B-movies, most often parodies. Pasolini chose them precisely for the 
affinity of their comicality with the one usually expected from or associated to a marionette 
theatre: “Li ho scelti per la loro impronta plebea, che è un po’ volgare, come 
l’avanspettacolo o come il teatro dei burattini più popolaresco: la loro comicità è un po’ 
                                                 
44 See Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?”, in Walter Siti, Franco Zabagli (eds.), op. cit., p. 939, 
in Mariangela Tempera, “‘’Twas Me Who Combed Her Hair’: Audience Participation in Two Italian 
Rewritings of Othello”, Gramma: Journal of Theory and Criticism 15 (2007): 193-210, p. 196. 
45 Susan Snyder, The Comic Matrix of Shakespeare’s Tragedies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979,  
p. 74, in Mariangela Tempera, op. cit., p. 196. 
46 “Moroccan” is derogatorily used by many Italians to identify anybody from Africa and by Northern Italians  
to refer to anybody from Southern Italy. In the script, it also represents an allusion to the journey Pasolini had 
just taken to Morocco to choose locations for his next film, Oedipus Rex. (See Mariangela Tempera, op. cit., p. 
196) 
47 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?”, in Walter Siti, Franco Zabagli (eds.), op. cit., p. 941. The  
English translation is quoted from Mariangela Tempera, op. cit., p. 196. 




abietta, forse, ma è anche immediata.”49 Franchi in particular, with his marionette-like 
mimicry, is a perfect counterpart to Totò’s own body language: following Cassio’s comic 
announcement of the imminent war (“E’ la gueeerra!” – “It’s waaar!” – he shouts laughably 
while he shakes his head), Iago’s aside is shown in countershot, while he gives shape to his 
hatred by means of comic, childish gestures such as sticking out his tongue accompanied by 
a typically Neapolitan gesticulation with his arms (quite untranslatable, it usually is a funny 
way to express scorn or disdain).   
The intervals between scenes are accompanied by the sound of mandolins played by 
a small, poor orchestra, and by the short narrative commentaries of the puppeteer interpreted 
by the poet Francesco Leonetti, one of Pasolini’s best friends, already introduced while 
crafting the puppet Othello. From above the stage, and looking straight into the camera, he is 
like a “deus ex machina” that only crafts his creatures and then controls them by pulling 
their strings and making them follow a script, without direct interventions on nor clear 
explanations of their actions. Being Leonetti himself a writer and an intellectual, his God-
like puppeteer is clearly meant to represent the role of the author towards his characters, 
with more immediate reference to Shakespeare, Velázquez, and Pasolini himself. His 
youngest creature, Othello/Ninetto Davoli, is in a way ‘created’ by the puppeteer, 
Shakespeare and Pasolini as well. Ninetto Davoli was a young Roman proletarian, whom 
Pasolini admired for his naivety and enthusiasm for life, and who, like many of the actors in 
his films, was chosen to interpret precisely who he was in his real life:  
 
C’era da poco questo rapporto in cui Pier Paolo era allo stesso tempo molto generoso e molto 
Pigmalione… Ninetto si presentava come un piccolo dolce selvaggio, apprendista falegname della 
periferia, l’ho visto a volte a delle cene con Moravia arrivare dal lavoro ancora con le mani tutte 
sporche. Ninetto era molto autentico, e Pier Paolo se lo portava sempre appresso.50 
 
The child-like innocence of Ninetto Davoli (who was nineteen when the film was 
shot) and his social and cultural foreignness make his newborn Othello even more easy for 
Iago to lead into doubt and deceive. Moreover, Davoli’s Othello is juxtaposed to Laura 
                                                 
49 Pier Paolo Pasolini in Pier Paolo Pasolini, Jon Halliday, op. cit., p. 139. “I chose them because of their  
plebeian mark, which is a bit vulgar, like curtain raiser shows or like folksy puppet shows: their comicality is a  
bit abject, perhaps, but it’s also very immediate.” 
50 Francesco Leonetti in Laura Betti, Michele Gulinucci (eds.), op. cit., p. 152, in Emanuela Patriarca, op. cit., 
p. 146. “It was not so long since Pier Paolo had been in this relationship where he was at the same time very 
generous and a sort of Pygmalion… Ninetto looked like a sweet little savage, he was an apprentice carpenter 
from the suburbs, I saw him sometimes at dinner with Moravia, he came there from work with his hands still 




Betti’s Desdemona, who, although she looks childish and doll-like here, was a rather daring 
choice, suggesting quite the opposite of sexual naivety. Another of Pasolini’s friends, Laura 
Betti was at the time better known as a jazz singer than as an actress, popular among the 
intellectual elite for the unconventional and often scandalous themes of the songs she 
interpreted.51 In line with the image such an actress offered of herself, her Desdemona plays 
a childish but teasing love-duet with Othello before their wedding night. As in a dumb show, 
they perform almost entirely without words but with an overdone mimicry a prelude to their 
love-making: they stand face to face, while Desdemona, who is wearing two pairs of bright 
red, pulpy cherries as a sort of earrings, coquettishly smiles and swings them at her newly-
wed. With a lustful gaze, Othello returns the smile and gently takes off of her ear a pair of 
cherries, kisses one and places it in his mouth. He then offers the other one to Desdemona 
who does the same, and the scene is replayed with the other pair of cherries.52 The sexual 
innuendo of the brief scene is made even more explicit through a last humorous pun, which, 
while sanctioning the success of the previous gestural communication, also underlines the 
inadequacy or the superfluity of words: prey to the excitement, Desdemona exclaims: 
“Signore mio diletto…” (“My beloved master”) and the naïve Othello, more at ease with the 
language of the body, and confused by that of words, misunderstands them and replies53: 
“Ah, già... di letto… Andiamo a letto!” (“Ah… Yes, yes… Let’s go to bed!”).54  
The love scene is interspersed with countershots of Iago peeping around the corner 
unnoticed to spy on Othello’s and Desdemona’s tender encounter, and making grimaces of 
hate and despise that irremediably look more like funny faces. When the two exit, Iago, soon 
followed by Roderigo, is free to give voice to his hatred and disgust (“Zozzoni!” – 
“Lechers!”), and then, noticing the handkerchief Desdemona has just accidentally dropped, 
he develops the scheme in which he is going to entrap Cassio, Desdemona and Othello: 
 
Iago: Un’idea! Ha ha ha! Cassio! Cassio! 
                                                 
51 See Mariangela Tempera, op. cit., pp. 195-196. 
52 The cherry earrings may be a symbolic connection to Desdemona’s handkerchief , which in Shakespeare’s 
text is described as spotted with red strawberries dyed with virgins’ blood, thus carrying with it a series of 
associations to purity as well as sin. As we are going to see, this is the very sequence in which Desdemona 
accidentally drops the handkerchief, which (with a slight twist from Shakespeare’s plot) Iago readily picks up 
and on which he develops his evil plan. 
53 See Daniela Bini, op. cit., p. 233. 
54 The pun is based on the homophony between the Italian word “diletto” (“beloved”) and the phrase “di letto” 
(literally, “of bed”, which gives way to the sexual innuendo). Pasolini changed the script slightly to make the 
scene clearer in the film. In the script, Othello replies: “Ah, già… di letto… Vieni, vieni ...” (Pier Paolo 
Pasolini, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?”, in Walter Siti, Franco Zabagli (eds.), op. cit., p. 946): while the 
separation between preposition and noun is immediately caught in reading, it could be missed in listening. (See 




Roderigo: Ma che cassio55 vai dicendo? 
Iago: Lo vedi questo? Questa è una fava, e con questa fava prendiamo due piccioni! Cosa 
vuoi che duri l’amore di Desdemona per Otello? Quel negro porco, zozzo, puzzolente! E’ negro 
dappertutto, sai? L’ho visto io! Mentre Cassio è giovine, bello, biondo, limpido, focoso, lui; focosa, 
lei, e vuoi che non avvenga – ha ha ha ha! – il patatrac? Eh!56 
 
As Iago unfolds the plot, bursting into laughter in a tragi-comic crescendo, the 
puppet Othello overhears from behind the curtains what happens on stage, looking at Iago 
with sad and incomprehensive eyes. According to Pasolini’s own description from the script: 
“Nell’angoletto dietro le quinte dove si mettono gli attori in attesa che venga il loro turno di 
entrare nel palcoscenico, Otello accoglie Jago con uno sconcertato sorriso di innocente 
offeso, che ancora non si capacita della sua triste esperienza.”57 The puppet of Othello, as a 
backstage spectator of Iago’s mischievous plot, is tortured by his facing for the first time the 
gap between reality and its representation(s). He starts questioning the truthfulness of the 
words and actions performed on stage, wondering what there is behind them, and addresses 
Iago as he exits the stage:  
 
Othello: Ammazza, Iago, te credevo così bono, così bravo, così generoso, un pezzo di pane, 
e invece… Quanto sei cattivo… Ma perché? 
Iago: Shhh…! 
Othello: Comunque me giudico da me, pure io faccio schifo, mica solo te! Ma perché 
dovemo esse’ così diversi da come se credemo, perché?! 
Iago: Eh, figlio mio, noi siamo in un sogno dentro un sogno.58 
 
                                                 
55 The assonance between the name “Cassio” and the Italian word “cazzo” (which means “penis” but is also a  
colloquial exclamation of disappointment, especially within youth language, similar to the word “fuck” in 
English) creates a sexually implicit pun.  
56 “Iago: I have an idea! Ha! Ha! Ha! Cassio! Cassio! Roderigo: What the heck are you saying? Iago: Look at  
this! This is a stone, and with this stone we’ll kill two birds! How long do you think Desdemona’s love for  
Othello is going to last? That pig, filthy, stinking nigger! He’s black all over, you know? I saw him! Cassio, on  
the contrary, is young, blond, handsome, fair, hot-blooded – and so is she, and how can you not expect that the  
two will eventually…? Ha! Ha! Ha! Ha!”  
57 “In the corner behind the scenes where actors wait for their turn to go onstage, Othello receives Iago with a  
bewildered smile, like an innocent man who’s been offended, and still doesn’t comprehend his sad  
experience.”  
58 “Othello: Hell, Iago, I thought you were so good, so generous, instead, how wicked you are… But why?  
Iago: Shhh! Othello: Anyhow, you are not the only one, I, too, am awful, I can judge myself, but why are we  
so different  from what we believe we are? Iago: Son, we are in a dream within a dream.” (The translation of  
Othello’s questions is quoted from Daniela Bini, op. cit., p. 230, whereas the translation of Iago’s replies is  
mine) Iago’s reply is a clear citation  of the play La Vida es Sueño (Life is a Dream, 1635-1636) by the Spanish  
17th-century dramatist Pedro Calderón de la Barca. The quotation can be examined also in a more complex net  
of intertextual relations which involves Pasolini’s own play Calderón (1966) and Velázquez’s Las Meninas,  




As we saw from the very opening sequence, the puppet Iago is offstage wise and 
fatherly, “serio e dolce, un vecchio, paziente filosofo”59 (“earnest and kind, an old, patient 
philosopher”). He unmasks the fictive, constructed dimension in which they are bound to 
live as puppets, and reveals to the astonished puppet Othello that their fiction is itself inside 
a fiction, a ‘representation of a representation’ from which the truth seems to be too far off 
to be seen or understood. The backstage of the theatre, being a liminal space in-between 
fiction and what is outside, offers a momentary escape from mimetic representation, the 
suspension of whose rules and categories allows the puppets to question and ultimately 
dissolve them, looking for what is beyond. Like the mirror in Velázquez’s Las Meninas, the 
behind-the-scenes non-space in Nuvole projects the characters outside into a still undefined 
absence; it suggests the existence of an unsaid “something” that uncannily resists and 
escapes onstage representation: “Lo specchio di  Velázquez e il sogno pasoliniano, nel 
comune tradimento della mimesi, intrecciano al motivo della visione quello più inquietante 
dell’elusione, quel non detto che rappresenta la cifra più autentica dell’esistenza dei 
burattini.” (“Velázquez’s mirror and Pasolini’s dream, by abandoning a mimetic intent, add 
to the motif of vision the far more disquieting one of elision, of the untold, which represents 
the most authentic feature of the puppets’ world.”)60 Iago’s quite sibylline reply is preceded 
in the script by a brief monologue that Pasolini cut out from the film, where Iago, with a 
simple, domestic metaphor, explains the rules governing (self-)representation and the 
plurality of perspectives that it entails: 
 
La nostra vita è come una polenta. Prende le forme della caldara dov’è rovesciata. Ma qual è 
questa forma? La forma della superficie della polenta contro la parete della caldara, o la forma della 
caldara, o la forma della parete della caldara che contiene la polenta? Noi siamo la polenta, e il 
giudizio degli altri è la caldara…61  
 
The metaphor brings clearly to the surface the underlying motif of the irremediable 
distance between reality and the multiple, deceiving shapes it is compelled to take to exist in 
the eyes of the world and of itself. The characters of Pasolini’s play-within-the-film seem to 
                                                 
59 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?”, cit., p. 955. 
60 Alberto Marchesini, Citazioni pittoriche nel cinema di Pasolini: da Accattone al Decameron, Firenze: La 
Nuova Italia, 1994, p. 105, in Sonia Massai, op. cit., p. 102. The English translation is quoted from Sonia 
Massai, op. cit., p. 102. 
61 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?”, cit., pp. 955-956. “Our life is like polenta. It takes the  
shape of the pot into which it is poured. But what is this shape? Is it the shape of the surface of the polenta  
against the side of the pot, or the shape of the pot, or the shape of the wall of the pot that contains the polenta?  
We are the polenta, and the other people’s judgement is the pot.” (The English translation is quoted from  




embody the tragedy of relativism starting from their very consistence of semi-human 
puppets, of fictional characters fused with real actors, who shift uncannily back and forth 
from onstage fiction to backstage liminality. As a matter of fact, “[i]n a short note within the 
opening stage direction, Pasolini employs a quasi-biblical language to describe the puppets, 
who are said to be “one and bifold” (Siti and Zabagli 2001: 935), as if their nature 
constituted a mystery similar to that of the Holy Trinity.”62 Although not explicitly 
mentioned, such motif cannot help bringing to mind the work of Luigi Pirandello, who was 
among those writers that made the multiplicity of reality one of the central concerns of 
Italian and European literature in the 20th century.63 A passage from his novel Il Fu Mattia 
Pascal (The Late Mattia Pascal), in particular, can be significantly linked to Pasolini’s 
Nuvole: 
 
 Ora senta un po’ che bizzarria mi viene in mente! Se nel momento culminante, proprio 
quando la marionetta che rappresenta Oreste è per vendicare la morte del padre sopra Egisto e la 
madre, si facesse uno strappo nel cielo di carta del teatrino, che avverrebbe? Dica lei. […] Ma è 
facilissimo, Signor Meis! Oreste rimarrebbe sconcertato da quel buco nel cielo […] sentirebbe 
ancora gl'impulsi della vendetta, vorrebbe seguirli con smaniosa passione, ma gli occhi gli 
andrebbero lì, a quello strappo, donde ogni sorta di mali influssi penetrerebbero nella scena, e si 
sentirebbe cadere le braccia. Oreste, insomma, diventerebbe Amleto. Tutta la differenza fra la 
tragedia antica e la moderna consiste in ciò, creda pure: in un buco nel cielo di carta.64  
 
Pasolini’s Othello seems to have much in common with the puppet of Orestes65: until 
he remains onstage, within the stuffy, circumscribed make-believe world of words, he is not 
                                                 
62 Sonia Massai, op. cit., p. 192.  
63 Among innumerable other examples, a quote from Pirandello’s novel Uno, Nessuno e Centomila seems to be 
in a significant connection with the previous quote from the script of Nuvole: “La realtà che ho io per voi è 
nella forma che voi mi date; ma è realtà per voi e non per me; la realtà che voi avete per me è nella forma che 
io vi do, ma è realtà per me e non per voi.” (Luigi Pirandello, Uno, nessuno e centomila,  Milano: Mondadori, 
1988, p. 60) (“The reality that I have for you is in the form that you give me; but it is reality for you and not for 
me; the reality that you have for me is in the form I give you, but it is reality for me and not for you.”) The 
English translation is quoted from Luigi Pirandello, One, No One, and One Hundred Thousand, trans. by 
William Weaver, Boston: Eridanos Press, 1990, in Daniela Bini, op. cit., p. 231. 
64 Luigi Pirandello, Il Fu Mattia Pascal, Milano: Mondadori, 1988, pp. 166-167. “But now listen what a  
strange idea came to me. Supposing that, just at the climactic moment, when the marionette representing 
Orestes is about to avenge his father’s death on Aegisthos and his mother, a hole should suddenly be torn in the 
paper ceiling over the stage – what would happen? You tell me. […] But it’s very simple, Mr. Meis! Orestes, 
of course, would be quite shocked by that hole in the sky. […] Orestes would still feel the impulses of 
vengeance, he would want to give into them with intense passion, but his eyes would turn up toward that hole, 
through which all sorts of evil influences would come down onto the stage. He would become disheartened. 
Orestes, in other words, would become Hamlet. The entire difference between the ancient tragedy and the 
modern comes down to that, I assure you, Mr. Meis – to a rent in a paper sky!” (The English translation is 
quoted from Daniela Bini, op. cit., p. 232) 




aware of being maneuvered by them, and acts according to the script, believing in what Iago 
tells him without any hesitation. The marionette theatre in the film, as a locus of illusion, is 
tellingly sealed off from the real world except for a single window, as narrow as a slit66, a 
tangible allusion to Plato’s myth of the cave according to Sonia Massai67; which, on the 
other hand, signals the existence of a “something” beyond predetermined fiction. When 
outside the site of official representation, in the liminal non-space of the backstage, Othello 
is in fact as shocked and confused as Orestes is by the hole in the paper sky: his whole 
vision of the world, all of his certainties crumble; his thoughts of vengeance are overtaken 
by doubts just like Hamlet; he raises his head and looks for the truth beyond the ‘cave wall’ 
represented by the theatre. As Massai sums it up, “Pasolini’s puppets, […], are all-too-
human, and if they are fashioned by the Shakespearean script while on stage, they are 
endowed with agency, stoical strength and self-awareness when they linger in the wings.”68 
 
Rapid shifts from behind the scenes to the stage interrupt the puppets’ moments of 
self-awareness and Othello’s search for the truth, throwing them back to predetermined 
fiction as in a logic of uncanny iteration and indeterminacy. Onstage, a second love duet is 
played between Cassio and Bianca, who, standing face to face like Othello and Desdemona, 
play with a tiny stuffed bird and a nest, whose sexual symbolism is even more explicit. 
Bianca looks invitingly at Cassio and tries to get him to put his bird into the nest she is 
holding very near her lap, while Cassio eyes her both seductively and laughably, and teases 
her repeatedly by pretending to hand the bird to her and then suddenly retracting it, much to 
Bianca’s visible disappointment. As Cassio is finally placing the bird into the nest, this 
pantomimic wooing ritual is abruptly arrested by a group of Cypriots led by Roderigo in 
disguise, who deceptively accuses him of harassing their women (“Marrano, tu insidi le 
nostre ragazze…”; “Marrano, how dare you harass our women?”69). When Othello 
intervenes to stop the ensuing brawl and demands an explanation, the scene becomes an 
uncanny repetition of what Othello himself had experienced in front of the Senate (although 
this previous scene has been omitted in the film). Ironically blind to the similarity between 
the Cypriots’ complaints against the outsider Cassio and Brabantio’s earlier accusation 
against him (“Egli insidia l’onore delle nostre donne, signor Governatore! Scandalo! 
Scandalo!”; “He injures the honour of our women, Lord Governor! What a scandal! What a 
                                                 
66 “Una sola finestrella […], piccola come una feritoia” (Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?”, cit., 
p. 935, in Sonia Massai, op. cit., p. 103). 
67 See Sonia Massai, op. cit., p. 103. 
68 Ibid., p. 102. 




scandal!”70), Othello downgrades Cassio, adopting the same racist logic as Brabantio.71 Not 
only is the motif of racial hatred, as Massai argues, shifted “from Iago, the ‘insider’, to the 
Cypriots, the ‘outsiders’”72, but also to Othello himself, the outsider par excellence, whose 
total foreignness, translating into naïve unawareness, becomes paradoxically what makes 
him so keen on blindly adapting to and then adopting his very denigrators’ vision of 
‘otherness’. Right after the episode with Cassio, the insiders’ discriminative vision of 
women – as another aspect of ‘otherness’ – is all too readily absorbed by the outsider 
Othello by means of Iago’s insinuations on Desdemona. As Cassio enters the stage, she is 
rocking a doll in her arms and singing a lullaby (in the script but not in the film): “Povera 
bambina,/ E’ morta per amor/ Povera bambina,/ E’ morta per amor./ La gente che qui passa/ 
Le getterà un bel fior.” (“Poor child,/ She died of love/ Poor child,/ She died of love./ 
Passers-by will drop/ A beautiful flower [on her grave]”73). As we have already seen, 
Desdemona’s apparent childishness is deceived by the gloominess of her most intimate 
fantasies. We cannot avoid the suspicion of doubleness when she says to Cassio, who is 
pleading her help to be reinstated by Othello: “Sì, sì, sì, sì, la voglio proprio fare questa 
buona azione! E poi lei è così giovane… così carino… Sì, con tutto il cuore! Con tutto il 
cuore!”74; or even when she carries on singing a lullaby at the end of their encounter. When 
Othello and Iago catch her talking to Cassio, the erotic connotations of her childish 
appearance now lead inevitably to Iago’s interpretation of her also in the eyes of Othello: 
 
Iago: A me questo fatto… mi puzza di abbruciaticcio… 
Othello: Ma… ma nun era Cassio quello che stava ’nsieme lì a Desdemona? 
Iago: Occhio che non vede, cuore che non duole…! 
[…] 
Iago [aside to Othello talking to Desdemona]: Era Cassio, era Cassio! 
[…] 
Iago: Mah! 
Othello: Perché dici “mah!”? 
Iago: Eeh! Eh eh! 
Othello: E perché dici “eeh! Eh eh!”? 
                                                 
70 See Ibid. 
71 See ibid. 
72 Ibid., p. 98. 
73 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?”, cit., p. 951. The English translation is quoted from Sonia 
Massai, op. cit., p. 97. 
74 “Yes, yes, yes, yes, I so want to do this good deed! Besides, you’re so young… so cute… Yes, with all my  




Iago: No, no, dico, ... Certo, Cassio non ha mica colpa, eh? Eh! Lui è bello, è giovine, è di 
carnagione bianca, eh eh eh! Chi se lo sarebbe aspettato che Desdemona… 
Othello: Che?! Che?!  
Iago: Ohé, eh! E non t’arrabbiare! Diventi nero! Pare che mi vuoi mangiare!75 
Othello: Come sarebbe a di’ “chi se lo sarebbe aspettato da Desdemona”?! 
Iago: Quello che volevo dire è che Desdemona è come tutte le altre… [the audience protest] 
Othello: Desdemona come tutte l’altre?!  
Iago: Sì, proprio così. Adesso ve l’ho detto, e mi sento con la coscienza a posto! 
Othello: Se è vero la sventro, glie tiro er collo come ’na gallina!76 
 
When Iago addresses the audience directly at the beginning of the play, trying to gain 
their approval for his plot against Othello, the audience, recognizing him as Totò, at first 
applaud his comic wit and ingenuity, and seem to be prepared to let him fashion their 
responses to the play. As Iago’s plot unfolds and he becomes more and more Vice-like, the 
spectators begin to shift allegiance and deny him any sympathy. The response caused by 
Iago’s mystifying words (starting from “Desdemona è come tutte le altre…”) makes the 
audience increasingly involved in the play: they do not simply sit there and watch, but begin 
to comment, hiss and shout in protest, try to warn Iago’s victims, and eventually turn against 
Othello too, especially during the ‘eavesdropping scene’ that follows: “Otello, apri l’occhi!”; 
“E’ stato Iago a da’ a Cassio quer fazzoletto!”; “Cassio non parlava de Desdemona! Parlava 
de Bianca! ’A disgrazziato pure te! Magar’a tocchi Desdemona te famo vede’ noi!” 
(“Othello, watch out!”; “It was Iago who gave Cassio the handkerchief!”; “Cassio wasn’t 
talking about Desdemona! He was talking about Bianca! You’re as bad as he [Iago] is! If 
you lay a finger on Desdemona, we’ll teach you!”77). Right after the scene closes with 
Othello’s declaration that he is going to kill Desdemona, the camera catches again the 
puppet of Othello behind the scenes, with tears on his face, blaming himself for what he has 
become and still not understanding what motivates his actions onstage: 
                                                 
75 Again a racial allusion to Othello’s potential cannibalism. 
76 “Iago: I have a weird feeling about that… Othello: Wasn’t that Cassio there with Desdemona? Iago: What  
the eye doesn't see, the heart doesn't grieve over…! […] Iago: It was Cassio, it was Cassio! […] Iago: Who  
knows! Othello: Why are you saying ‘Who knows!’? Iago: Well! Well, well! Othello: And why are you saying  
‘Well! Well, well!’? Iago: No, no, I mean, …Sure, we can’t say it’s Cassio’s fault, can we? Sure! He’s  
handsome, he’s young, he’s white-skinned… Well, well, well! Who would have expected  that Desdemona…  
Othello: What?! What?! Iago: Hey, hey! Don’t get mad! You’re turning black! You look like you’re going to  
eat me! Othello: What do you mean ‘Who would have expected that from Desdemona’?! Iago: What I meant is  
that Desdemona is like all other women… Othello: Desdemona’s like all other women?! Iago: Yes, that’s the  
truth. Now that I’ve told you, I have a clear conscience! Othello: If it’s true I’ll tear her all to pieces, I’ll wring  
her neck like a chicken!”  





Othello: Io so’ ’n’assassino… Io so’ ’n’assassino… Chi se lo credeva… Io so’ ’n’assassino, 
mannaggia! A sor mae’, ma perché devo crede’ le cose che me dice Iago?! Perché so’ così stupido?! 
Puppeteer: Forse perché in realtà sei tu che vuoi ammazzare Desdemona. 
Othello: Come? Io voglio ammazza’ Desdemona? E perché? 
Puppeteer: Forse perché… a Desdemona piace essere ammazzata.  
Othello: Ah, sì? E’ così? 
Puppeteer: Forse è così. 
Othello: Ma qual è la verità? E’ quello che penso io de me, o quello che pensa la gente, o 
quello che pensa quello là lì dentro?  
Iago: Cosa senti dentro di te? Concentrati bene, cosa senti, eh? 
Othello: Sì, sì, si sente qualcosa che c’è… 
Iago: Quella è la verità! Ma… shhh! Non bisogna nominarla, perché appena la nomini, non 
c’è più.78 
 
Unconvinced by the puppeteer’s semi-Freudian explanations about his desire to kill 
Desdemona, and Desdemona’s own desire to be killed, the tormented puppet of Othello 
turns to the wise puppet of Iago to know what truth is. And it is precisely the puppet of Iago, 
who on stage uses words to stir from the truth and to create the “net” of a totally deceitful 
reality, that offstage seems to guide with a Socratic method the puppet of Othello in his 
search beyond words and the roles he is told to play. Truth, Iago suggests, is something that 
stirs from deep inside the young puppet’s chest, which cannot be given a name nor 
represented, but just felt. Othello is overcome with joy as he notices that he can actually, 
though dimly, feel “something”. There follows that truth cannot be expressed in words, but 
it can be found only outside language; that is, outside denotative representation. 
Once back on stage, though, all of the behind-the-scenes awareness disappears and 
the fiction of the Shakespearean script, of Iago’s web of words, and of the actions the 
puppeteer leads him into, is the only reality the puppets can see and in which they seem 
inextricably enmeshed. Desdemona’s murder scene has to follow right after all the same: 
when Othello finds her childishly saying her evening prayers, he rushes to her pushed by 
                                                 
78 “Othello: I’m a murderer… I’m a murderer… Who would have thought that… I’m a murderer, dammit!  
Good sir, but why do I have to believe the things Iago says to me?! Why am I so stupid?! Puppeteer: Maybe  
because you actually want to kill Desdemona. Othello: What? I want to kill Desdemona? And why? Puppeteer:  
Maybe because… Desdemona likes being killed. Othello: Ah, really? Is it so? Puppeteer: Maybe it is so.  
Othello: But what is the truth? Is it what I think of myself, or what people think, or what the one in there  
thinks? Iago: What do you feel inside? Pay attention, what do you feel? Othello: Yes, yes, I feel that there  
is something… Iago: That is the truth! But… shhh! You don’t have to name it, because as soon as you do, it’s  




Iago, blindly determined to kill her. Desdemona’s ingenuous insistence on Cassio’s 
reintegration is inevitably read as another proof of her infidelity, just as her reaction when 
Othello smacks her. As a matter of fact, although she screams naively, her words evidently 
indicate that her husband’s unexpected violence enflames her with masochistic pleasure: 
“Sì, mio signore… (lo schiaffo ricevuto ha aumentato il suo rispetto e il suo amore) però 
che schiaffo che mi avete dato! E’ il primo schiaffo che piglio! Se volete darmene un altro… 
(ha un ambiguo sorriso di sottomissione).”79 Accordingly played by the childish and 
sexually irreverent Laura Betti, Desdemona’s actions are determined by a sort of parodic or 
elementary masochism, which, as we have seen with the puppeteer’s explanation to Othello, 
is the interpretative key that the author has imposed on her. Since she appears on stage, 
Desdemona seems to be doing everything to disappoint and incite first her father by 
choosing Othello as her partner; then she provokes her own husband with her too insistent 
mediations on behalf of Cassio; and now, her enjoyment in being slapped might even 
suggest that she craves to be killed80, as the puppeteer had suggested (or better, planned). 
Othello, enraged by her lustful attitude which seems to confirm his suspects, tries to smother 
her, encouraged with grotesque ferocity by Iago standing aside (“Ammazzala! Ammazzala!” 
– “Kill her! Kill her!”). But the audience, shouting furiously in protest, eventually rise up 
and break in the theatrical action, storming the stage to save Desdemona from Othello’s 
murderous grip, and thus interrupting the play. While the women revive and comfort the 
tearful lady, the men kill both Othello and Iago and celebrate the triumph of a puzzled 
Cassio. With the irruption of the audience on the scene and their interaction with the 
characters and with the play itself, the ultimate disruption of the conventions of theatrical 
fiction takes place. In Massai’s words, “Pasolini’s audience breaks the spell of 
representation, and ‘rearranges’ it”81: unlike the puppets, they do not see any difference 
between what happens on stage and outside of it, and devastatingly bring reality on the 
scene, upsetting or rather literally killing the delusional mechanisms of mimetic 
representation.  
 
La scena non è più uno spazio di finzione da rispettare ma diventa uno spazio col quale la 
realtà può interagire. Gli spettatori, che conoscono la verità, esattamente come la conoscono Otello e 
                                                 
79 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?”, cit., p. 961. “Yes, my lord… (being smacked has 
increased her love and respect for him) …what a slap, though! Nobody had slapped me before! Would you 
want to slap me once again… (she has an ambiguous expression of submission on her face).” (The English 
translation is quoted from Sonia Massai, op. cit., p. 97) 
80 See Anthony Guneratne, op. cit., p. 230. 




Jago, possono interrompere la finzione e diventare gli esecutori di una elementare giustizia: 
Desdemona si salva, Jago e Otello no.82  
 
After the audience assault and kill them, the puppets of Othello and Iago are thrown 
into a trash bin, while their mates cry for their loss. Hence, the garbage man we have seen in 
the opening sequence collects them on his truck and tosses them into a dump, all the while 
singing the same song with which he opened the film. This song, which had welcomed 
Othello’s birth as a puppet with the announcement of the story of love and death 
Shakespeare wrote for him, now cyclically accompanies the puppet as he dies; still, the 
destiny of the puppet Othello has been interrupted before it could be fulfilled the way  
Shakespeare, the puppeteer and Iago had ‘planned’. More precisely, it has been interrupted 
at the very moment in which words and their misleading representations were irremediably 
taking over – a sort of injustice which the audience within the film cannot take. Violently 
thrown outside the theatre, then, Othello and Iago die as puppets (that is, fictional, 
predetermined characters) to be born again into the real world (again like Pinocchio, who 
definitively switches from fiction to reality and becomes a real child just as he is about to 
die). Their journey to the dump is in fact characterised by an interspersed imagery of death 
and birth (or re-birth), beginning from the posters in the garbage truck. Behind the head of 
Modugno, two images of naked women are visible: a photo of Brigitte Bardot, one of the 
most famous erotic symbols in the 1960s, and a reproduction of Velázquez’s painting Venus 
del Espejo (Venus in the Mirror, 1647–51), where the entire body of the model is presented 
to the viewer from the back, in a pose that calls to mind the picture of Bardot that caused the 
banning of Simone de Bouvoir’s book on the French actress.83 Like Las Meninas, the picture 
of Venus too upsets the rules of representation by directly involving the viewer as the object 
of Venus’s gaze reflected in the mirror, thus completing the frame formed by the dolly shot 
of Velázquez’s paintings in the opening sequence. In perfect symmetry with the beginning, 
the film flows towards the end interweaving Othello’s death as a puppet, the garbage man’s 
song and Velázquez’s painting, this time as a prelude of a totally different kind of show. 
Fulfilling the cyclical connection between death and life that governs the film’s structure 
                                                 
82 Marco Antonio Bazzocchi, op. cit., p. 94. “The scene is not a space reserved to fiction anymore but it  
becomes a space with which reality can interact. Spectators, who are aware of the truth as much as Othello and  
Iago, are able to interrupt the fiction and become the executors of an elementary justice: Desdemona is saved,  
Iago and Othello are condemned.”  




(and theme), the image of Venus – symbol of life and creation84 – announces a re-birth. The 
journey to the dump, which is apparently a funeral rite of the puppets (that is, of 
Shakespeare’s Othello and of fictional representation itself) turns thus into a new coming to 
the world. Heaped with the rest of the rubbish on the truck, Othello and Iago seem to shout 
in terror, but their screams are muted and we only see their grotesquely comic grimaces 
apparently miming the trauma of birth. When they are delivered from the truck stopped near 
a slope where “tutte le cose morte [del camion] rotolano come una colorata vanghetta giù” 
(“all the dead things roll down the truck just as a colourful little avalanche”)85, the terrified 
puppets roll down the slope with the rest of the garbage. As they stop at the bottom lying on 
their backs among the garbage, their eyes see for the first time the immense blue sky where 
white clouds are sailing past. Othello’s eyes sparkle with burning curiosity, uncontainable 
joy; Iago’s are filled with wonder and ecstasy:86 
 
Othello: Iiih! E che so’ quelle? 
Iago: Quelle… sono… sono le nuvole. 
Othello: E che so’ ’ste nuvole? 
Iago: Mah? 
Othello: Quanto so’ belle, quanto so’ belle! Quanto ’so belle! 
Iago: Ah, straziante meravigliosa bellezza del creato!87 
 
Completing the process of ‘incorporation’ that dominates the film, the puppets’ 
coming to the (real) world starts in a dump, where the material refuse that is considered dead 
because it cannot be consumed anymore is cyclically transformed into a source of new life. 
Now that they are out of the ‘cave’, freed from the strings that chained them to a 
predetermined reality, the material world outside fiction is unveiled to Othello and Iago, 
who, like children contemplating a natural element for the first time, are overcome by 
wondrous joy. They do not need to know what clouds are to enjoy their beauty: the infinite 
sky, with the clouds moving swiftly blown by the wind, is a site free from predetermined 
                                                 
84 “La donna rappresenta la vitalità. Le cose muoiono e noi ne proviamo dolore, ma poi la vitalità ritorna: ecco 
che cosa rappresenta la donna.” (“The woman represents vitality. Things die and we feel sorrow for that, but 
then vitality comes back: here’s what the woman represents.”) Pier Paolo Pasolini talking about his 1966 film 
Uccellacci e Uccellini, in Pier Paolo Pasolini and Jon Halliday, op. cit., p. 124.  
85 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?”, cit., p. 966. The English translation is quoted from  
Daniela Bini, op. cit., pp. 239-240.  
86 See ibid., in Marco Antonio Bazzocchi, op. cit., p. 100. 
87 “Othello: Eeeh! And what are those? Iago: Those… are… are the clouds. Othello: And what are these  
clouds? Iago: Who knows? Othello: They’re so beautiful, they’re so beautiful! They’re so beautiful! Iago: Ah,  





knowledge as well as from representation.88 As a matter of fact, when Othello asks “E che 
so’ ’ste nuvole?” (“And what are these ‘clouds’?”), Iago replies: “Mah?” (“Who knows?”), 
and then the camera moves to the clouds themselves as if to answer through the mere image 
of them that “clouds are what they are” (with the same naïve tautology we have seen with 
Don Quixote’s reply). It is the camera that reveals the clouds as themselves, because, as 
Pasolini himself argued several times, the cinematic image is not a representation but a 
reproduction of reality; so that the puppets’ discovery of reality is ultimately possible thanks 
to the potentials of the cinematic medium. This very final image of the clouds, admired for 
the first time by the puppets as they get born in the ‘real’ world, synthesizes the astounding 
effect of the cinematic sublime in the film, connected to the (re)discovery of material reality. 
In light of the final sequence, I am going to consider the sublime aesthetics in Nuvole as 
originating from the incorporation of intertexts that structures the film, and disclosing upon 
a meta-cinematic discourse that begins from its very title – a probable reference to the 
fundamental book of essays on cinema by the French critic and theorist André Bazin entitled 
Qu’est-ce que le cinéma?89  
 
4.3 Breaking the Hegemony of the Text 
 
The myriad intertextual references in Nuvole taken from the literary, pictorial and 
cinematographic tradition, analysed according to the dialectic of incorporation, implies first 
of all the shifting or complete dissolving of representational boundaries. As a matter of fact, 
Othello itself has significantly proved liable to cause uncanny confusions between fiction 
and reality; for instance, the history of the reception of Shakespeare’s play on stage and on 
film has very often signalled disquieting and upsetting effects on the audience. Marvin 
Rosenberg reports that Samuel Pepys’s “pretty lady cried out” when she saw Desdemona 
smothered; and that “a rare ‘review’ from 1610 […] tells us that when Shakespeare’s 
company performed Othello in Oxford, the actors […] ‘drew tears not only from their 
                                                 
88 Again, Pirandello’s Uno, Nessuno e Centomila seems implicitly present in Pasolini’s Nuvole; the final 
sequence, in particular, reminds of an extract from Chapter Nine in the second book (“Nuvole e vento”): “Ah, 
non aver più coscienza d'essere, come una pietra, come una pianta! Non ricordarsi più neanche del proprio 
nome! Sdrajati qua sull'erba, con le mani intrecciate alla nuca, guardare nel cielo azzurro le bianche nuvole 
abbarbaglianti che veleggiano gonfie di sole; udire il vento che fa lassù, tra i castagni del bosco, come un 
fragore di mare.” (Luigi Pirandello, Uno, Nessuno e Centomila, cit., p. 54). [“Ah, to be unconscious, like a 
stone, like a plant! Not to remember even your name anymore! Stretched out here on the grass, hands behind 
your head, to look into the blue dazzling sky at the white clouds that sail past, filled with sun; to hear the wind, 
among the chestnuts in the wood, making a sound like the roar of the sea.”] See Daniela Bini, op. cit., p. 239. 




speech, but also from their action.’”90 Although the ending of the play was never altered 
during the following Restoration by any English actor, in France, for instance, Desdemona’s 
life had been spared until Jean-François Ducis “had at first the temerity to let the heroine be 
killed.”91 The fact that “the prettiest women in Paris fainted in the most conspicuous boxes 
and were publicly carried out of the house”, convinced Ducis to change the ending back 
again, although the actor playing Othello demanded the original back to the “peculiar 
agonies of the most obviously handsome and fashionable.”92 The strong reactions elicited by 
the staging of the play since Shakespeare’s own days have accompanied its performances up 
until today. Just to mention one example, when talking about his adaptation of Othello 
(2014) in an interview, the Sicilian actor and director Luigi Lo Cascio mentioned that a 
woman, meeting the actors in the backstage after the show, literally assaulted them, accusing 
them of instigating feminicides with that play.93  
As strong as their reactions might have been, though, no real audience of either 
theatrical or cinematographic productions of Othello have been granted the degree of agency 
enjoyed by the audience-within-the-film in Che Cosa Sono Le Nuvole. Only fictional 
audiences, in fact, exasperating their meta-theatrical potential, have ever been enabled to 
break the boundaries of representation and confound fiction with reality. One of the literary 
predecessors of the urban proletariat in Nuvole is to be found, for instance, in Collodi’s Le 
Avventure di Pinocchio (The Adventures of Pinocchio, 1883), as pointed out by Hervé 
Joubert-Laurencin94 with reference to Chapter X of the novel, in which Pinocchio walks in a 
marionette theatre while the puppets of Arlecchino and Pulcinella are fighting on the scene. 
As they recognise him, they interrupt the play to invite Pinocchio to join them on stage:  
 
Quando Pinocchio entrò nel teatrino delle marionette, accadde un fatto che destò una mezza 
rivoluzione. […] [A]ll’improvviso, che è non è Arlecchino smette di recitare, e voltandosi verso il 
                                                 
90 Marvin Rosenberg, The Masks of Othello: The Search for the Identity of Othello, Iago, and Desdemona by 
Three Centuries of Actors and Critics, Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1961, pp. 216; 5, in Sonia 
Massai, op. cit., p. 101. 
91 Ibid., p. 32, in Sonia Massai, op. cit., pp. 101-102. 
92 Ibid., in Sonia Massai, op. cit., p. 102. 
93 In the same interview, Vincenzo Pirrotta (who played Othello) reported: “Addirittura qualcuno, una signora, 
è arrivata in camerino […] dicendo che è un’istigazione al femminicidio…”, (“There was even someone, a 
lady, who came to the dressing room […] saying that it was an instigation to feminicide…”), and Luigi Lo 
Cascio added: “Fummo assaliti proprio… ‘Lei si rende conto che facendo questo spettacolo aumenteranno [i 
femminicidi]?’” (“We were actually assaulted… ‘Don’t you realize that by performing this play [feminicides] 
are going to increase?’”) Luigi Lo Cascio and Vincenzo Pirrotta in ‘retroscenasat2000’, “‘Retroscena – I 
segreti del teatro’ - Puntata del 24 febbraio 2015” (online video clip), YouTube, published on 3 Mar 2015, 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBDApsv3d9w&t=1230s>. 
94 See Hervé Joubert-Laurencin, “Pasolini. Portrait du poète en cinéaste”, Cahiers du Cinéma, Paris 1995, p.  




pubblico e accennando colla mano qualcuno in fondo alla platea, comincia a urlare in tono 
drammatico: 
 “Numi del firmamento! Sogno o son desto? Eppure quello laggiù è Pinocchio!... […] 
 “Pinocchio, vieni quassù da me,” grida Arlecchino, “vieni a gettarti fra le braccia dei tuoi 
fratelli di legno!” 
 A questo affettuoso invito Pinocchio spicca un salto, e di fondo alla platea va nei posti 
distinti; poi con un altro salto, dai posti distinti monta sulla testa del direttore d’orchestra, e di lì 
schizza sul palcoscenico.95 
 
The reference to Pinocchio (already perceptible in the crafting and coming to life of 
Othello’s puppet in the opening sequence) might have been very present to the ‘real’ 
audience of Pasolini’s Nuvole: the film’s Iago, Totò, was not only associated to a puppet for 
his comic mimicry and the picaresque adventures of his character, but actually impersonated 
Pinocchio several times during both his theatrical and cinematographic career.96 In the 1952 
film Totò a Colori, in particular, the character of Totò (Antonio Scannagatti) finds himself 
in a marionette theatre while escaping from his brutal brother-in-law who is chasing him 
with a knife. In order to hide from him, he dresses up like Pinocchio and pretends to be a 
puppet. Once on stage, Totò-Pinocchio performs a marionette-dance, very much enjoyed by 
an audience of working-class children and their parents (similar to Pasolini’s), and 
apparently fooling his brother-in-law that watches from behind the scenes. But as he smiles, 
takes off his fake nose, and thanks the applauding audience, his chaser recognizes him and 
                                                 
95 Carlo Collodi, Pinocchio, Napoli: Lito-Rama, 2001, p. 24. “Quick as a flash, Pinocchio disappeared into the  
Marionette Theater. And then something happened which almost caused a riot. […] The play continued for a  
few minutes, and then suddenly, without any warning, Harlequin stopped talking. Turning toward the audience,  
he pointed to the rear of the orchestra, yelling wildly at the same time: ‘Look, look! Am I asleep or awake? Or  
do I really see Pinocchio there?’ […] ‘Hey, Pinocchio, come up to me!’ shouted Harlequin. ‘Come and join  
your wooden brothers!’ At such a loving invitation, Pinocchio, with one leap from the back of the orchestra,  
found himself in the front rows. With another leap, he was on the orchestra leader's head. With a third, he  
landed on the stage.” The English translation is quoted from Carlo Collodi, The Adventures of Pinocchio,  
trans. by Carol Della Chiesa (1883), The Literature Network, <http://www.online- 
literature.com/collodi/pinocchio/10/>.  
96 “Nella Rivista di Michele Galdieri del ’42 [Volumineide] interpretò i panni del noto burattino assieme ad 
Anna Magnani nel ruolo di Fata turchina e Mario Castellani, nei panni di Lucignolo. Totò interpretò Pinocchio 
anche due anni dopo nella rivista «Che ti sei messo in testa» [1944], rappresentata durante l’occupazione 
tedesca dove, fuori copione parodiò Hitler appena scampato ad un attentato e nella rivista “Con un palmo di 
naso” [1944] dove fece una parodia di Mussolini e di Hitler ormai all’ultimo atto del loro potere. Infine, la più 
nota scena in “Totò a colori” del ’52 immortala un’‟esibizione unica e “a colori” del nostro artista 
disarticolato.” (“In Michele Galdieri’s 1942 show [Volumineide], Totò played the well-known puppet with 
Anna Magnani as the Blue Fairy and Mario Castellani as Lucignolo. Totò played Pinocchio two years later too 
in the 1944 show “Che ti sei messo in testa”, performed during the German occupation in Italy, and in which 
he improvised a parody of  Hitler who had just escaped an assassination attempt, and then again in a 1944 
show (“Con un palmo di naso”), where he parodied both Mussolini and Hitler, whose power was by then 
decaying. At last, a known sequence in “Totò a Colori” (1952) sees a unique and ‘in colour’ performance of 





jumps on stage with the intention to kill him. If, on the one hand, reality seems to storm on 
stage as in Pasolini’s movie, the melodramatic lines of the ireful brother-in-law – together 
with his Sicilian accent – seem to turn him too into a puppet, thus exchanging reality for a 
marionette show.  
Another literary example of an audience going back and forth between fiction and 
reality can be found in Chapter XXVI, Part II, of Cervantes’s Don Quixote.97 Master Pedro’s 
puppet show is representing the rescue of Melisandra, Charlemagne’s foster-daughter, from 
the Moors by whom she was held captive in Zaragoza. Don Quixote follows the play 
attentively, intervening with some exclamation now and then, until he gets so caught up in 
the fictional action that, as the Moors are attacking Melisandra running away with her 
rescuer Don Gaiferos, he rises from his seat, and bursts out: 
 
“I will never consent, while I live, that in my presence such an outrage as this be offered to 
so famous a knight and so daring a lover as Don Gaiferos. Hold, base-born rabble, follow not nor 
pursue after him; if you do, prepare for instant battle.” As he spoke, he unsheathed his sword, planted 
himself close to the show, and, with violent and unheard-of fury, began to rain hacks and slashes 
upon the Moorish puppets, overthrowing some and beheading others, laming this and demolishing 
that.98 
 
A similar episode (and a probable source of inspiration for Pasolini) is to be found in 
the Neapolitan episode of Roberto Rossellini’s Paisà (1946)99, where a drunk African-
American military policeman and a Neapolitan street kid, running away from the crowd, 
take refuge inside a marionette theatre. The puppet play going on in there shows the white 
paladin Orlando fighting against the Moor, introduced by the crusaders’ exclamation: 
“Abbasso i mori!” (“Down with the Moor!”). On watching the duel, the audience get 
increasingly excited, shouting and miming the action they are watching, and so does the 
black soldier, who instead identifies with the Moor up to the point that he jumps on stage 
and joins the fight, taking the place of the Moor puppet. The puppeteers and the audience, 
enraged, yell and rush against him, until men substitute the puppets on the scene and a real 
fight involving all of the present takes place there.  
As for Don Quixote, he innocently adds an explanation for his behaviour: “I protest 
to you, gentlemen, that whatever has passed at this time, seemed to me to pass actually and 
                                                 
97 See Marco Antonio Bazzocchi, op. cit., pp. 96-97.  
98 Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote de la Mancha, trans. by Charles Jarvis, Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 
1847, p. 181. 




precisely so. I took Melisandra, to be Melisandra; Don Gaiferos, Don Gaiferos; Marsilio, 
Marsilio; and Charlemagne, Charlemagne.”100 His naive confusion between fiction and 
reality is signalled by the tautological use of the same name to indicate both the puppets and 
the real people they represent: language, as well as any kind of representation, implies the 
substitution of the thing with the name, the signified with the signifier. Such an uncanny 
blurring of representational boundaries has a strong connection with cinema, especially with 
cinematic adaptations where Othello is turned into a play-within-the-film as in Nuvole. As 
Douglas Lanier points out, films based on the motif of players rehearsing or re-enacting 
Othello have a long history in both European and Anglo-American traditions.101 Very often, 
theatrical fiction gets confused with filmic ‘reality’ – as in Marcel Carné and Jacques 
Prévert’s Les Enfants du Paradis (1945) and Jean-Paul Sartre’s Kean (1956). This kind of 
movies brings about the compelling imitation in real life of the tragic plot of Othello, which 
the main characters either perform themselves on stage or watch being performed.102 What 
the cinematic medium seems to allow in a peculiar way, in order to let reality out of its own 
representation, is to destroy the signifier103, just like Don Quixote, the black soldier in Paisà, 
and the working-class audience in Pasolini’s Nuvole do.  
 
The symbolic destruction or death of traditional representation is the first operation 
through which the film can be ascribed to a sublime aesthetic. By ‘killing’ and going beyond 
Shakespeare’s Othello and the myriad textual references incorporated in the film, Pasolini 
gives shape to a loss of signification, like the one Foucault envisages in Don Quixote. The 
knight is described in fact as “the hero of the same” and his journey as a process of 
“similitude” that annuls the difference between reality and fiction, thus turning the material 
world into a concretion of the representative world of language. The result is that 
representation itself is nullified, as things are just what they are, while “words wander off on 
their own, without content, without resemblance to fill their emptiness; they are no longer 
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the marks of things; they lie sleeping between the pages of books and covered in dust.”104 A 
similar process happens with Pasolini’s Nuvole, whose structure unveils and exasperates the 
rules of mimesis with its net of intertextual, meta-pictorial, meta-theatrical and meta-
cinematographic references, and the following interaction and shifting of codes one into 
another. Its semi-human puppets are, on the one hand, tied to strings (through some sort of 
handcuffs) that force them to re-enact a set of actions predetermined by several ‘puppeteers’: 
external to the film, the (although labile) presence of Shakespeare’s text; within the film, the 
actual puppeteer of the marionette theatre; and then, within the play itself, the character of 
Iago. On the other hand, cinema allows them to move back and forth from theatrical fiction 
to backstage liminality and then to real life, and thus disrupt the stability of the categories 
ruling representation itself. The same goes for the audience: if they should be ideologically 
constructed and their response fashioned by the Shakespearean script, by the puppeteer and 
by Iago, the existence of a multiple audience (the one inside the marionette theatre, the 
puppets themselves and the puppeteer behind the scenes, and the ever-changing audience of 
the movie) also implies the coalescence of different dimensions that challenges 
predetermined roles. None of the audiences can really be far off and detached from the play 
they are watching, since all of them are simultaneously addressed by “Iago’s gaze, which is 
clearly aware of our complicity,” and “has the same ensnaring power as the painter’s gaze in 
the painting, [Velázquez’s Las Meninas] which we fall captives to.”105 The fictive and the 
real audience, collapsed into one another, become in their turn directly involved with the 
theatrical event, so that, shifting like the human puppets between fiction and reality, they 
defy the ultimate boundaries that codify representation:  
 
Pasolini tries to reproduce for his viewers the effect of being at the same time outside and 
inside the film, of being at one with the fictive audience, but also of wandering backstage in search 
of the elusive author who challenges them to constantly readjust their interpretation of Clouds in the 
light of his references to other authors.106 
 
Testifying to how “Pasolini found content pressing against the boundaries of 
form,”107 this reversion of incorporation is what gives rise to the ‘sublime’ in Nuvole: the 
bodily remainder that escapes and defies representation translates into a tension between 
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form and content that finally re-discovers the direct, unfiltered relationship between a 
cinematic work of art and material reality. As a matter of fact, the audience’s interruption 
can be seen as a revolution against the boundaries of fiction that metonymically expresses a 
collective non-acquiescence in the operation of hegemony, rooted in the Marxist vision of 
proletarian agency. In pointing out that “the camera shapes this reality into a depiction of 
social structure that gives a decidedly Gramscian twist to Marx’s agonistic depiction of class 
interests,”108 Guneratne briefly retraces Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and social agency 
within the aesthetic dynamics of the movie. According to Gramsci, social divisions that 
ensure the hegemony of a ruling elite can be sustained only through the tacit consent and 
formal acquiescence of individuals within differing social strata. Gramsci’s vision of socio-
political dynamics seems to be the substratum that permeates the aesthetical (re-)discovery 
of reality in Pasolini’s Nuvole. Observing that “Pasolini contrives to group his shots into a 
rigorous series of compositions in which each actor represents a particular Gramscian social 
agent”, Guneratne accordingly finds in “the author of the spectacle, Shakespeare the 
perverse puppeteer, […] the hegemon who pulls the strings and determines the extent of 
Desdemona’s masochism, Cassio’s complicity, and even the reluctant Othello’s violence”; 
and in Iago “the interpreter of the puppet master’s directives, and thus representative of that 
category of organic intellectual who facilitates the dominance of the ‘author’s’ 
representational regime.”109 On the other hand, the proletarian spectators who storm the 
stage bring about effective collective action, breaking as they do the author’s (and the source 
text’s) hegemony. As Guneratne goes on to note, “[t]he revolution staged by spectators 
amidst the Sicilian Marionettes, reminiscent though it may be of Don Quixote’s earlier 
comical attack on Saracen Marionettes in defense of Christianity, does have an impact on 
the world beyond the theatre.”110 What follows is in fact “the transition between the world of 
art and the detritus of the real world”111, mediated by the singing garbage man who also 
signals the ‘death’ (through appropriation and desecration) of another intertext, Velazquez’s 
Venus in the Mirror, ‘reduced’ to a sort of pin-up poster in his truck. Mentioning Rabelais’s 
satirical “material bodily lower stratum”112 as the source of Pasolini’s “folksy” twist to the 
Venus preludes in fact to the world we are going to find beyond the theatre. Namely, after 
going through the leftovers of traditional representation (the world’s signifiers), the 
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cinematic medium, being structured on our very sensuous perception of the world, carries 
the spectators on the same level of, or “within”, reality itself: 
 
[Q]uale differenza esiste fra cinema e realtà? Praticamente nessuna. Capii che il cinema è un 
sistema di segni la cui semiologia corrisponde a una possibile semiologia del sistema di segni della 
stessa realtà. Così il cinema mi ha obbligato a restare sempre al livello della realtà, “dentro” la realtà: 
quando faccio un film sono sempre dentro la realtà, fra gli alberi e fra la gente come me e lei; non c’è 
fra me e la realtà il filtro del simbolo o della convenzione, come c’è nella letteratura. Quindi in 
pratica il cinema è stato un’esplosione del mio amore per la realtà.113 
 
4.4 Cinema as “Being There, within Reality” 
  
In order to understand what Pasolini meant with “love for reality” I would like to 
consider briefly the connections between Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole? and some of the poet’s 
contemporary production. The intertextual net which apparently entraps the film and its 
characters can in fact be related to Pasolini’s own work, beginning from his “Poema per un 
verso di Shakespeare” (“Poem for a line by Shakespeare”), which appeared in 1964 in his 
collection of poems Poesia in Forma di Rosa (Poems in the Shape of a Rose). The line 
which the title refers to is taken from Othello, and is a rather free translation of Iago’s final 
words “Demand me nothing, what you know, you know./ From this time forth I never will 
speak word.” (V.ii.300-1) The Italian version reported by Pasolini, “Ciò che hai saputo, hai 
saputo: il resto non lo saprai”, more than Iago’s unwillingness to speak and his refusal to 
reveal the source of his hate, stresses the inaccessibility of some passive knowledge coming 
from above (a back translation of the line could be: “What you know, you know: you will 
not know what remains”). The line is literally incorporated, turned into a material body, and 
it takes the shape of a grey bird – sometimes looking as white as the morning sun, 
sometimes revealing its true black colour – coming back from faraway lands to haunt the 
poet. (“Nella mia pace figliale, ma non crepuscolare, tu dormi,/ dove e come non so, verso di 
Shakespeare,     ritornato per istinto stagionale (?)    da terre che non hanno nulla a che fare 
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con noi ecc.”114) The poet feels compelled to fight against the bird as against the 
unapproachability or denial of knowledge it embodies (“Non lo saprò? E allora che senso ha 
avuto  una vita che non è altro che passato  e con esso nasce ogni giorno, come un 
rosaio?”115); until he finally consigns the line and the truth it tries to hide to an unsustainable 
past, thus preserving the innocence of future life.116 (“E, per un po’ di scienza della storia 
che mi dà esperienza/ di quanto sia grande la tragedia di una storia che finisce,/ mi prendo 
tutta l’innocenza della vita futura!”117) The screaming end of the poem sets aside a history 
he wants to have nothing to do with anymore:  
 
“NESSUNO DEI PROBLEMI DEGLI ANNI CINQUANTA  
MI IMPORTA PIU’! TRADISCO I LIVIDI  
MORALISTI CHE HANNO FATTO DEL SOCIALISMO UN CATTOLICESIMO  
UGUALMENTE NOIOSO! AH, AH, LA PROVINCIA IMPEGNATA!  
AH, AH, LA GARA A ESSERE UNO PIU’ POETA RAZIONALE DELL’ALTRO!  
LA DROGA, PER PROFESSORI POVERI, DELL’IDEOLOGIA!  
ABIURO DAL RIDICOLO DECENNIO!”118  
 
The poem, in the shape of diaristic snapshots, recasts the outspokenly 
autobiographical motif of the exploration of the past in search for knowledge within a fever-
pitch and chaotic form, signifying the poet’s ideological uneasiness in the historical 
experience he is living.119 Poetry itself is for Pasolini an instrument of self-awareness in 
relation to the experience of the world, and the appearance of Shakespeare’s text in the 
shape of a bird may already be significantly revelatory of the role that reworking literary 
tradition has in the process of (self-)consciousness taking place in his works. After all, a 
bird, Minerva’s little owl, is the symbol of knowledge, philosophy and wisdom in the history 
of Western thought, and as such, Pasolini himself will employ another kind of bird – a crow 
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– as the personification of Marxist ideology in Uccellacci e Uccellini (1966). However, as 
famously noted by Hegel, “the owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night 
are gathering”120, meaning that philosophy comes to understand a historical condition just as 
it passes away. Minerva’s owl, like Pasolini’s crow, speaking of the recent past, has to be 
listened to, the knowledge it brings has to be acquired, and then necessarily overcome (as I 
already mentioned, the crow in Uccellacci e Uccellini is for this purpose eaten, thus literally 
incorporated). The bird that embodies Shakespeare’s line in the poem has the same function: 
Pasolini is hauntingly obsessed by the line, he forcibly fights against it, and then he seems to 
let it go, together with the knowledge of the recent past which he totally abjures.  
 
Another of Pasolini’s work that clearly shows to be built on this (at times conflictual) 
dialectic of incorporation is a play, Calderòn, which is connected rather tightly to Nuvole 
both for its intertextual references and the time in which it was started. Pasolini began to 
write it in 1966 and periodically revised it until the final version published in 1973, but it 
was performed only posthumously in 1978. The crucial intertextual connection in Calderòn, 
as the title suggests, is La Vida es Sueño (Life is a Deam), a philosophical drama written in 
1635 by the Spanish playwright Pedro Calderòn de La Barca. Apart from the names of the 
characters, Pasolini’s Calderòn borrows from it the central theme of dream, that becomes 
also the structure on which the play is built: the episodes represented are dreams in which 
Rosaura, the main character, tries vainly to take refuge from reality. Each dream sees her in 
a different social position, and all of them chain her to a series of different conventions and 
constrictions: first, she wakes up as a member of aristocracy; then as a sub-proletarian 
prostitute, and finally as a petite bourgeois wife. The present she tries to escape – 1967 
Spain – follows her too in all of the dreams, and is often reiterated with deictics underlining 
its inescapability, such as “questo giorno del 1967”121 (“this day in 1967”); that is, a day in 
which Spanish people were in the throes of Franco’s dictatorship. From each of those 
dreams Rosaura is repeatedly forced to wake up by Leucos and Melainos (Greek for, 
respectively, “white” or “bright”, and “black” or “dark”), the servants of Basilio, a recurrent 
character who personifies power. The meta-theatricality already implicit in the 
representation of Rosaura’s “dream within a dream” is made formally evident first by the 
intervention of the author himself, whose voice is mediated by the “speaker” who introduces 
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each of the three stasima talking straight to the audience about the play they are watching. 
Further on, Calderòn exposes a rich net of intertextual connections in which Velázquez 
assumes a central role. The third episode, in particular, is a kind of tableau vivent 
reproducing Las Meninas itself, in which Rosaura’s aristocratic parents (Dona Lupe and 
Basilio) are respectively Queen and King, and address their daughter from the mirror as if 
they were Mariana and Felipe IV, and she the Infanta Margareta surrounded by her dames of 
honour. The episode, openly described as a dream, unveils the representational dynamics of 
both the pictorial and theatrical work of art in its own making, together with the codification 
of roles and behaviours imposed by a class-divided society, to which the artist too seems 
unable to escape (Lupe Regina: “Diego Rodriguez Velázquez stesso!/ […] coinvolto 
anch’esso/ nel mondo della nostra ricchezza,/ e, pur guardando da fuori del quadro, ne è 
dentro!”; “Velázquez himself/ […] involved in our world of wealth,/ and, although he looks 
out of the painting, he is inside it!”122). However, Velázquez is mentioned again in the 
eighth episode, this time as the name of a character who, like Socrates, has been accused of 
being a pederast but in fact, as Pablo (one of his pupils) remarks, he is in prison because he 
has a body123, because his very reality is a threat to Spanish society.124 On the one hand, 
then, Sonia Massai is right in pointing out that Pasolini’s Calderòn makes the collusion 
between authorial discourse and power explicit in suggesting “that the painter, despite being 
the origin of representation and partaking in the process through which representation 
contributes to reify the subject, is himself at the same time contained by it.”125 On the other 
hand, though, the play seems to anticipate the destabilizing function the process of 
‘incorporation’ can assume. The intertextual net in which authors like Calderòn and 
Velázquez are intertwined, by treating them too as “bodies” or reified objects of 
representation, scrutinizes and decomposes the relationship between authorial discourse and 
power. The author, as the active subject that ‘incorporates’, is at the same time the passive 
object of incorporation, the bodily residue (“Velázquez is in prison because he has a body”) 
that comes uncannily back to defy the order of representation (which seems to imply a 
“threat” to social order as well). As a matter of fact, when representation is turned into its 
very object, the boundary between subject and object, empowering ‘self’ and disempowered 
‘other’, is in a way overcome, and their apparently overpowering relationship in the process 
is also subverted, thus depriving the representation of its traditional reifying function. This 
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way, like Velázquez’s literal “body” best symbolizes, representation can become instead a 
vital site of resistance against the reification and imprisonment of the object. 
 
The process begun in 1966 with Calderòn is carried on by Pasolini in the 
experimental cinematographic phase of La Terra Vista dalla Luna and Che Cosa Sono le 
Nuvole?, as the fact that the last work and the play are partially connected by their web of 
intertextual references seems to confirm. The conclusion towards which the intertextual 
discourse in both short films is inevitably drawn is death, a revelatory passage to a new life 
that has nothing otherworldly but, on the contrary, is “worldly” in its purest sense: if the 
moral of a fairy-tale like La Terra Vista dalla Luna is that “essere morti o essere vivi è la 
stessa cosa” (“being dead or being alive is the same thing”), the dead puppets of Othello and 
Iago in Nuvole are finally able to contemplate all the “straziante meravigliosa bellezza del 
creato” (“heartbreaking wonderful beauty of the Creation”). From a stylistic point of view, 
death can be intended as the overcoming of an already written past, the equally revelatory 
passage from a stifling textual tradition to a present which cinema is able to re-discover in 
its immediate, shocking material reality. This short phase (1964-66), often described by 
critics as “un crinale oltre il quale niente è più come prima”126 (“a ridge beyond which 
nothing is like before anymore”), is in fact the premise to a new stage in Pasolini’s 
cinematographic style, characterized by a more decisive turn to the adaptation of “myths”. 
Films such as Edipo Re (Oedipus Rex); Medea, and Appunti per un’Orestiade Africana 
(Notes Towards an African Orestes), beyond the simply canonical value of their sources, 
demonstrate how the founding works of Western civilization can work as the measure 
against which men’s consciousness has been evolving throughout the centuries and up to the 
contemporary age. Myth (as we have seen with Shakespeare’s works) can assume such a 
role in a special way thanks to its “adaptability”, by which the essential core of a story is 
capable of being adapted, rewritten or re-appropriated through evolving historical situations. 
Such a blending quality may have been what interested Pasolini the most: adaptation allows 
the author to transpose to the meta-historical level of myth his own and most intimate, 
irrational obsessions, and at the same time to rationalize and acquire consciousness of them, 
by re-inscribing myth itself within a historical and ideological frame, in “un sofisticato 
processo di destorificazione il cui fine è riconquistare la possibilità di tornare alla storia”127 
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(“a sophisticated dehistorification process whose aim is to reconquer the possibility to go 
back to history”). Because of their very unstable and ever-changing nature, adaptations are 
also able to unveil the arbitrariness of so-called meta-historical (or a-historical), absolutist 
myths, and undermine their legitimizing pretensions. Pasolini’s rewritings of Greek myths 
(as well as his “trilogy of life” and Salò o le 120 Giornate di Sodoma - Salò, or the 120 Days 
of Sodom) are in fact always immersed into the concreteness of history, becoming a sort of 
“counter-myths”, variations which assume the capacity to destabilize those new “‘miti’ 
metastorici, bandiere di assolutezza”128 (“metahistorical ‘myths’, flags of absoluteness”) 
created by the dominant classes to legitimize the status quo.  
 
I miti che porta in scena Pasolini […] non sono certo “metastorici”. Al contrario, sono calati 
in un preciso momento storico e in una situazione politica chiaramente connotata. Quei miti 
riconducono i loro eroi e le loro storie dall’astrattezza senza tempo del racconto autoconsolatorio (e 
autolegittimante) alle contraddizioni delle situazioni concrete, dei conflitti, degli scontri che in quel 
momento dividono la società italiana.129 
 
In Pasolini’s adaptations of myth, too, death assumes a central role within the filmic 
structure, becoming “la condizione necessaria e insostituibile per fare della sua [di Edipo, 
come degli altri protagonisti] vita una storia”130 (“the necessary and irreplaceable condition 
in order to turn his [Oedipus’s, as well as the other protagonists’] life into a story”). Such a 
theory of “death as montage” is ultimately what combines together μύθος and λόγος, making 
sense of the irrational consciousness of both collective and private past by elevating it to the 
rational level of history. The need to look for a new filmic structure that would re-elaborate 
rationally the ‘raw’ reality such as it is perceived by memory and experience, is ascribable to 
a change in Pasolini’s own perception of the world. This need to find a new stylistic 
equilibrium, born around the time he made Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?, necessarily 
corresponds to a loss of ideological balance in a “civil poet” like Pasolini, and marks the 
passage from “gli anni della fiducia nella ragione e nella politica agli anni del disinganno e 
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del ritorno ai miti irrazionali e alle passioni private”131 (“the years of trust in reason and in 
politics to the years of disillusionment and of the reversion to irrational myths and private 
passions”).  
 
Insomma, cos’è che ha visto Pasolini in quei due anni [namely, 1964-66], tra le capriole della 
propria intelligenza? Ha visto sparire la realtà, inghiottita dalla borghesia; e ha capito che in quella 
mancanza di realtà (“irrealtà” è la parola che gli presta l’amica Morante) non c’è più una sponda 
sicura per il Poeta.132  
 
Around the years 1964-66, a profound crisis shattered Pasolini’s political idealism as 
well as his thoughts about the artist’s own engagement within society. Those were the years 
in which he began to recognize a rapid and radical “anthropological” transformation in Italy 
connected to the so-called “economic miracle” and the subtle imposition of consumerism as 
a way of life. 
  
[…] [I]n questo momento sta minacciandoci una vera mutazione antropologica. Questa è la 
vera minaccia. […] La vera apocalisse è che la tecnologia, l’era della scienza applicata, quella civiltà 
industriale di cui parlavo, muterà antropologicamente l’uomo, farà dell’uomo qualcos’altro da quello 
che era prima.133  
 
L’Italia nel suo insieme si sta avviando a diventare una società consumistica, un orribile 
mondo piccoloborghese, […]. Un’epoca storica, l’epoca della Resistenza, delle grandi speranze nel 
comunismo, della lotta di classe, è finita. Quello che abbiamo adesso è il boom economico, lo stato 
del benessere, e l’industrializzazione, che usa il Sud come riserva di manodopera a buon mercato e 
incomincia perfino a industrializzarlo. Vi è stato un vero cambiamento che ha coinciso grosso modo 
con la morte di Togliatti.134  
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swallowed by the bourgeoisie; and he understood that that lack of reality (‘unreality’ is the word he borrows  
from his friend Elsa Morante) offers no more safe shores to the Poet.”  
133 Pier Paolo Pasolini in Pier Paolo Pasolini, Gideon Bachmann,  op. cit., pp. 31-32. “Right now we’re 
being threatened by a true anthropological mutation. This is the true threat. […] The true apocalypse is that  
technology, the age of applied science, that industrial civilization I was talking about, is going to transform  
man anthropologically, is going to turn him into something else than he was before.” 
134 Pier Paolo Pasolini in Pier Paolo Pasolini, Jon Halliday, op. cit., pp. 44; 123. “Italy as a whole is going to  
turn into a consumerist society, a horrible petite-bourgeois world, […]. A historical period, that of Resistance,  
of the hope in Communism, of class struggle, is over. What we have now is the economic boom, the welfare  
state, and industrialization, which exploits Southern Italy as a source of cheap manpower, and even begins to  





The passage from rural poverty to apparent urban prosperity that took place in less 
than twenty years in Italy is seen as a sort of explosion that involved and transformed the 
country in the deepest. To the industrial and economic development that was speedily 
transforming the post-war Italian social structure into a homologated petite-bourgeois mass 
corresponded a series of pragmatic choices that Pasolini interprets as symptoms of a ‘new 
collective conscience,’ whose ideology is the very ‘decline of ideology.’135 Namely, it is 
Marxist ideology which, in the worldly language of bourgeoisie, ‘has gone out of style’136, 
and so has the apparent engagement of the intellectual:  
 
Oggi, l’impegno è un alibi ormai inutile per la coscienza della borghesia italiana, che ha 
superato la miseria e ha valicato il primo traguardo dell’industrializzazione: e la caduta 
dell’impegno, come nozione-civetta, ha trascinato con sé, nella caduta, la problematicità tout court: 
la contestazione, l’individuo che protesta, l’anormale, il Diverso ecc. La nuova “coscienza 
collettiva”, in Italia, esclude i problemi.137  
 
The new need for stability and homogeneity brought about by neo-capitalist 
prosperity and ‘health’ in the mid-1960s causes, in Pasolini’s view, an irrefutable cultural 
change, for which any form of dissention is revived in new, irrational ways, until it can all 
too easily be turned into a “fashion”, and finally re-absorbed within the system that 
generated it. As early as 1966, Pasolini recognizes this as part of a wider process, a 
“something” happening in the overwhelmingly bourgeois world that needs to be observed 
closely and evocated through a new, more appropriate language.138   
 
Ma mi sembra che se noi osserviamo quel “qualcosa” che sta accadendo nel mondo 
borghese, questo rovesciarsi nella quotidianità di valori negativi e ideali, violenti e non violenti: 
questo ripresentarsi della “povera e nuda” problematicità, forse cominceremo ad avere qualche 
confusa risposta… […] Questo “qualcosa”, dunque, che implica un canone sospeso e una tensione 
senza meta, che si presenta come una novità nel mondo, se da una parte impegna a un allargamento e 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
135 See Pier Paolo Pasolini, “La Fine dell’Avanguardia”, in Id., Empirismo Eretico, cit., p. 133.  
136 See Ibid., p. 132.  
137 Ibid., p. 133. “Today, commitment has become an useless alibi for the conscience of the Italian bourgeoisie  
that has overcome poverty and crossed the first finish line of industrialization: and the end of commitment as a  
fake notion has also made the attention to problems tout court disappear: dissention, protests, what is out of the  
norm, Different, etc. The new “collective conscience” in Italy sets problems aside.”  





forse a una modifica metodologica dell’analisi marxista, si presenta tuttavia, almeno in parte e 
originariamente, come indipendente dal marxismo e quindi dal mondo operaio: è una forza violenta, 
prefigurata solo parzialmente e nominalmente da precedenti consimili, che scaturisce dall’interno 
della piccola borghesia, appunto, e dal mondo contadino arcaico e preindustriale (ora in via di 
sviluppo).139  
 
Some of the new forms of consciousness that seem to contradict scandalously both 
Marxist and bourgeois rationalism are identified by Pasolini as related to realities in progress 
such as  
 
[u]na rivolta crescente, in forme e quantità finora mai verificate, contro la borghesia in seno 
alla borghesia: che scandalizzano l’ideologia della non-ideologia borghese, ma, insieme, l’ideologia 
marxista, che è ancora bloccata, […], alle vecchie, noiose condanne di ogni anarchia, […].140  
 
On the one hand, this new kind of bourgeoisie’s revolt against itself is first observed 
by Pasolini in the original context of a “mystically conceived democracy” like the U.S.A., 
where he sees an authentic revolutionary impulse that could truly lead to a civil war.141 The 
social and political ferment in North America is connected to a variety of movements, some 
of them ideologically opposite to each other: from the groups of the New Left fighting for 
peace and racial emancipation to the more radical Black Panthers; from the anti-conformism 
of Beatniks paving the way to the hippie counterculture to the racist, pro-Vietnam-War neo-
Nazi revivals. Although he is going to be disappointed by the following rapid absorption of 
such ferment inside the neo-capitalist system, at first Pasolini recognizes in them a 
completely new, even if “negative-positive force”, which, in its anarchic violence, pacifist 
                                                 
139 Ibid. “It seems to me, though, that if we observe that ‘something’ that’s happening in the bourgeois world,  
how negative values and ideals, both violent and non-violent, are spreading into everyday life: this recurrence  
of the ‘poor and naked’ problems, maybe we shall begin to find some confused answers… […] This  
‘something’, then, which implies an openness and an aimless tension, and appears as a novelty in the world, if  
on the one hand requires a widening and maybe a methodological change of Marxist analysis, appears  
nonetheless, at least partly and originally, as independent from Marxism and thus from the working-class  
dimension: it’s a violent force, only partially and nominally foreshadowed by similar precedents, originating  
from within the petite-bourgeoisie, as well as from the archaic and pre-industrial peasant world (which now is 
developing).” 
140 Ibid., p. 148. “A growing uprising, in shapes and quantities never seen before, against the bourgeoisie and  
inside the bourgeoisie: they have a shattering effect on the ideology of bourgeois non-ideology, but, at the  
same time, also on Marxist ideology, which is still stuck […] to the old, boring condemnation of any form of  
anarchy […].”  





rage and democratic mysticism, expresses a revolutionary urge alien to both bourgeois and 
Marxist rationalism.142  
 
In America, sia pure nel mio brevissimo soggiorno, ho vissuto molte ore nel clima 
clandestino, di lotta, di urgenza rivoluzionaria, di speranza, che appartengono all’Europa del ’44, del 
’45. In Europa tutto è finito: in America si ha l’impressione che tutto stia per cominciare. Non voglio 
dire che ci sia, in America, la guerra civile, e forse neanche niente di simile, né voglio profetarla: 
tuttavia si vive, là, come in una vigilia di grandi cose.143  
 
On the other hand, Pasolini’s analysis also recognizes the roots of the following 1968 
youth movement in Italy as endogenous to bourgeoisie itself, but extraneous to a sincere 
revolutionary will, whose absence only keeps it to the level of a contestation, as he most 
provocatively and polemically exposes in the poem Il PCI ai Giovani!! that very year 
(“Spero che l’abbiate capito/ che fare del puritanesimo/ è un modo per impedirsi/ un’azione 
rivoluzionaria vera.”144; “I hope you understood/ that acting like puritans/ is a way to avoid/ 
a true revolutionary action.”). A partner in crime is of course identified by Pasolini also in 
the blindness of contemporary ‘official’ Marxist culture, which does not see nor adapt to the 
latest rapid evolution of neo-capitalism, and, incapable to furnish an authentically 
revolutionary alternative, helps give way to the triumphant spreading of the bourgeoisie as a 
new “human condition”145:   
 
[…] [D]opo un’improvvisa rivoluzione come quella degli anni Sessanta, di tipo tecnologico, 
e dopo la falsa rivoluzione del ’68, che si è presentata come marxista ma che in realtà non è stata 
altro che una forma di autocritica violentissima della borghesia. La borghesia si è servita dei giovani 
per distruggere dei miti che le davano fastidio.146  
 
                                                 
142 See ibid., pp. 147-149. 
143 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Guerra civile”, in Id., Empirismo Eretico, cit., p. 151. “During my brief stay in 
America, I had the chance to experience the clandestine atmosphere, full of struggle, of revolutionary urge, of  
hope, which was typical of 1944-45 Europe. It’s all over in Europe: everything seems about to begin in  
America. I don’t mean to say that America is experiencing a civil war or anything similar, nor do I mean to  
prophesy it: nonetheless, people are living there as if great things are going to come.”   
144 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Il PCI ai giovani!! (Appunti in versi per una poesia in prosa seguiti da una 
‘Apologia’)”, in Id., Empirismo Eretico, cit., p. 162. 
145 See ibid., p. 165. 
146 Pier Paolo Pasolini in Pier Paolo Pasolini, Gideon Bachmann, op. cit., p. 56. “After a sudden, technological 
 revolution as that of the ’60s, and after the fake revolution of ’68, which appeared as Marxist but was actually  
nothing but a kind of violent self-criticism of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie exploited young people to  





Another of the emerging realities that, according to Pasolini, are giving shape to new 
forms of consciousness in the mid-1960s is the presence of the Third World; that is, the 
peasants’, pre-industrial world, which is just breaking from prehistory into history. The 
centre of this world apparently left out of history is indicated by Pasolini in the Afro-
American movement in the United States (in which he saw one of the bases for a civil war); 
but recognizes it also in hotbeds spread worldwide, such as the independence process in 
Africa, the Algerian and Cuban revolutions, up to including that part of Southern Italy that 
still resists industrialization and consumerism. The until then overshadowed presence of the 
Third World necessarily arises thus as a violent, physical revolt, a fight for one’s material 
existence, a desperate need for the most elementary human rights. Unacceptable for a world 
where the recent development has made prosperity seem so easy to conquer and so hard to 
abandon, the Third World issue is overall seen as a scandal, and thus rejected ‘outside’, into 
otherness, object of the racial hatred of the bourgeoisie and of the substantial 
incomprehension of official Marxism147:  
 
In questo momento storico, mi sembra che l’odio razziale sia l’odio che prova un borghese 
verso un contadino: ossia l’odio che prova un uomo integrato in un tipo di civiltà moderna e 
cittadina, contro un uomo che rappresenta un tipo precedente di civiltà, che ancora minaccia la 
presenza dell’attuale: dimostrando fisicamente che un regresso è sempre possibile (socialmente). 
Ecco perché si odiano razzialmente i negri, in quanto poveri, e i poveri, in quanto, inevitabilmente, 
diversi di pelle, essendo addetti ad antichi lavori che comportano necessariamente l’aria aperta e il 
sole (l’effetto del sole sulla pelle sembra avere un valore decisivo nell’odio razziale di chi vive in 
case civili, e, se lavora la campagna, lo fa da padrone, o industrialmente). Negri, sudeuropei, banditi 
sardi, arabi, andalusi ecc.: hanno tutti in comune la colpa di avere i visi bruciati dal sole contadino, 
dal sole delle epoche antiche.148  
 
Pasolini also expresses the need to recognise the arrest and the downfall of a sincere 
revolutionary thrust in most of those countries where a communist revolution had taken 
                                                 
147 See Pier Paolo Pasolini, “La Fine dell’Avanguardia”, cit., p. 149, and Id., “Guerra civile”, cit., p. 153.  
148 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “L’odio razziale”, in Id., Il Caos, Milano: Garzanti, 2015, p. 16. “I think that in this  
historical moment racial hatred is the hatred a middle-class individual feels towards a peasant: that is, the  
hatred felt by a man integrated in a certain kind of modern and urban civilization against a man that represents  
an antecedent kind of civilization, which still threatens the existence of the current one: by physically  
demonstrating that (social) regression is always possible. Here’s why black people are object of racial hatred,  
because  they are poor, and the poor are unavoidably dark-skinned, because they traditionally do ancient jobs  
that require exposure to sun (sun’s effect on skin seems to be one of the most determinant causes of racial  
hatred in those people that live in comfortable, city houses, and, if they happen to work in the country, they are  
usually landowners or industrial owners.) Black people, Southern Europeans, Sardinians, Arabs, Andalusians,  
etc.: what they all have in common is being guilty of getting their faces burnt by the sun of peasants, the sun of  




place (first of all, of course, in the U.S.S.R.). Once the industrial revolution of rural areas is 
accomplished, with the consequent modernization of the archaic world of peasants, the 
initial revolutionary thrust of both workers and intellectuals seems fatally – to use Pasolini’s 
own expression – to sink into a sort of “enormous swamp.”149 Established as the dominant 
(or unique) ideology of the new state apparatus, Communism is subject to a slow, 
unavoidable demagogical decline that turns it into a bureaucratic dictatorship such as 
Stalinism. Pasolini’s bitter conclusion is that “dopo ogni rivoluzione industriale contadina ci 
sarà uno stalinismo (vedi ora, forse, Cuba)”150; (“after every industrial-agricultural 
revolution there will be a Stalinism [see, perhaps, Cuba nowadays]).” Besides Cuba, this 
process can be distinguished in countries such as Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary, 
where – Pasolini observes in a 1966 article – it is possible to perceive an atmosphere of 
political and intellectual uneasiness and disquiet, which was going to lead to the “Prague 
Spring” of 1968 and its dramatic repression. The main reason for that is summed up in the 
fact that the communist revolution had not been carried forward; that is  
 
lo Stato non si è decentrato, non è scomparso, e gli operai nelle fabbriche non sono 
veramente partecipi e responsabili del potere politico, e sono invece dominati – chi non lo sa, ormai, 
e non lo ammette? – da una burocrazia che di rivoluzionario ha solo il nome. E che naturalmente, dà 
dei “rivoluzionaristi piccolo-borghesi” a coloro che invece credono ancora che la “rivoluzione debba 
continuare.”151  
 
Summing up, Pasolini notes that a further major issue in need of consideration is the 
uninterrupted presence of Nazism as the only ideology that has actually sustained the 
bourgeoisie and still does.152 The silent background to those emerging realities just 
mentioned is in fact the persistence of the deeply irrational, conservative instinct that defines 
the bourgeois individual, and that, apparently rationalized or codified when transposed to a 
mass level, gives rise to fascist aberration: 
 
                                                 
149 See Pier Paolo Pasolini, “La fine dell’avanguardia”, cit., p. 149. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Guerra civile”, cit., pp. 150-151. “The State wasn’t decentered, didn’t disappear, and  
factory workers do not really participate in political power, and, on the contrary, are dominated – who doesn’t  
know that, by now, and doesn’t admit it? – by a bureaucracy which is only formally revolutionary. And which,  
of course, accuses those who believe that ‘the revolution should be carried on’ of being ‘petite-bourgeois fake- 
revolutionaries.’”  




Ma si può parlare di rinascita nazista? E’ mai morto il nazismo? Non siamo stati dei pazzi a 
crederlo un episodio? Non è esso che ha definito la piccola borghesia “normale” e che continua a 
definirla? C’è qualche ragione per cui i massacri in massa razzistici debbano essere finiti, coi loro 
lager, le loro camere a gas ecc.?153  
 
The bourgeoisie’s distorted idea of the self and of reality, increased by the recent 
pervasive development of neo-capitalism, cannot but originate utterly alienated and 
unrecognizable feelings such as unmotivated hate (especially racial hate), whose latest most 
tragic result Pasolini finds in Kennedy’s assassination.154   
 
These observations, shortly enumerated in the seminal 1966 essay “La Fine 
dell’Avanguardia” (“The End of the Avant-Garde”), are part of a wider discourse on the 
need to redefine the role of artistic works in a changing society. The essay begins as a 
response to Lucien Goldmann and Roland Barthes about the acknowledgement that classical 
Marxism had entered a state of crisis. Although Pasolini takes issues with them over the 
terms in which they framed the crisis, he finds himself in agreement with their more general 
conclusions, which lead him to ascribe Goldmann and Barthes among the so-called 
“contenutisti”, focusing as they do on the content of a work rather than on isolated linguistic 
features. Pasolini goes on to describing his own tortuous discovery of contenutismo; that is, 
the idea that the content of a stylistically coherent work determines its form, a discovery that 
prompted him to transfer his attention from the language of the novel to moving pictures.155 
He illustrates it through the plot of the first episode of a film he is planning (the one of 
which La Terra Vista dalla Luna and Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole? are going to be the only 
episodes he completed), in which a teacher (Totò) explains to his pupil (Ninetto Davoli) 
what cinema is: 
 
Il cinema è una lingua – canta Totò – una lingua che costringe ad allargare la nozione di 
lingua. Non è un sistema simbolico, arbitrario e convenzionale. Non possiede una tastiera artificiale 
su cui suonare i segni come campanelli di Pavlov: segni che evocano la realtà, come appunto un 
campanello evoca al topolino il formaggio e gli fa venire l’acquolina in bocca. Il cinema non evoca 
la realtà, come la lingua letteraria; non copia la realtà, come la pittura; non mima la realtà, come il 
                                                 
153 Ibid., p. 148. “Can we really talk about a Nazi revival? Did Nazism ever disappear? Weren’t we crazy to  
believe it was just an episode? Didn’t it actually define the ‘common’ petite-bourgeoisie and still does? Is there  
a reason why we should believe that racial mass murders are really over, together with their concentration  
camps, their gas chambers, etc.?”  
154 See Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Guerra civile”, cit., p. 153. 




teatro. Il cinema riproduce la realtà: immagine e suono! Riproducendo la realtà, che cosa fa il 
cinema? Il cinema esprime la realtà con la realtà. […] Così, tutti felici, Totò e Ninetto, escono dalla 
scuola, e vanno a realizzare la teoria per le strade, per le piazze, tra la gente. E il cinema è questo! 
Non è altro che stare lì, nella realtà! Tu ti rappresenti a me e io mi rappresento a te!156  
  
Therefore cinema, as the “written language of reality” that furnishes us with “a 
semiology of reality in its natural state,” leads Pasolini to acknowledge that reality already 
expresses itself in a language of its own, while in literature reality only expresses itself in 
absentia.157 Bringing such a discourse to the present uncertain situation of worldwide 
change, he identifies a series of “principi di situazioni reali che vogliono essere evocate o 
testimoniate”158 (“principles of real situations that ask to be evoked or witnessed”), whose 
very undeniable and pressuring presence testifies to the central thesis of the essay; namely, 
the necessary and inevitable decline of a literary response like the Italian Avant-Garde. 
Pasolini’s view is that the burning actuality or “senso nuovo”159 (“new meaning”) of these 
world sceneries is so strong, yet outside any rationalistic codification, as to overcome the 
old, rationally codified ones and their artistic answers, especially a fashionably inclined and 
politically elusive movement like the Italian Avant-Garde. In short, the cultural change of 
the mid-1960s imposes the necessity to express the world with new, appropriate means160:  
 
Mi sembra, insomma, che non manchi una “realtà” da evocare – in qualsiasi modo. E anzi 
che è colpevole il non farlo. E poiché quella realtà ci parla col suo linguaggio ogni giorno, 
trascendendo – in un “senso” ancora indefinito (è certo solo che è disperazione e contestazione 
furente) – i nostri significati – è bene, mi pare, piegare a questo i significati! Se non altro per porre, 
appunto, delle domande in opere anfibologiche, ambigue, a canone “sospeso” […]: ma niente affatto, 
in questo, disimpegnate, anzi!161  
                                                 
156 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “La fine dell’avanguardia”, cit., pp. 141-142. “Cinema is a language – Totò sings – a  
language that forces us to widen the notion of language. It is not a symbolic, arbitrary and conventional system. 
It does not possess an artificial keyboard upon which you can play signs like Pavlov’s bells: signs that evoke  
reality, just as the bell evokes nothing other than cheese to the little mouse and makes his mouth water. Cinema  
does not evoke reality as literary language does; it does not copy reality like painting; it does not mimic reality  
like theatre. Cinema reproduces reality: image and sound! In reproducing reality, what does it do? Cinema  
expresses reality with reality. […] So, Totò and Ninetto, all happy, get out of the school, and go out on the  
streets, among people to put theory into practice. And that’s what cinema is! It is nothing but being there,  
within reality! You represent yourself to me and I represent myself to you!”  
157 See ibid., p. 144. 
158 Ibid., p. 149. 
159 Ibid. 
160 See ibid. 
161 Ibid., p. 147. “In short, I think that there is a ‘reality’ that needs to be evoked – in any way. In fact, not  
evoking this reality is a guilt. And since that reality speaks to us with its everyday language, transcending – in  





Cinema is Pasolini’s answer to the urge of letting such an undefined reality express 
itself in its own peculiar way, in a work that would keep its ambiguity intact, the suspension 
of meaning proper to an action in progress. Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?, as part of a never-
fully-realized film about cinema, is a concretion of his very idea of contenutismo, “an 
astonishing translation of style (according to him the key missing component of Goldmann’s 
and Barthes’s contenutismo) into just such a semiology of reality”162. This way, the film 
realizes the uprooting action of the cinematic sublime: in investing cinematic adaptation 
with the power of cultural critique towards the source(s)163, Pasolini opens up fiction, annuls 
its delusive power, and re-discovers a renewed, unmediated sensuous contact with things. 
The film’s sublime aesthetic, built around content’s breaking out of form – that ‘rip in the 
paper sky’ that discloses “l’immenso cielo azzurro dove corrono veloci delle bianche 
nuvole”164 (“the immense blue sky where white clouds are running swiftly”) – acts itself as a 
Gramscian revolutionary agent. As a matter of fact, Pasolini (like Foucault) sees 
representation as a discourse that, as a form of power, imprisons and reifies, “mercifica il 
corpo, riducendolo a ‘cosa’” (“Power reifies the body, by reducing it to an object.”)165, 
becoming part of a system of control that, by the mid-1960s, was reaching such a stage of 
sophistication that its effects almost went unnoticed:   
 
[Il potere di oggi] è un potere che manipola i corpi in un modo orribile, che non ha niente da 
invidiare alla manipolazione fatta da Himmler o da Hitler. Li manipola trasformandone la coscienza, 
cioè nel modo peggiore, istituendo dei nuovi valori che sono dei valori alienanti e falsi, i valori del 
consumo, che compiono quello che Marx chiama un genocidio delle culture viventi, reali e 
precedenti.166 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
adjust our meanings to it! With no other purpose than asking questions in amphibological, ambiguous, ‘open’  
works of art […]: but while doing this these works should not be disengaged; quite the opposite!”   
162 Anthony Guneratne, op. cit., p. 229. 
163 See ibid., p. 227. 
164 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?”, in Marco Antonio Bazzocchi, op. cit., p. 100.  
165 Pier Paolo Pasolini in Gianni Borgna, Pasolini Integrale, Roma: Castelvecchi, 1995, p. 53. The English 
translation is quoted from Sonia Massai, op. cit., p. 100. 
166 Pier Paolo Pasolini in an interview taken from the documentary Salò d'hier à aujourd'hui (Salò : Yesterday  
and Today), dir. Amaury Voslion (2002). “The power in today’s world […] manipulates the body horribly, and  
rivals Himmler and Hitler in every way. It manipulates the body by transforming it into conscience, the  
very worst way, establishing new values that are alienating and false. Consumerist values that fulfill what  






Il regime è un regime democratico, ecc. ecc.; però quella acculturazione, quella 
omologazione che il fascismo non è riuscito assolutamente a ottenere, il potere di oggi, cioè il potere 
della civiltà dei consumi, invece, riesce a ottenere perfettamente, distruggendo le varie realtà 
particolari, togliendo realtà ai vari modi di essere uomini che l’Italia ha prodotto in modo 
storicamente molto differenziato. […] E questa cosa è avvenuta talmente rapidamente che noi non ce 
ne siamo resi conto.167 
 
In answer to Foucault’s notion of pervasive power connected to authorial discourse, 
Pasolini opposes “an act of faith in human resistance to the tyranny of foregone conclusions, 
to the authority vested in authorship.”168 Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole?, as a movie that displays 
cinema’s own rediscovery of things afresh in their astounding material reality, can be seen 
as a prelude to a new stage in human knowledge that subtracts the body from power’s subtle 
imprisonment and reification: “La mia opera – almeno nella mia coscienza – si configura, in 
ultima analisi, come una lotta contro il potere (ossia la lotta del figlio contro il padre);”169 
(“My work – at least in my conscience – is, to sum up, a fight against power (that is, the 
fight of a son against his own father”). Pasolini’s cinematic sublime works in such a way as 
to sustain the spectator in regaining consciousness of one’s own being in the world, in line 
with the poet’s urgent remarking that “vi sono momenti della storia in cui non si può essere 
inconsapevoli; bisogna essere consapevoli, e non esserlo equivale a essere colpevoli”170 
(“there are moments in history when we cannot be unaware; we need to be aware, and not 
being so means being guilty”).  
 
[F]inché perdura il sistema che si combatte (nella specie, il sistema capitalistico) esso non va 
considerato il male, perché anche sotto di esso c’è la realtà, ossia Dio. Infatti la realtà è infinitamente 
più estesa del sistema, ma il sistema è infinitamente più esteso di noi: e quindi, come il sistema non 
coprirà mai tutta la vita, noi non potremo mai giungere ai confini del sistema e scavalcarlo. La realtà, 
di conseguenza, potremo sempre conoscerla ‘attraverso’ il sistema, mai ‘al di là’ del sistema. Tutto 
quello che possiamo fare è modificare il sistema, appunto, rivoluzionandolo, in modo che il rapporto 
                                                 
167 Pier Paolo Pasolini in the documentary Pasolini e la Forma della Città (Pasolini and the Shape of the City), 
dir. Paolo Brunatto, 1974, <http://www.teche.rai.it/2015/01/pasolini-e-la-forma-della-citta-1974/>. “We live in  
a democratic regime, but that acculturation, that homogenization that Fascism was not able to create, was 
created instead by the power in today’s world, that is, the power of a consumerist society. The result is that all  
those different peculiar realities are being destroyed, and  all those historically differentiated ways to live that 
Italy has developed are being taken away. […] And this has been happening all so quickly that we did not even  
notice.”  
168 Anthony Guneratne, op. cit., p. 231. 
169 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “I carcerati di Parma”, in Id., Il Caos, cit., p. 203. 






con la realtà, il suo conoscerla, sia, almeno nelle nostre speranze, più puro e autentico.171 
                                                 
171 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “La paura di essere ‘mangiati’”, in Id., Il Caos, cit., p. 24. “While the  system which is  
being fought (in our case, the capitalistic one) lasts, it must not be considered evil, because reality, or God, is  
behind it too. As a matter of fact, reality is infinitely bigger than the system, but the system is infinitely bigger  
than us: thus, so as the system will never hide the whole reality, we will never be able to reach the borders of  
the system and overtake them. Therefore, we can get to know reality always ‘through’ the system, never  
‘beyond’ it. All we can do is to try and change the system by revolutionizing it, so that our relationship with  








My Own Private Idaho  
by Gus Van Sant 
 
This chapter explores a highly idiosyncratic Shakespearean appropriation, Gus Van 
Sant’s 1991 My Own Private Idaho, which incorporates the Henry IV plays within the 
context of early 1990s American street life via Orson Welles’s 1965 adaptation of the 
Falstaff narrative, Chimes At Midnight. The film is basically a creative reworking of the 
characters of Prince Hal and Poins as two adolescent gay hustlers, Scott and Mike (played 
respectively by Keanu Reeves and River Phoenix), who belong to a family of street boys 
whose ‘father’, shaped after Welles’s own portrait of Falstaff, is an old fat drug-addict 
named Bob Pigeon (William Richert). Twenty-six years after its release, the most exilic and 
least acclaimed of Welles’s films found a compelling afterlife right in his own nation’s 
heartland: the core of Van Sant’s movie (the so-called “tavern scenes”) is a clear homage to 
Welles’s initially underrated masterpiece, following nearly frame-for-frame those of 
Chimes, sometimes even in their order.1 This fundamental pattern of intertextuality is of 
course far from being governed solely by the dictates of imitation, as the film appears from 
the beginning a very deliberate effort to do something new and culturally specific with the 
source material. As Van Sant himself explained, “I tried to forget the Welles film because I 
didn’t want to be plagiaristic or stylistically influenced by it, even though it had given me 
the idea. So I referred to the original Shakespeare.”2 He also claimed that even as the film 
“toned the Shakespeare down” (especially in terms of language) “it was literally , from 
beginning to end, a restructuring of the Henry IV plays”; going so far as to call the 
Shakespeare scenes in the film “an editing job,” one that “didn’t involve too much 
                                                 
1 See Kathy M. Howlett, “Utopian Revisioning of Falstaff’s Tavern World: Orson Welles’s Chimes at 
Midnight and Gus Van Sant’s My Own Private Idaho”, in Lisa S. Starks and Courtney Lehmann (eds.), The 
Reel Shakespeare: Alternative Cinema and Theory,  Madison and Teaneck, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 2002, p. 165. Van Sant brought this sort of stylistic 
homage even further in his 1998 remake of Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho, which literally reproduces shot-for-
shot the 1960 film, often copying Hitchcock’s camera movements and editing, and reusing both the original 
and the musical score. 
2 Gus Van Sant in Graham Fuller, “Gus Van Sant: Swimming against the Current” (an interview), p. xxxvii, in 




creation.”3 As a matter of fact, whereas in Welles’s adaptation the director mentions writing 
credits for himself, Holinshed, and Shakespeare, Van Sant’s movie is presented as his own: 
the director is the writer, with a credit announcing “additional dialogue by William 
Shakespeare.”4 While explaining why he first decided to put “a bunch of Shakespeare in the 
middle of”5 My Own Private Idaho by appropriating the Prince Hal saga as a foundation for 
the film, the director actually reported to have found inspiration for the screenplay also from 
works of great literature as George Eliot’s Silas Marner, Petronius’s The Satyricon and 
various bits of Charles Dickens novels (“When you don’t have any ideas, steal from the 
classics”6, was his semi-ironic explanation for his choice). To put it again in Van Sant’s 
words, although it was Chimes at Midnight that had “given him the idea,”7 he really “started 
working on this story in 1978. It’s based on kids I used to see on Hollywood Boulevard.”8 In 
the interview with Graham Fuller, he went on explaining:  
 
[I]n My Own Private Idaho, I was fashioning those characters after people that I had met in 
Portland who are street hustlers. […] The original script was written in the seventies when I was 
living in Hollywood. It was actually set on Hollywood Boulevard. […] Meanwhile I had shot Mala 
Noche and eight years went by. Then I started writing again about these same street characters.9  
 
In the same interview, Van Sant stated that his script for Idaho combined three 
previous screenplays, which still did not include the appropriations from Shakespeare and 
Welles10, derived from a huge and problematic process of revision. Thus, the documentary 
narration of the life of street boys, standing alongside with Shakespeare and Welles as the 
basis of Van Sant’s new, personal compound, relocates the Bard’s “minions of the moon” 
(as the script came to be called at one point) to the streets of Portland, among socially and 
sexually marginalised characters. As Van Sant himself remarked, “[t]he Shakespearean 
                                                 
3 Gus Van Sant in Graham Fuller, op. cit., pp. xxv, xlvi, in Andrew Barnaby, “Imitation as Originality in Gus 
Van Sant’s My Own Private Idaho”, in James R. Keller, Leslie Stratyner (eds.), op. cit., p. 40. 
4 See Hugh H. Davis, “‘Shakespeare, he’s in the alley’: My Own Private Idaho and Shakespeare in the streets”, 
Literature/Film Quarterly; 2001; 29, 2, p. 117.  
5 Gus Van Sant, Even Cowgirls Get the Blues and My Own Private Idaho – Screenplays, London and Boston: 
Faber & Faber, 1993, p. 37, in Ailsa Grant Ferguson, “‘An anagram of the body’: Shakespeare and the 
Body/Text Commodified in My Own Private Idaho”, Borrowers and Lenders: The Journal of Shakespeare and 
Appropriation , VI:2 (Oct 2011), <http://www.borrowers.uga.edu/782965/show> . 
6 Gus Van Sant in Lance Loud, “Shakespeare in Black Leather”, in American Film, vol. XVI, n. 9, Hollywood, 
September-October 1991, <http://www.whoaisnotme.net/articles/1991_09xx_sha.htm>. 
7 Gus Van Sant in Graham Fuller, op. cit., p. xxxvii.  
8 Gus Van Sant (quoted from the jacket of the 1993 laser disc of My Own Private Idaho), in Andrew Barnaby, 
op. cit., p. 35. 
9 Gus Van Sant in Graham Fuller, op. cit., p. xxiii, in Andrew Barnaby, op. cit., p. 41. 




passages [helped him] underscore the timelessness of the story Scott and Mike are enmeshed 
in”11, and “the reason the Shakespeare is in the film is to transcend time, to show that those 
things have always happened, everywhere.”12 In fact, Van Sant’s own repetition with a 
difference of Shakespeare, working as a means of giving voice to what is historically 
specific both in cultural and personal terms, is going to be considered as the main strategy 
by which the cinematic sublime operates in the film.   
 
5.1 “We Have Heard the Chimes at Midnight” 
 
The Shakespearean core of the movie focuses mainly on the characters of Scott and 
his two fathers (the blood one, the mayor of Portland, and the chosen one, Bob), in a replay 
of the Hal/Henry IV/Falstaff relationships of the Henry IV plays. While Scott’s story is set 
out verbally in terms of Shakespeare’s Prince Hal narrative, it is visually filtered through 
Orson Welles’s Chimes at Midnight (Van Sant himself claimed that he “didn’t fully know 
who [Scott] was”13 until he had seen Welles’s movie). Like the king-to-be, Scott is initially 
on war terms with his father, the mayor of Portland, and the paternal conflict seems to have 
propelled him into street life as a sign of rebellion to his authority:  
 
Scott: And my dad… he has more fucking righteous gall than all the property and people he 
lords over. And those he also created… like me, his son. But I almost get sick thinking that I am a 
son to him. You know you have to be as good as him to keep up. You have to be able to lift as big a 
weight. You have to be able to throw that weight as far… or make as much money… or be as 
heartless… to hold your ground. My dad doesn’t know that I’m just a kid. He thinks I’m a threat. 14 
 
As Hal chooses the ‘dissolute’ Falstaff over his real, royal father, so does Scott, 
replacing his father the mayor with Bob, a hippysh drug dealer (“I’d say I love Bob more 
than my father and my mother”; “He was fucking in love with me”). Still, Scott is on the 
street but not of it, because, as he makes clear from the beginning, he is “going to inherit 
money. A lot of money.” His homosexual behaviour is likewise just opportunistic (“I only 
have sex with a guy for money”), and so is his choice of Bob Pigeon as his “true father” and 
                                                 
11 Gus Van Sant (quoted from the jacket of the 1993 laser disc of My Own Private Idaho), in Andrew Barnaby, 
op. cit., p. 23. 
12 Gus Van Sant in Graham Fuller, op. cit., pp. xlii-xliii, in Andrew Barnaby, op. cit., p. 40. 
13 Gus Van Sant in Graham Fuller, “Gus Van Sant: Swimming against the Current, an interview by Graham 
Fuller”, in Gus Van Sant, Even Cowgirls Get the Blues and My Own Private Idaho – Screenplays, cit., pp. 
xxiii-xliii. 




lover and of Mike as his best friend. His whole identity as an outcast is a mask, which Scott 
is planning to “throw off” from the very beginning, just like Shakespeare’s Hal with his 
“loose behaviour”:  
 
Prince: I know you all, and will a while uphold 
The unyoked humour of your idleness. 
Yet herein will I imitate the sun, 
Who doth permit the base contagious clouds 
To smother up his beauty from the world, 
That, when he please again to be himself, 
Being wanted, he may be more wond’red at 
[…] If all the year were playing holidays, 
To sport would be as tedious as to work; 
But when they seldom come, they wished-for come, 
[…] So, when this loose behavior I throw off 
And pay the debt I never promisèd, 
[…] My reformation, glitt’ring o’er my fault, 
Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes 
Than that which hath no foil to set it off. 
I’ll so offend to make offense a skill, 
Redeeming time when men think least I will. (1 Henry IV, I.ii.185-207) 
 
In Idaho’s interpretation of the monologue, Scott makes it clear from the beginning 
too that, while apparently choosing to stay with an alternative family on the streets, he is all 
along scheming to return to the inherited luxury and power connected to his father’s 
authority, abandoning his outcast behaviour just as he had previously done with his ‘regular’ 
one. Soon after Scott declares his affection for Bob, in fact, he vows to reform his 
behaviour, anticipating his eventual rejection in a monologue to camera that re-enacts Hal’s 
first soliloquy as played by Keith Baxter in Chimes at Midnight, with Falstaff/Bob 
ingenuously standing in the background:  
 
Scott: When I turn 21, I don’t want any more of this life. My mother and father will be 
surprised at the incredible change. It will impress them more when such a fuck-up like me turns good 
than if I’d been a good son all along. All my bad behaviour I will throw away to pay a debt. I will 





What clearly indicates Scott’s transitory position within society’s left-outs is, 
moreover, his passage from street language to a sort of ‘naturalised’ Shakespeare.15 The 
language of the Henriad is in fact translated “into an unstable and deliberately disconcerting 
amalgam of Welles’s abridgement, lines drawn directly from the plays, and a patently 
invented contemporary street hustler argot”16, giving shape to a sort of “bastardised 
Shakespearean English.”17 This modernised Shakespearean language, where the original 
formal or lofty poetry are replaced with colloquialisms and slang words (Keanu Reeves’s 
“Valley-speak”, for example), is associated with a visual style that is a clear homage to 
Orson Welles’s 1965 adaptation of the Henriad.  
The more strictly Shakespearean/Wellesian nucleus can be found right in the middle 
of the movie, opened with the introduction of Bob Pigeon (Van Sant’s Falstaff) in his 
exchange with Budd (a young Master Shallow, played by Flea from the rock band Red Hot 
Chili Peppers). The two picturesque characters enter to the sound of Renaissance faire music 
on the soundtrack as they come back to Portland from one of their journeys. Bob’s 
enormous and slouching figure first appears with the crazed Budd by his side, in a 
reworking of 2 Henry IV, III.ii that closely echoes the opening sequence of Welles’s Chimes 
at Midnight: 
 
Budd: Jesus, the things we’ve seen. Do you remember a thing since we moved from Graffiti 
Bridge? 
Bob: No more of that, Budd… 
Budd: Is Jane Lightwork alive, Bob? 
Bob: She’s alive, Budd. 
Budd: Is she holding on? 
Bob: Old, old.  
Budd: She must be old. She has no choice… Jesus, the things we’ve seen. Aren’t I right, 
Bob, aren’t I right? 
Bob: We have heard the chimes at midnight. 
Budd: That we have, that we have. In fact, Bob, we have. Jesus, the things we’ve seen.  
 
As with Scott, Bob and Budd’s language is a sort of ‘naturalised’ or ‘bastardised’ 
Shakespearean English, which indicates at once Shakespeare, Welles and – here more than 
                                                 
15 See Paul Arthur and Naomi C. Liebler, “Kings of the Road: My Own Private Idaho and the Traversal of 
Welles, Shakespeare, and Liminality”, Post Script: Essays in Film and the Humanities, 17.2 (Winter/Spring 
1998), p. 30. 
16 Anthony Guneratne, op. cit., p. 214. 




with Scott – the harsh conditions of life of street-boys. The feeling of loss that My Own 
Private Idaho inherits from Shakespeare as well as from Welles assumes, as a matter of fact, 
a new connotation in relation to a series of social ills, such as stealing, prostitution, drugs, 
and homelessness18, as the re-contextualisation of the phrase “chimes at midnight” attests. 
Pronounced by an old, fat drug-addict to his young, crazed follower, the phrase now stands 
for all the experiences linked to the marginalisation of those people who have no social 
status at all: the impoverished, abused, homosexual, homeless, “doomed to hear the chimes 
at midnight when most people [regular people] are at home with their families, asleep in 
their beds.”19 As Van Sant himself remarked, “[t]he Shakespearean passages [helped him] 
underscore the timelessness of the story Scott and Mike are enmeshed in”20; but his 
appropriation is at the same time the result of a specific historical moment, and of its new 
social and cultural significance. There follows that social realities such as that of street 
hustlers stand alongside with Shakespeare and Welles in Van Sant’s new, personal 
compound. Bob and Budd’s arrival introduces both a Shakespearean and Wellesian presence 
into the group of street-boys, turning the sequence into a ‘pastiche’ that embraces 
Shakespearean or poetic figures, Welles’s cinematic visual tropes, and a documentary street 
hustler jargon. The sequence, in fact, goes on as a repeat of Welles’s first tavern scene, 
reworking Falstaff’s connections with his gang as a social reality beyond legal constraints 
and control, outside an “accepted” or mainstream dimension. Although Van Sant declared 
that his intent was not to be plagiaristic of Chimes at Midnight, in this sequence and other 
instances he literally reduplicates Welles’s mise-en-scène almost shot for shot – such as with 
Scott/Hal’s declaration within earshot of Bob/Falstaff of his intention to mend his ways 
(which re-enacts Hal/Keith Baxter’s monologue to camera with Falstaff/Orson Welles 
standing trustingly in the background); or Bob/Falstaff’s death scene.21 Other moments 
throughout the movie (also beyond the Shakespearean core and in association with Mike) 
borrow unquestionably Wellesian visual and aural tropes: odd camera angles, fleeting 
images, dialogue broken and unsettling music, in a sort of homage to the textual anomalies 
of Chimes at Midnight. As a matter of fact, it is the overall “creative resistance” emerging 
from the film’s structure that evokes the influence of Welles’s late work – as it results from 
the disjointed movements of the filmic image, as well as from the intermingling of various 
                                                 
18 See Andrew Barnaby, op. cit., p. 34.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Gus Van Sant (quoted from the jacket of the 1993 laser disc of My Own Private Idaho), in Andrew Barnaby, 
op. cit., p. 23. 
21 Shortly before Van Sant’s film, Kenneth Branagh’s Henry V (1989) was likewise partly inspired by the 




stylistic codes (theatrical, documentary, avant-garde).22 Especially if we consider further 
how, in the course of shooting and editing, written scenes were rearranged, other scenes 
invented anew for the camera, and scenes functioning like digressions (such as the images of 
salmon swimming upstream to their place of origin) disjointedly inserted, My Own Private 
Idaho contains a ‘Wellesian’ quality that is more than an exercise in style for Van Sant.  
   
  5.1.1 A Net of Stories and Styles 
 
Many versions of the Shakespearean/Wellesian narrative later, Van Sant combined it 
with a counterpart, the tale of Scott’s friend Mike, who is searching for a family while Scott 
is running away from his23; a role slightly amplified by Welles, but which in Idaho is given 
enough importance to be River Phoenix’s most admired screen performance.24 Mike can be 
considered Van Sant’s personal reworking of Shakespeare’s character Poins, Prince Hal’s 
partner in crime in the mockery of Falstaff, but also his brotherly friend. Whereas Poins’s 
intimacy with Hal remains unexplained in the Henriad, in Idaho it becomes the homoerotic, 
unrequited love Mike feels for Scott. As Van Sant himself described his adapting process:  
 
I realized that Shakespeare’s Henry IV plays had this gritty quality about them. They had the 
young Henry, Prince Hal, who is about to become king, slumming on the streets with his sidekick. 
The young Henry seemed to be Scott and the sidekick seemed to be Mike, so I adapted the 
Shakespeare story to modern Portland.25  
 
My Own Private Idaho is actually the combination of two individual stories that, like 
the characters representing them, do not seem to really belong together: a road movie about 
Mike’s fruitless search for love and safety; and a contemporary retelling of Shakespeare, 
with Scott’s character markedly distant from the environment of street-boys he chooses as a 
family. Indeed, during the editing, Van Sant cut some Shakespeare sections because, he 
claimed, they were “becoming like a movie within a movie.”26 As a matter of fact, 
                                                 
22 See Paul Arthur and Naomi C. Liebler, op. cit., p. 33. 
23 See Lance Loud, op. cit. 
24 River Phoenix’s interpretation in Idaho was actually acclaimed with several awards: he received the “Volpi 
Cup for Best Actor” at the 1991 Venice Film Festival; “Best Male Lead” from the Independent Spirit Awards, 
and “Best Actor” from the National Society of Film Critics. 
25 Gus Van Sant in Graham Fuller, op. cit., p. xxv, in Andrew Barnaby, op. cit., p. 41. 
26 Ibid., p. xxxviii, in Susan Wiseman, “The Family Tree Motel: Subliming Shakespeare in My Own Private 
Idaho”, in Richard Burt, Lynda E. Boose (eds.), Shakespeare, the Movie: Popularizing the Plays on Film, TV, 




commentators have often talked about Idaho as two movies in one, although that might 
actually risk missing out that it was Van Sant’s intention to incorporate the two stories while 
stylistically remarking that they are worlds apart. So, if it does not come to “a movie within 
a movie”, the presence of Shakespeare in Idaho does seem to produce two cohabiting and 
contrasting narrative strategies that organise the differentiation of Mike and Scott’s 
identities.27 The use of opposite visual and verbal languages and styles apparently separates 
the stories of Scott and Mike, so that the spectator perceives them almost as set apart.28 
While Mike’s displacement is conveyed visually by means of a fragmented imagery that 
blurs both temporal and spatial levels, Scott’s Prince Hal-like skill in rhetoric, control of 
dialogue, and its relation to Shakespeare seem instead to require the audience to transfer 
their focus from the image to the spoken word.29  
Being born at this intersection of the “practice of reading” and the “practice of 
viewing”30 Shakespeare, Scott’s story is connected to verbal language, and developed 
through dialogue-heavy sequences.31 His (awkward) mixing of street language and a sort of 
translated or ‘naturalised’ Shakespeare seem to point out not just his coldness, but also his 
pragmatic, almost Machiavellian instrumentalization of the experience of the outcast world 
in order to be successfully granted into “acceptable” society. Either from the cover of a porn 
magazine or in an updated Shakespearean soliloquy like the one previously quoted, Scott 
talks directly to the camera on several occasions (unlike Mike, whose speech is vague and 
fragmentary since he belongs to a non-verbal or pre-linguistic realm). Nonetheless, he does 
not seem to bring further the complicity Prince Hal could establish with the spectators, 
especially not as Keith Baxter appears to do in Welles’s Chimes. Reeves’s monologues to 
the camera, in fact, result less sympathetic than Baxter’s, revealing a colder, more self-
interested Prince Hal – especially since he is placed in direct opposition to Mike, with whom 
the audience is led to identify.  
Mike, meanwhile, is driven through the narrative by loss, by the unconscious 
unacceptance of his past, the inconsistency of his memories, and his attempt at re-building 
them (“My mom’s house was blue. No, it was green. How could I forget that?”). His search 
                                                 
27 See Kate Chedgzoy, Shakespeare’s Queer Children, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995, in 
Susan Wiseman, op. cit., p. 208. 
28 See Susan Wiseman, op. cit., p. 204. 
29 See Scott Tobias , “My Own Private Idaho is a personal statement and a River Phoenix memorial”, The A.V. 
Club, Mar 21, 2013, <http://www.avclub.com/article/imy-own-private-idaho-iis-a-personal-statement-and-
94005>. 
30 See Ailsa Grant Ferguson, “‘An anagram of the body’: Shakespeare and the Body/Text Commodified in My 
Own Private Idaho”, cit. 




creates the crisis that drives the main narrative of the film, which can be represented as a 
journey. Loss and the following restlessness and urge to move are actually what triggers the 
action in the whole film: coming from an uncertain background, with no regular family, 
Mike lives as a total outcast in a postmodern urban wilderness, always on the run, constantly 
and vainly struggling to go home (Hans: “Where do you want to go?” Mike: “Home”). The 
search for his mother, who abandoned him in early childhood, brings him to his birthplace in 
Idaho, then all the way to Italy and then back to Portland. On the other hand, it was Scott 
who abandoned his wealthy and powerful father to live on the streets, only to finally reject 
his life as an outcast and get back to the world of money and politics he is going to inherit 
from him. While Scott’s identity goes back to the Shakespearean written text, the notion of 
selfhood embodied by Mike is entirely connected to a meta-cinematographic discourse: his 
memories are reproduced as home movies, his trance-like seizures as time-lapse animation. 
Mike’s story relies on those filmic strategies traditionally used to cheat time and space, 
which allow his disorientation and displacement to be shared by the audience.32  
But Scott’s and Mike’s stories are in their turn entangled in a net of other stories, so 
that Shakespeare is far from being the only intertextual marker in the film. As a matter of 
fact, we could identify Idaho’s relationship with Shakespeare as situated within a broader 
textual and visual environment giving thus shape to “an intertextual mosaic blending […] 
Shakespeare with popular culture references ranging from songs on the soundtrack to a 
Simpsons episode.”33 This merging of canonical literature and popular entertainment is 
consistent with the film’s overall hybrid structure, where different languages, genres and 
styles intermingle within a form that is in constant transformation – and whence, as we are 
going to see, originates the disrupting effect of the cinematic sublime. Like most of Van 
Sant’s works, My Own Private Idaho exposes the intrinsically metamorphic quality of the 
cinematographic image, which, reproducing reality (potentially) infinite times and thus 
always renewing the experience of it, makes film a constitutionally unfinished, open work, 
in continuous evolution. This stylistic instability, in fact, parallels the centrality of themes 
such as movement and transformation, which brings the characters in Idaho to be constantly 
on a journey, both literally and allegorically. According to the director himself, My Own 
Private Idaho is about “looking for a home. You may not find one, but you keep looking.”34 
As far apart as they may seem, though, their inability to stick anywhere for long makes both 
                                                 
32 See Ailsa Grant Ferguson, “‘An anagram of the body’: Shakespeare and the Body/Text Commodified in My 
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33 Hugh H. Davis, op. cit., p. 120. 




Mike and Scott’s identities appear to be fluid or loose, unfixed, always in transformation: it 
is movement that determines their unstable, marginal status, exposing physical, social, as 
well as cinematic boundaries to constantly re-shape and re-define themselves.  
  
 5.2 Repetition with a Difference 
 
In literary as in cinematographic tradition, characters walking or riding apparently 
nowhere or on a seemingly endless road are one of the most common τόποι of transition, a 
symbol of metamorphosis. Since the last decades of the XIX century, the image of walking 
men has been object of a renewed interest, also thanks to the contemporary appearance of 
the cinematographic medium. According to Susanne Liandrad-Guigues, such an image is a 
“dynamic allegory” which dominates both the scientific and aesthetic imagery of the 19th 
century, fascinated as it was by the rhythms of pace and by the repetition of a gesture that 
annuls and repeats itself (potentially) endlessly.35 Under the focus of both science and 
artistic avant-garde, the wandering subject begins to be considered not merely a theme, but 
also an active agent of transformation, a dynamic principle that transmutes the space around 
him/her, thus bringing about an actual subversion of the traditional, stable categories of 
representation.36 From the visual arts to photography, physiology and then cinema, catching 
the human figure in movement brings about a disconnected and multiplied perception of 
both time and space, as the late-19th-century technique of chronophotography typifies. 
Massively developed by French physiologist Étienne-Jules Marey, this technique consists of 
“a set of photographs of a moving object, taken for the purpose of recording and exhibiting 
successive phases of motion”37, which results in the sectioning of movement into moments, 
of space into time. It becomes thus visually concrete that movement multiplies the body, 
producing “ghosts” that ultimately confound the boundaries of the moving subject and the 
space around it38: what the exploration of movement brings about is a scenery in constant 
transformation, by which the human figure is deprived of a stable framework in which it 
                                                 
35 See Susanne Liandrad-Guigues, Estétique du Mouvement Cinématographique, Paris: Klincksieck, 2005, p. 
111, in Barbara Grespi, “Il cinema metamorfico di Gus Van Sant”, in Id. (ed.), Gus Van Sant, Venezia: 
Marsilio, 2011, p. 33. 
36 See Barbara Grespi, op. cit., p. 33. 
37 “Chronophotograph”, Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, C. & G. Merriam Co., 1913, retrieved 
August 23 2017 from <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Chronophotograph>. 
38 I report a quote by Marey that briefly mentions this blurring effect of movement: “Non bisogna cercare di 
ottenere attraverso la cronofotografia le immagini complete del soggetto che si studia, perché esse si 
confonderanno in modo inestricabile, […].” (“We cannot try to use chronophotography so as to obtain 
complete images of the subject we are studying, because they will interosculate  in an inextricable way.”) 
Étienne-Jules Marey, Le Mouvement, Paris: Masson, 1894, p. 61 (the translation of the passage from French to 




could shape its own identity, and is left stranded in-between, always in the process of 
looking for one.  
As for modern cinema, the erring of characters is considered by philosophers such as 
Deleuze as their most distinctive trait. In his reflections on the “forme-bal(l)ade” (a term that 
conveys both the sense of “balade” – French for “trip” – and “ballade”, which means 
“ballad”, “song”), for instance, the French philosopher sees in the cinematographic motif of 
‘wandering’ a manifestation of the crisis coming from the disconnection between man and 
world.39 In Idaho, movement becomes what the film is both thematically and formally built 
around, its structure being based on main strategies such as appropriation or ‘repetition with 
a difference’. As a dynamic process that constantly renews itself, repetition is the basic 
creative principle that organises the movie on different levels, aimed not so much at a post-
modern formal pastiche, as at creating a movement within the filmic form that inevitably 
turns into a transition within the mind of the viewer: 
  
“Ebbene, che cosa succede allo spettatore di fronte alla ripetizione con differenza, alla 
percezione di continui slittamenti di grana, supporti, direzioni e ritmi? L’effetto principale è il 
movimento, l’oscillazione dell’occhio, il transito mentale fra due poli, e la possibilità di vagare, di 
fermarsi nel mezzo.”40 
 
This dynamic experience, which Grespi associates to the one described by Jacques 
Aumont in reference to a pictorial series (such as Monet’s Cathedrals), brings the eye to 
compare images which are apparently the same but actually different; in which action, 
Aumont remarks, “lo sguardo acquista di fatto una possibilità nuova: quella di ritrovarsi fra 
tutte e due, là dove non c’è nulla, nulla di visibile. Diventa uno sguardo intermittente, uno 
sguardo a eclissi”41 (“the gaze actually attains a new possibility: that of standing in between 
them, where there is nothing visible. It becomes an intermittent, eclipse-like gaze”). From its 
inevitable in-betweenness, the cinematic eye becomes capable of pointing out the ‘difference 
within the same’ and viceversa. The ultimate consequence of repetition within a 
cinematographic work, then, is the continuous crossing and redefinition of boundaries, 
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which translates into the challenge to or transformation of traditional categories of 
representation.  
 
In Van Sant’s My Own Private Idaho, the ‘repetition with a difference’, 
foregrounded by the relocation of Shakespeare’s Henriad and Welles’s Chimes within the 
new context of early 1990s street life in Portland, is the starting point of my analysis of the 
film’s sublime aesthetic. As the title itself forestalls, it responds to the overall strategy of 
appropriating or embodying the outside, public space into one’s inside, private self, from 
which it is possible to open the film to its cultural and social background. Drawn from the 
1980 song by B-52’s, Private Idaho, it appropriates the middle-west state of Idaho, turning it 
into a “state” of mind, a metaphor for one’s inwardness, as the song already suggests 
(“You’re living in your own Private Idaho/ Where do I go from here to a better state than 
this?”). As a matter of fact, the phrase “to live in one’s own private Idaho” has become an 
idiomatic expression, defined by Urban Dictionary as “‘living inside an Idaho potato’, or a 
very small place. Metaphorically, it refers to someone who is not paying attention because 
they are daydreaming, or under the influence, or otherwise wrapped up within their own 
very narrow sphere of interest or frame of reference.”42 The opening, pre-credit sequence 
introduces the film by glossing out the dictionary entry of “narcolepsy” (“a condition 
characterized by brief attacks of deep sleep”), which we are soon going to find out is the 
pathology by which Mike is affected when placed under stress, and which has roughly the 
same function as drugs or alcohol in other Van Sant’s movies. At the same time, on a meta-
cinematographic level, it announces the “symptom” which affects the film’s overall 
structure as well. As a matter of fact, Mike’s narcolepsy, being a “trancelike subjectivity, a 
liminal performance that is neither regulated sleep nor distracted sentience,” is enlisted by 
Van Sant “as a formal device with which to bridge spatial and temporal transitions (when 
Mike wakes up he is invariably in a new location). It is, moreover, not just a marker but a 
complex bearer of meaning, a signifier of transition as thematic substance of the work.”43 
Beyond the mere contents, narcolepsy is also the formal “condition” of the movie, signalling 
the dreamlike journeys of which it is made, with the abrupt shifting among a variety of 
tightly interwoven intertextual references, artistic languages, cinematographic techniques, 
genres and styles. The “setting” of the character’s (and, metonymically, the film’s) mental 
condition is then replaced by a different denotative state, “Idaho”, in a second title. As the 
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film begins, we see Mike stranded in the middle of nowhere, on a deserted road somewhere 
between Portland and Idaho, apparently caught on a journey (we do not know whether it is 
the beginning or the end). The wide, seemingly endless road in Idaho is one of the many 
recurring visual landmarks in the film, coming back in the middle and final sequences, and a 
metonymy of the in-between status Mike finds himself in as a homeless, narcoleptic, gay 
prostitute. This most immediate symbol of disjointedness, which confounds temporal and 
spatial dimensions, is to Mike, himself disjointed from all traditional forms of sociality, his 
only connection, something familiar, human and comforting more than family themselves. 
The detachedness of the road τόπος produces the paradox of a reassuring familiarity – Mike 
associates the road to a “fucked-up face”, which can be trusted as a familiar presence 
because it keeps coming back to him. With its persistent recurrence, the road acquires a 
unifying function in the hybrid and fragmented imagery connected to Mike, as he 
immediately appropriates that nowhere, agoraphobic landscape, turning it into a private, 
personal place in his mind: 
 
I always know where I am by the way the road looks. Like I just know that I’ve been here 
before. I just know that I’ve been stuck here, like this one fucking time before, you know that? Yeah. 
There’s not another road anywhere that looks like this road, I mean exactly like this road. It’s one 
kind of place, one of a kind, like someone’s face, like a fucked-up face.  
 
The déjà vu experienced by Mike anticipates the repetitiveness through which his 
story is built over the course of the film: his vain and endless search for an identity, a home, 
and his mother, which seems to envelope him in a spiral with no way out. On an overall 
structural level, this sense of repetition might also foreground the appropriative strategy 
around which the whole film builds itself as a ‘repetition with a difference’ of a wide range 
of intertexts. Mike claims that he “[has] been there before”, marking the beginning of the 
film’s own narrative memory, and meta-cinematographically announcing that intertextual 
allusion animates its structure.44 “Mike’s déjà vu thus marks Van Sant’s own self-
consciousness that he is returning us to where we have already been: to Shakespeare’s 
stories of Prince Hal and Falstaff and to Orson Welles’ own repetition of those stories in his 
1966 Chimes at Midnight.”45 Nonetheless, Mike adds that the road is unique, like someone’s 
face (later on, he will call it “my road”). He has interiorised and made his own the road: he 
talks about it as if it were a person, paralleling the camera’s job, which builds it as an 
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essential, emphasised character. The image of the road, recurring over and over and 
bookending the movie, is a metonymic synthesis of the way Van Sant himself deals with his 
net of intertextual references: in a way, Mike appropriates and moulds that road like a 
director, detaching it from both time and space, framing it with his own fingers in a meta-
cinematographic gesture, and then the whole landscape is enclosed within an iris shot that 
identifies the camera eye with Mike’s, as well as the spectator’s.  
 
The shift from the road into Mike’s head as he falls into the first of his narcoleptic 
sleeps is where his (and the film’s) journey really begins, made as it is of other journeys, 
both literary and cinematographic: from Alice in Wonderland and Huckleberry Finn to The 
Wizard of Oz and road movies such as Easy Rider, among which both Shakespeare and 
Welles play a major role. As for the opening sequence, the beginning of the journey is set by 
a few clear reminders (looking more like remainders) from Carrol’s masterpiece. The clock 
Mike is distractingly looking at evokes Alice’s rabbit, which then appears for real, 
informally addressed by Mike as his journey mate (“Where do you think you’re running, 
man? We’re stuck here together, you shit!”). Although at first he seems obstinately 
immobile, as if he were literally “stuck” there waiting for something, Mike’s journey begins 
when he is hit by a narcoleptic seizure, and so does the movie. In fact, the whole film seems 
to be triggered by Mike’s narcolepsy: as he is lying on the road having his first fit, we begin 
to travel with him through time-lapse shots of clouds rapidly shifting and salmon leaping 
upstream. Suddenly, we shift to half-memories/half-dreams of his mother fused with visions 
of houses dropping from the sky, which remind of The Wizard of Oz. Just as Mike is able to 
make a road his road (“I’ve been on this road before. This is my road”) by fragmenting bits 
and pieces out of it (framing the horizon within his fingers or detecting a face out of it), so 
does Van Sant appropriate his source texts by turning them into disjointed images. He 
scatters his fragmented intertexts throughout the movie and confounds them with the 
memories and fantasies of Mike’s narcoleptic seizures. In between two sequences, the 
dream-like shots of salmon fighting the currents of an Oregon river, which keep leaping up 
and falling back down, suggest Mike’s self-destructive and vain urge to return home. The 
wooden houses dropping from the sky to smash onto the ground convey the surreal 
displacement of The Wizard of Oz; and the clouds flowing rapidly across the sky seem to 
portray Mike’s own detachment from temporal and spatial boundaries. Memories from 
Mike’s childhood are likewise spread from the opening sequence to the whole film: images 




immediately before, his narcoleptic trance-states, are temporally and physically disjointed, 
caught in dream visions, photography lapses, and home-movie footage.  
The initial sequence already presents the processes by which Idaho develops and 
delivers a rich intertextual baggage – both its thematic structure and formal method.46 As 
Arthur and Liebler put it, “the striking disorientation of the opening sequence summarises a 
stammering narrative journey that is shaped as much by detours and returns, gaps and 
paratactic leaps, as by direct antecedents or decipherable destinations.”47 Typical of the 
director’s whole filmography, this coming together of different media, such as home-movie 
camera, television, photography and painting, is in Idaho especially related to the character 
of Mike and his shifting identity. When the focus is on Mike, both the style and the language 
of the movie reflect the character’s: the images fleet within a Wellesian, rapid-paced editing, 
almost stream-of-consciousness-like, often cutting abruptly from one place or action to 
another, in such a way as not only to reconstruct Mike’s narcoleptic episodes, but also fuse 
them with the viewer’s own experience of the movie. By presenting Mike’s narcoleptic 
hallucinations and memories through different visual orders (besides home movie footage, 
time-lapse photography or dream-like visions), the opening sequence already announces the 
whole film’s disorderly or ‘metamorphic’ aesthetic: made of an intricate net of references 
and styles, rapidly shifting into each other, it becomes all the more ready to melt with the 
new terrain set out by Van Sant in both personal and historical terms.  
 
5.3 The Fragmented Text-Body  
 
The visual idiosyncrasies and contaminations that determine the dynamic quality of 
the image in Idaho start with the reworking and intermingling of a variety of genres and 
styles: the Shakespeare/Welles scenes are juxtaposed with the road movie and cinéma 
vérité/documentary; with home movie footage as well as with tableaux vivants and 
hallucinatory dreams. As for the Shakespearean core of the movie, the textual body (or 
bodies) of the Henriad is literally “cut into pieces that emerge, disembodied, at the margins 
of the cinematic text,”48 intermingled with the rest of the (textual and human) bodies, and 
reified by the ‘promiscuous’ quality of Van Sant’s cinematic frame. Although 
constitutionally transient and intangible, Shakespeare’s text apparently brings a 
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‘comfortable’ or reassuring background to Scott’s representational narrative. With their 
appearance among other intertexts, the shreds of the Shakespearean textual body become 
synecdoches that signify the haunting or spectral whole49:  
 
The fragment of the body, glimpsed at the edges of the text, cannot escape the shadow of the 
rest of the body that lingers tantalizingly beyond sight. When Shakespeare’s text is that body, it is a 
body known to us, familiar enough that one fragment – “Now is the winter of our discontent…” 
(Richard III, 1.1.1); “To be or not to be…” (Hamlet, 3.1.56); “I know thee not, old man…” (2 Henry 
IV, 5.5.47) – is necessarily a synecdoche, allowing us to recognize the whole, ensuring that the 
nature of that whole – themes, characters, plots – becomes an absent-presence in the new text.50 
 
This kind of intertextual relationship, besides the ‘comfort’ of recognizing something 
familiar, depends on the audience’s interaction by having them add – in their minds – the 
Shakespearean text-body that lingers outside the movie to the fragments inside. As Linda 
Nochlin wrote about the partially visible bodies of the French impressionists, props that 
signify concealed bodies “are connected only through the relation of specularity – and it is 
really our position of spectatorship, reiterating the original viewing position of the artist, that 
holds the elements together.”51 Scott’s Shakespearean origin, then, is far from making him 
represent “culture’s lasting footprint on the subject”52: Shakespeare’s familiar text, mirrored 
and reconstructed through the “specular” eyes of the audience, becomes a “spectral body”53, 
disembodied and dissected by the cinematic gaze.  
As a matter of fact, the director uses Shakespeare the way he uses quotations from 
road-movie genres, from the visual arts, from folk, country and rock music, and from 
popular culture in general. Although allowing viewers to discern the various sources, the 
disparate forms that contain them conflate in such a way that viewers are somehow forced to 
treat Shakespeare like a ‘cowboy’ or a ‘punk’. To begin with, pieces of Shakespeare’s 
textual body appear on the cover of a pornographic magazine (“Torso”) showing an older 
man lustfully looming over a boy-actor. Titles of Shakespearean plays are purposefully 
misquoted to create pornographic puns: “King Leer”; “Two Gentlemen of Pomon”; 
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“Pleasure for Pleasure”; “Julio and Ron Dewet”. As the very name of the magazine clearly 
suggests, Shakespeare becomes one of the fragmented and commodified bodies that seem to 
abound in this sequence as well as in the rest of the movie. The porn ‘Shakespeare’ is 
surrounded by magazines whose covers recreate various and old-fashioned settings, in 
which a cast of male figures is on display and on sell. As a matter of fact, the Shakespearean 
magazine is most noticeably placed among a cowboy (Scott) and a Christ (Mike), and 
generally fetishist images, in a revision of Western cultural, social and religious icons that 
seems to defy traditional heterosexual hegemony. The porn shop sequence, apparently 
detached from the rest of the movie, in fact prepares the viewer to the juxtaposition of 
incongruent intertextual references that governs the whole film. For instance, Renaissance 
music on the soundtrack of the sequence is later used also to announce the appearance of 
Bob Pigeon/Falstaff, clearly associated to the Shakespeare quotes. Besides Scott, we see 
another cowboy figure enter the shop, recalling the most (stereo)typically American literary 
and cinematographic genres – the Western and road movie – whose tropes are reworked 
throughout Idaho. Finally, Christ recurs impersonated by Mike in several tableaux vivants, 
which reproduce some of the most famous sculptures or paintings in Western culture (like 
Michelangelo’s Pietà). All these intertexts are combined on the shelves of the porn 
bookshop, where they are displayed as bodily fragments destined to mass consumption.54 
Further on, Shakespeare is also briefly inscribed in the film’s moment of vérité filmmaking, 
when we sharply move to the documentary narration of two actual hustlers in a Seattle café, 
who address the camera interview style and recount their first times prostituting themselves, 
while the song “Cherish” by popstar Madonna plays in the background. As the lines go 
“Romeo and Juliet/ They never felt this way I bet,” one of the hustlers simultaneously 
remarks that his first trick “had this big fucking cock and shit and, um, it was this totally 
awful experience.” The grittiness and authenticity of the hustlers’ narratives, who report 
their stories with a curious lack of emotion, are both contrasted and fused with an ideal and 
explicitly unreal notion of “Shakespearean” love as recounted in the pop song.55  
The process of embodying (rather than simply enacting) Shakespeare in Idaho 
includes his textual fragments within a series of bodies “on sale”, as well as inside a track of 
popular, commercial music; or, further on, as part of a marketing product, “Falstaff Beer”. 
Besides preluding to Shakespeare’s own fragmentation and commodification, such a process 
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contributes to the film’s sublime aesthetic by engaging it with bodily reality. The 
conspicuous variety of disjointed, reified visual intertexts of which the movie is made, by 
reifying Shakespeare too, actually opens up to a not merely updated version of the Henriad, 
but a renewed one, or “radicalised”, precisely because it is being materially re-inscribed 
within a new reality. In Susan Wiseman’s words, “putting Idaho through Shakespeare 
‘radicalizes’ Shakespeare, giving Shakespeare’s texts new meanings in a modern world.”56 
Emblematically, Scott, to whom the most consistently Shakespearean part of the movie is 
associated, in this sequence appears as a mercenary cowboy, proudly asserting to be willing 
to “sell his ass”:  
 
I never thought I could make it as a real model. You know, fashion-oriented modelling. 
’Cause I’m better at full-body poses. It’s all right so long as a photographer doesn’t come onto you 
and expect something for nothing. I’m trying to make a living. I like to have a professional attitude. 
’Course, if the guy can pay me, then hell yeah, here I am for him. I’ll sell my ass, do it on the street 
occasionally for cash, or I’ll be on the cover of a book. 
 
Shakespeare too, inserted within neo-capitalist consumerist society, slums in the 
alleys like those “street boys”, like them becomes an object that is bought and sold, or even 
prostituted. Van Sant’s appropriation does not merely make Shakespeare historically 
specific, but seems to absorb and re-mould it like a body, materially re-inserting it within the 
early 90s American underworld. As a result of this process of “radicalization”, some themes 
from the Shakespearean source are either expanded or updated: to begin with, Hal’s struggle 
between his two fathers underlines a rather more radical division between what is socially 
acceptable and what stands irremediably outside the social order; plus, Poins’s intimacy with 
Hal is recast as Mike’s unreciprocated love for Scott. The thematic connections, in fact, 
seem to be consistent with Van Sant’s reading of Chimes as “an expression of homosocial 
intimacy manqué, with Welles’s battle between the court and tavern recast as the battle 
between a lower-class boy hustler underworld and an elite, normative, and adult 
heterosexuality.”57 While seemingly bringing to the surface sub-textual sexual implications 
from the source texts, particularly making explicit the homoerotic potential of all-male 
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gangs that pervades the whole of the Henry plays,58 Idaho claims Shakespeare’s cultural 
heritage for a set of non-dominant values in the contemporary world.59  
 
5.3.1 The Otherness of the “Open Body” 
 
The concern with the (real and symbolic) body and its implications is related, in the 
first place, to Van Sant’s choice to appropriate the Henry plays, where one of the main 
themes is the preoccupation with the carnivalesque inversion of power and its expression in 
the primacy of the body. Clayton G. MacKenzie, in fact, identifies the “motifs of repeating 
monstrosity in Henry IV”60, the horror of bodily functions, flaws and excesses, which are 
often used as a visual trope for carnivalesque reversals in resistant or transgressive works of 
art. Body fragments can actually be both revered and parodied relics; for instance, Bakhtin 
observes the medieval obsession with relics becoming comic:  
 
There was no small church or monastery that did not preserve a relic. […] Arms, legs, heads, 
teeth, hair, and fingers were venerated. It would be possible to give a long grotesque enumeration of 
all these parts of a dismembered body. At the time of Rabelais the ridiculing of relics was common.61  
 
The need to somehow preserve the body, or at least its symbolic value of 
authenticity, and talismanic properties, leads it to be indefinitely fragmented. Thus, the 
pieces that must synecdochically signify the venerated original get smaller and smaller. At 
the same time, these progressively reduced relics are also harder to recognize as part of the 
former wholeness of the body. The increasing distance from the original makes these 
fragments lose their venerable meaning: they become comically grotesque and an object of 
parody. 62 From the first speech of 1 Henry IV on, the centrality of the anatomical trope, with 
its grotesque and parodic function, is maintained in various forms throughout the plays of 
the Henriad, where dismembered body parts are enumerated with almost anatomical 
accuracy. Falstaff’s physicality, for instance, besides visually dominating the scene, also 
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dominates the verbal exchanges between Hal and Falstaff. The Prince’s comments on the 
latter’s abundant and uneven body shape signal all those transgressions that make the world 
outside the Court look appealing to Hal’s eyes. He literally enumerates the sinful or 
repulsive items connected to Falstaff’s fleshliness, which sound like a parody of “a 
sonneteer’s inventory of the beloved’s attractions.”63 Subverting the traditional lyrical 
praises of beautiful features and virtues, Hal’s listing dismembers the body and soul into 
“monstrous fragments”.64 On his very first appearance in Henry IV, Part 1, the Prince 
operates a sort of “dissection” of Falstaff, an “anatomy of his sins”65: 
  
What a devil hast thou to do with the time of the day? Unless hours were cups of sack, and 
minutes capons, and clocks the tongues of bawds, and dials the sign of leaping houses, and the 
blessed sun himself a fair hot wench in flame-coloured taffeta, I see no reason why thou should be so 
superfluous as to demand the time of day. (1 Henry IV, I.ii.5-11) 
 
“In the prince’s speech,” François Laroque points out,  
  
time is seen from the point of view of various concrete manifestations (hours, minutes, 
clocks, and dials) and it is emblematized in a burlesque procession with Sir John’s pet sins marching 
by: “cups of sack,” “capons,” “bawds,” “leaping houses,” and “hot wench.” […] Such concrete 
figuration of the abstract […] comes from an anatomy or dissection of the body.”66  
  
However, the revered relic turning into grotesque fragment is only one side of the 
dismemberment of the body, which relates to the carnivalesque world of Falstaff and his 
gang, and its festive rules. Outside the comic dimension of the carnival, loss of wholeness is 
feared:  
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Bodies that are dead, mutilated, fat, old, sick, weak, pregnant or drunk – the Otherness of the 
uncontrolled, “open body” – are a dominant trope in 1 and 2 Henry IV. In the second world, they are 
enjoyed and parodied; in the “official” world, they are a subject of fear and terror.67  
 
If in Falstaff’s world the fragmented body has a fundamental grotesque or comic 
function, the same body also hides those fears connected to disjunction and marginality – the 
Otherness that threats to uncover the disruptions behind the apparent order. According to 
Ferguson, “[i]t is these elements of the Henry IV plays and the ways in which this 
fragmentation of the body relates to the Other, the rebel or the criminal threat, that is re-
encoded, physically and metaphysically, in Idaho.”68 The film, while reproducing the 
imagery of body fragmentation and its double function from Shakespeare’s plays, also 
fragments in its turn Shakespeare’s textual body; in Ferguson’s words, it “both appropriates 
Shakespearean relics and offers carnivalesque, comic inversions of their accepted 
meaning.”69 On the one hand, Idaho preserves and visually increases the “burlesque 
procession” of body fragments adopted from the Henriad: when focused on the body, the 
camera never fully reproduces it. Such is the case with Mike’s mom, who appears only ‘in 
absentia’, as both temporally and physically fragmented. Alternatively, her site of birth, 
bottom half, legs and eyes are captured in dream visions, regressions or memories shaped 
through home-movie footage of Mike’s childhood.70 Likewise, in the quasi stop-motion sex 
scenes, only torsos, buttocks, legs, hands or mouths remain within the frame, reproducing a 
style in-between that of porn magazine photo stories and tableaux vivants. On the other 
hand, the film’s approach to the body as a site for grotesque dissection is meta-
cinematographically transposed back onto its use of Shakespeare’s texts. The fragmentation 
the film operates on Shakespeare’s ‘revered’ textual body can assume the disruptive function 
related to disjunction and its uncovering of Otherness. Like the recurrent images of bodies 
disembodied, almost dissected, by the frame, the partially seen textual body of Shakespeare 
can help recreate in cinematic terms what Linda Nochlin calls “the loss of the whole” out of 
which “is constructed the Modern itself,”71 and relate it to issues of marginality in the early-
1990s U.S. 
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It is possible to analyse this process starting from the “anatomy of [Falstaff’s] sins”72 
as appropriated and re-invented by Scott. By having Scott lean over Bob’s body, it 
underlines the mockery of Bob/Falstaff’s exaggerate physicality. On the other hand, Scott’s 
semi-sexual posture also explicitly addresses the homosexual issue:  
 
What do you care? Why, you wouldn’t even look at a clock, unless hours were like lines of 
coke, dials looked like the signs of gay bars or time itself was a fair hustler in black leather. Isn’t that 
right, Bob? There’s no reason to know the time. We are timeless.  
 
The anarchic body imagery connected to Falstaff in the Henry plays is re-interpreted 
through Scott and Bob with a clear allusion to homosexuality: the “leaping houses” become 
“gay bars” and the “fair hot wench in flame-coloured taffeta” is transformed into a “fair 
hustler in black leather.”73 The fragmentary materialization and reification of “time itself” is 
already present in Shakespeare’s text, where the “blessed sun himself” is turned into the 
body of the “hot wench” (1 Henry IV, I.ii.6-12). We can see that it is Scott himself who 
appears as “a fair hustler in black leather” (sometimes wearing a biker leather jacket, or 
showing a punk spiked collar of black leather). He seems to represent himself 
metonymically as a sexually connoted figure of power: as the “fair hustler in black leather”, 
he is associated to the “time itself/the blessed sun himself”, underlining the controlling 
position (both physical and symbolic) in which he stands towards Bob. Finally, Scott’s 
translation of Hal’s speech adds an apparently simple statement, “We are timeless”, with a 
possible implication that “we” extends not just back to Hal and Falstaff, but to Scott and 
Bob as well, and the subculture they belong to. In a meta-cinematographic discourse, Scott 
and Bob are at once a concretion of “time itself” and “timeless”. They are characters of a 
movie where the leitmotif of time is, on the one hand, materialised into the present 
concreteness of fragments or bodies. Starting from the film’s opening sequence, time is 
translated into tangible objects: Mike (Alice in Wonderland-like) looks at a clock (whose 
importance is highlighted by a close-up, central framing), before a rabbit appears, and his 
and the film’s journey begin. At the same time, the movie continually deconstructs the 
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passing of time and temporally displaces both his characters and the spectators; significantly 
through Mike’s time-lapse dream imagery and the overall lack of temporal cohesion 
signalled by his narcoleptic seizures. In a cultural and social discourse, on the other hand, 
“we are timeless” can be extended to the “Otherness” Scott and Bob represent and the fact 
that, according to Van Sant, “those things” connected to their marginal condition “have 
always happened, everywhere.”74  
 
Another of the Shakespearean fragments in Idaho that underline their “timelessness” 
while reconnecting them to a new historical moment is the film’s appropriation and 
reworking of the Gadshill incident. While Bob/Falstaff’s gang attacks and robs a group of 
indie-rock concert-goers (the pilgrims in 1 Henry IV, Act II, Scene ii), they are in their turn 
deceived by Scott and Mike in disguise who, like Hal and Poins, steal their loot, robbing the 
robbers. In Shakespeare’s play, Falstaff’s retelling of the episode and the outrageous lies is 
actually the reason why Poins and Hal pulled the joke in the first place:  
 
Prince: Pray God you have not murd’red some of them. 
Falstaff: Nay, that’s past praying for. I have peppered two of them. Two I am sure 
I have paid, two rogues in buckram suits. I tell thee what, Hal – if I tell thee a lie, 
spit in my face, call me horse. Thou knowest my old ward. Four rogues in buckram let drive 
at me. 
Prince: What, four? Thou saidst but two even now. 
Falstaff: Four, Hal. I told thee four. 
Poins: Ay, ay, he said four. 
Falstaff: These four came all afront and mainly thrust at me. I made me no more ado but 
took all their seven points in my target, thus. 
Prince: Seven? Why, there were but four even now. 
Falstaff: In buckram? 
Points: Ay, four, in buckram suits. 
Falstaff: Seven, by these hilts, or I am a villain else. (1 Henry IV, II.iv.179-95)  
 
Furnishing Poins and Hal with the entertainment they had hoped for, Falstaff reports 
the event amplifying it with grotesque hyperboles. According to Ferguson, his performance 
actually exposes – with a parodic result – “the inaccuracies of oral storytelling, but also 
interrogates the importance or otherwise of ‘truth’ in retelling, as compared to the gratifying 
                                                 




entertainment offered by such acts.”75 In Idaho, the image of stealing from thieves can also 
work as a meta-cinematographic device to highlight the intertextual “theft” from a text 
(Welles’s Chimes) which has in its turn “stolen” from another one (Shakespeare’s 
Henriad).76 Bob’s account of the double robbery then re-enacts the Shakespearean passage 
very closely: 
 
Scott: Thank God you had not murdered some of them. 
Bob: Murdered? Well, they are past praying for, I peppered two of them, 
two punks in leather jackets. 
Scott: What? 
Bob: I’ll tell you son, these four came in close –  
Scott: You said there were two. 
Bob: Four! I said there were four, Scott. 
Scott: Four. 
Bob: Now, these four came from the front kicking at me, pulling their knives 
and I whipped out the blade and took all seven as a target, like this — 
Scott: Seven? Just a second ago there were four! 
Bob: In leather? 
Gary: No, Bob, my friend, there was four of them and they all had leather on. 
Bob: Seven, by my count! 
 
Idaho’s appropriation of the Gadshill incident gives a new significance to the 
relationship between Henry IV’s underworld characters and the hegemonic ones. Through 
this shift of meaning, the rulers (Jack Favor/Henry IV and his circle) seem to be as 
criminally disposed as the underclass – or even more mischievously so – starting from the 
depiction of Prince Hal/the mayor’s son, Scott. Whereas in the play it is Poins who 
convinces Hal to be his partner in crime in the joke/deceit against Falstaff and the gang, here 
the roles are inverted (Scott: “Come on, Mickey, I have a joke I wanna play, a joke I can’t 
pull off alone”). Although the role of Poins is generally absorbed into Mike, Van Sant 
creates a somehow more criminal Prince in Scott by combining his ‘original’ rebellious 
attitude with Poins’s mischievous behaviour. As with Hal, Scott retains a position of 
superiority over Bob only by pointing out the absurd incongruities in his retelling of the 
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episode, not because he is led by moral conscience. Scott defies Falstaff’s grotesque 
exaggerations (right after his own deception and double robbery) not because of some moral 
need to re-establish the truth, but only to be entertained by Bob’s “unbelievably huge lies”. 
If Scott is only criminal for the fun of it (but then all the more so), Bob and his streetboys 
are instead straightforwardly placed within the marginal status of petty thieves, drug addicts 
and gay prostitutes. In translating Shakespeare’s portrayal of groups of “outsiders” or 
“traditionally anathematized types”77 into early-1990s American life, Thomas Cartelli notes 
that Idaho “record[s] a shift of sympathetic identification from ruling class to underclass.”78  
Although the presence of sympathetic identification is disputable, a shift of focus 
towards the underclass is clear from the linguistic changes Van Sant applied to this passage 
too, which explicitly re-position the characters into a new, but equally marginal cultural and 
social environment. “Rogues in buckram”, for instance, has been transformed into “punks in 
leather,” which can either be taken as a subcultural group, both stylistically and socially 
opposing the ruling class’s conformism; or be interpreted as U.S. youth slang, meaning 
“losers” or “troublemakers”. As in Scott’s earlier reference to “a fair hustler in black 
leather”, the repeated allusion to leather reinforces its connotative meaning entailing gay 
communities, which definitively marks them as “outsiders”. As a matter of fact, 
Shakespeare’s language is translated into what has been harshly labelled “the thieves’ slang 
of Gayspeak”79, referring to urban gay communities’ connotative and denotative linguistic 
idiosyncrasy. According to Ferguson’s analysis, the Shakespearean fragments are not altered 
in order to simply update Shakespeare’s language or to cover its temporal distance and 
incongruity. On the contrary, emphasising the anachronistic contrast between Elizabethan 
and contemporary slangs seems to respond to an intentional strategy.80 For instance, in the 
first passage, the film dialogue chooses not to explicitly adjust the adjectives “fair hot”, but 
to maintain the archaic word “fair” as a pre-modifier to the present-day “hustler in black 
leather”. In the second fragment, the verb “peppered” is not updated but inserted as it is in 
the new linguistic context of youth or “thief” slang of the end-of-the-century U.S.A. The 
result is an uneven, anachronistic pastiche that is coherent with the film’s overall visual and 
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textual fragmentation, its “disparate performative codes, oscillations between neo-realist 
transparency and full-blown stylization which undergird a liminal thematic of symbolic 
death and rebirth.”81  
However, resistance to harmonious integration between shards of the Henriad and of 
contemporary culture is an intentional aesthetic choice82: Van Sant himself has underlined 
that his use of Shakespeare is “a post-modernist move”, according to which his language 
should function like “valleyspeak”, a “secret language” that characters use “when they’re 
together” in order to have “fun”.83 In addition, the director has also suggested to think of it 
like dubbing, like switching to another language: “So in the movie the characters are the 
same, but suddenly they’re doing Shakespeare, as if they’re travelling back to another time, 
yet where there were characters like them.”84 Thus, Van Sant seems to make a claim for 
Shakespeare’s having noted characters and aspects in social life not that different from the 
ones he depicts in Idaho, which would make “the Shakespearean echoes valuable to us in 
the present, as we reinscribe their meanings or contest them or produce new ones.”85    
   
  5.4 Sexuality and Ideology  
 
The new dimension in which Van Sant appropriates Shakespeare’s texts can be 
further explored considering Scott’s behaviour against social norms in comparison to Hal’s. 
As the film’s starting point, Shakespeare’s Henriad can be (re)considered as a story of male 
relationships and (personal but also socio-politically relevant) rites of initiation. As such, it 
mainly revolves around a “young, wanton and effeminate boy,” Prince Hal, and his 
“unrestrained loose companions” (Richard II, V.iii.7-10). The king-to-be spends most of his 
time in the tavern, and dedicates himself to alcohol, women and petty crimes – all of such 
activities are immediately signalled as unfit for a future king. This is a central issue in 1 
Henry IV, because it makes Hal not worthy of assuming the crown, especially if compared to 
his cousin Hotspur. While Hal wastes his time dwelling in the tavern among minor thieves 
and prostitutes, Hotspur is contrasted to him as a paradigm of warrior-like masculinity. Hal’s 
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apparent incapability to fit in Hotspur’s standard of manliness is a major source of worry to 
his father Henry IV. Since ‘manly’ qualities are strongly connected to power, Hal’s initial 
lack of masculinity would be at the roots of his failure as a king86:  
 
King: […] I know not whether God will have it so 
[…] That, in his secret doom, out of my blood 
He’ll breed revengement and a scourge for me; 
[…] To punish my mistreadings. Tell me else, 
Could such inordinate and low desires, 
[…] Such barren pleasures, rude society, 
[…] Accompany the greatness of thy blood […]?  
[…] For all the world,  
As thou art to this hour was Richard then 
When I from France set foot at Ravenspurgh; 
And even as I was then is Percy now. 
Now, by my sceptre, and my soul to boot, 
He hath more worthy interest to the state 
Than thou, the shadow of succession;  
For of no right, nor colour like to right, 
He doth fill fields with harness in the realm, 
Turns head against the lion’s armèd jaws, 
And, being no more in debt to years than thou, 
Leads ancient lords and reverend bishops on 
To bloody battles and to bruising arms. 
[…] Thou that art like enough, through vassal fear, 
Base inclination, and the start of spleen, 
To fight against me under Percy’s pay, 
To dog his heels and curtsy at his frowns, 
To show how much thou art degenerate. (1 Henry IV, III.ii.4-128) 
 
As Alan Sinfield points out, women’s place in the history plays is very limited 
because the male characters define themselves against other men; still, the definition of 
‘male’ comes from constant, almost obsessive allusion to ideas of the feminine and the 
                                                 





female.87 Taking into account such ideas just to set them aside or reject them altogether is 
the pattern we can observe with other disorderly elements in the Henry IV/V plays. Genders 
and sexualities, for instance, are potentially disruptive of the dominant idea of masculinity, 
so that the king must either incorporate or expel them “in order to appear the undivided 
leader of an undivided kingdom.”88 Alongside the female, the “feminine” and the 
“effeminate” appear not only as features that would ruinously ‘contaminate’ men, but that 
also constantly threaten to ‘contaminate’ the state. Outside the Court and the city, in fact, we 
find Bolingbroke lamenting over the Prince of Wales’s dissolute conduct. Wiling away in 
the taverns with “unrestrained loose companions”, Hal’s behaviour apparently situates the 
Court as over-refined or effeminate centre versus manly margin89: 
 
[…] he – young wanton, and effeminate boy –  
Takes on the point of honour to support 
So dissolute a crew. (Richard II, V.iii.10-12) 
 
“Effeminacy” is a coercive, ideological construct that in early-modern England was 
relegated to define everything that was excluded from the notion of masculine. Namely, it is 
founded on the misogynist idea that a male may run the risk of falling away from the proper, 
rational totality of “masculine essence” – and of being drawn back instead into feminine 
“incompleteness”, into the laxity and weakness conventionally ascribed to women.90 
“Effeminacy” is thus “a way of stigmatising deviation from orthodox gender stereotypes” as 
part of a “policing of sexual categories […] pinioned by the fears and excitements that 
gather around the allegedly inappropriate distribution of gender categories.”91 It was 
recognised as being emotional or, in short, behaving like women. For instance, in Richard 
III, the king is accused of showing “gentle, kind, effeminate remorse” because he is 
unwilling to depose his brother’s son. The attribute ‘effeminate’ again disqualifies an 
attitude as not truly royal or connected to power, implying that the king will have to get rid 
of it for the good of the nation. Spending too much time with or being too much devoted to 
women also generates “effeminacy”; as is the case with Romeo, who attributes his 
disastrous incapacity to defend Mercutio to the fact that Juliet’s beauty “hath made me 
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effeminate.” (Romeo and Juliet, III.i.116)92 As for the Henriad, it is Falstaff that embodies 
this idea of effeminacy. On the one hand, he is too much devoted to women – although he 
probably amplifies this attitude by talking about it more than actually acting. On the other 
hand, he also bonds with the “wrong” person, Prince Hal, which leads him to be banished 
from Court in 2 Henry IV, and to death in Henry V. More specifically, Falstaff personifies 
“unmasculine relaxation”93: he is “so fat-witted with drinking of old sack, and unbuttoning 
thee after supper, and sleeping upon benches after noon” (1 Henry IV, I.ii.2-4); if his girdle 
should break, “how would thy guts fall about thy knees!” (1 Henry IV, III.iii.150) ; he is the 
leader of what Bolingbroke called Hal’s “unrestrained loose companions”, whom he blames 
for causing the prince’s own “effeminacy”. All his drinking, eating and joking around make 
Falstaff coincide with “feminine” or “effeminate” loosening, softening, weakening, relaxing. 
On the contrary, the masculine is seen as “taut”, suggesting obvious phallic associations94: 
when encouraging her husband to behave like a man, Lady Macbeth urges him to “Screw 
your courage to the sticking-place,” to which he replies that he “will bend up/ Each 
corporeal agent” (Macbeth, I.vii.61; 80-81). In the history plays, “manliness correlates with 
Englishness,”95 hence Prince Hal’s “loose” or “effeminate” behaviour preoccupies his father. 
His lack of tautness or proper masculinity would imply an apparent incapacity to assume 
active male/state responsibility. What it takes for Hal to properly become a king is to keep 
such “feminine” qualities aside or under restriction – a process that culminates in his final 
rejection and banishment of the one who embodies those qualities the most, his “loose 
companion” Falstaff: 
 
King Henry: I know thee not, old man. Fall to thy prayers. 
How ill white hairs becomes a fool and jester! 
I have long dreamt of such a kind of man, 
So surfeit-swelled, so old, and so profane; 
But being awaked, I do despise my dream. 
Make less thy body hence, and more thy grace. 
Leave gormandizing; know the grave doth gape 
For thee thrice wider than for other men. 
Reply not to me with a foo-born jest. 
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Presume not that I am the thing I was, 
For God doth know, so shall the world perceive, 
That I have turned away my former self; 
So will I those that kept me company.  
When thou dost hear I am as I have been, 
Approach me, and thou shalt be as thou wast, 
The tutor and the feeder of my riots. 
Till then I banish thee, on pain of death, 
As I have done the rest of my misleaders, 
Not to come near our person by ten mile. 
For competence of life I will allow you, 
That lack of means enforce you not to evils; 
And as we hear you do reform yourselves, 
We will, according to your strengths and qualities, 
Give you advancement. (2 Henry IV, V.v.46-69) 
 
The restriction of “feminine” softening qualities in favour of “manly” tautness is 
especially evident as the (masculine, “active”) reign of Henry V embarks in a war of 
conquest against (feminine, “passive”) France – metonymically expressed in the crude and 
rapid domination of Princess Katharine, the king’s French fiancée. Metaphors of tautness fill 
Henry’s military talk: “Stiffen the sinews,” he orders before Harfleur; “Now set the teeth 
and stretch the nostril wide,/ Hold hard the breath, and bend up every spirit/ To his full 
height! […] I see you stand like greyhounds in the slips,/ Straining upon the start”; finally 
explicitly insisting that those not at Agincourt will “hold their manhoods cheap.” (Henry V, 
III.i.7; 15-17; 31-32; IV.iii.68).96 Moreover, the image that both the English and the French 
project of their countries is that of women needing masculine subjugation, since “the 
impression of legitimacy depends in part both on the monarch’s production of gender 
difference and on the powerful subordination of the feminine to masculine authority.”97 
Accuses of “effeminacy” made by both the English and the French against each other are 
thus the ideological counterpart of struggles for supremacy. With “masculinity” as a sort of 
synonym of “power”, “[t]he fear of effeminization is a central element in all discussions of 
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what constitutes a ‘real man’ in the period, and the fantasy of the reversal of the natural 
transition from woman to man underlies it.”98  
 
Significantly, “effeminacy” as constructed in Shakespeare’s plays is more directly 
associated with a disastrous regression towards the female, but it is not distinctly linked to 
homosexuality – neither as defining, nor as a signal of it, as it would be in Western modern 
cultures. As Eve Sedgwick and others have shown, the consideration of same-sex love was 
defined by different patterns in early modern England than it is now, since “the structure of 
homosocial continuums is culturally contingent, not an innate feature of either ‘maleness’ or 
‘femaleness’.”99 Whereas in today’s cultures the cement of homosocial bonding is (still) in 
many cases hostility towards homosexuality (repressed and/or overt), constructed as the 
“Otherness” against which modern societies define themselves, intense relations between 
men in Elizabethan England do not imply any damaging drawback into the feminine. On the 
contrary: if happening in a context where masculine/warrior values are dominant, male-to-
male relations express the meaning and eventual aim of men’s struggles.100 As Sinfield 
points out, “[e]ngaging in same-sex practices, then, didn’t make you either a homosexual or 
effeminate; in certain circumstances it made you specially masculine.”101 What is crucial to 
understand is that during the early-modern Age the boundaries of sexualities were dictated 
by different criteria than those that determine sexual boundaries in the contemporary world. 
Accordingly, in Shakespeare’s plays there seems to be no suggestion that homosexuality 
was even defined as a distinct category. As Sinfield further underlines, a notion similar to 
what in the present-day has been codified as “homosexual individual” may have circulated 
in early-modern Europe, but probably just among restricted or elitist circles, aside from the 
dominant idea of sexuality of the time. However, we should always keep in mind that the 
concept of homosexuality as well as individuality we tend to apply, actually belongs to the 
distinct mode of thought of Western modern and contemporary society. Nothing really 
entitles us to think that such a concept existed or was widely known in such a way as to 
influence the general patterns of sexuality and gender of the early-modern Age.102 “So, even 
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if certain figures were recognizably continuous with our idea of ‘a homosexual,’ a gay 
identity might still be inaccessible – incomprehensible – to almost everyone”103 in 
Shakespeare’s time. What Sinfield demonstrates is that  
 
sexualities, genders, and the norms proposed for them are principal constructs through which 
ideologies are organised, diversely in diverse cultures but always with reference to power structures 
that are far wider than individuals and their psyches. They are major sites of ideological production 
upon which meanings of very diverse kinds are established and contested.104  
 
The re-enactment of Prince Hal’s confrontation with Henry IV in My Own Private 
Idaho is especially relevant to this relationship between sexuality and ideology. Here, the 
homosexual issue is highlighted again by Van Sant, since Scott’s being a gay prostitute 
(although just opportunistic and not authentically so) serves this time as the main reason for 
the schism between him and his father, Mayor Jack Favor (Tom Troupe). To his father’s 
eyes, he is unworthy of being the son of a mayor not just because he has chosen a life on the 
streets, among thieves and drug addicts; but especially because, as a gay hustler, he does not 
exist in his world of heterosexual, or conservatively sexual society. The level of Scott’s 
transgression is conveyed through the clothes he is wearing: not only do they signal his 
streetlife, but he clearly appears as the “fair hustler in leather jacket”, with his naked torso 
visible underneath, a spiked collar, and worn out jeans. “Thus”, Arthur and Liebler point 
out, “all the talk of honour and manly virtue, borrowed more-or-less intact from its 
Elizabethan source, carries a newly subversive, polymorphous or trans-sexual edge”105:  
 
I don’t know whether is God trying to get back at me for something that I have done, but… 
your passing through life makes me certain that you are marked, and that heaven is punishing me for 
my mistreatings. When I got back from France and set foot in Clark County and saw what your 
cousin Bill Davis had done with his family’s ranch, I thought “By my soul!”. He has more worthy 
interest to my estate than you could hold a candle to. And being no older than you are, he organises 
operations for state senators, lobbies for the small businessmen, and has an ambitious five-year plan 
for the “Force” that even I would like to support. And then I have to think of you, and what a 
degenerate you are…  
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Then, when Mike and Scott end up in Italy looking for the former’s mother, Scott 
finds instead an Italian girl, Carmela (Chiara Caselli), to settle down with: this heterosexual 
relationship is the beginning of Scott’s finally fitting into ‘acceptable’ societal standards – in 
particular, into his father’s societal standards. Back to Portland, at his father’s death Scott 
inherits his world of money, politics and heterosexuality. The degree to which Scott is 
totally changed is highlighted by refocusing the narrative on Mike, whose unrequited 
homosexual feelings for his former friend deepen his outcast status. Literally left stranded in 
a foreign country by Scott’s abandonment, he goes back to his life on the streets as a 
homeless prostitute. When the film goes back to the Henriad, we see that Scott, like Hal, had 
to shake off him his life as a gay hustler and drug-addict in order to take on what he 
previously seemed to have refused – the role of a rich, heterosexual politician’s son, trying 
to climb on in the social scale. In Idaho, Bob/Falstaff’s ultimate rejection scene takes place 
in an expensive-looking restaurant, where all the fancy people of Portland are shocked at 
seeing Bob and his gang of hustlers, who do not belong to their world, walk in and address 
one of them:  
 
Bob: God save you! God save you, my sweet boy. Scottie, my own true friend! I mean you, 
Scottie. It’s me! Bob! 
Scott [with his back turned to him]: I don’t know you, old man. Please, leave me alone. 
When I was young and you were my street tutor and instigator for my bad behaviour, I was 
planning a change. There was a time when I had the need to learn from you, my former and 
psychedelic teacher. And although I love you more dearly than my dead father, I have to turn 
away. Now that I have, and until I change back, [turns slowly to Bob] don’t come near me.  
 
To the same effect work the final sequences of the film, which (following closely 
Welles’s Chimes at Midnight) show the harsh effects of his betrayal upon Bob, who dies of 
heart-attack (“Scott Favor broke his heart,” says one of his boys), Mike and the others. At 
last we see the earthy, musical, sexual, violent outburst of human emotion of Bob Pigeon’s 
funeral juxtaposed to the conventional interment of Scott’s distant father, to which he 
assists, sitting silently, a few miles away. In circular connection to the opening sequence, the 
film ends on Mike, stranded on the same road in Idaho on which it began, newly collapsing 
into his dream world: “I’m a connoisseur of roads. I’ve been tasting roads my whole life. 





Shifting the focus back to Mike allows to see Scott’s transition from a social-sexual 
outcast into a totally adjusted character from an alternative point of view. It retrospectively 
sheds a different light on aspects of the Henriad such as Hal’s motivations and actions, 
expounding the importance of constricting definitions of masculinity in his 
transformation.106 River Phoenix’s performance itself had much to do with the radical 
function both Mike and Scott assume in the film. As Van Sant himself notes in relation to 
the campfire scene, Phoenix amplified the initial script that “had Mike less gay and even less 
capable of being in love. River made the character more gay,” Van Sant affirms, “I think 
that was a political act on his part.”107 Going back to the ideological preoccupations of 
Elizabethan England as they emerge from Idaho’s update of the Henry plays, it becomes 
possible to shift the boundaries defining sexual and social norms, and thus unmask their 
constructedness, aimed at guaranteeing the “unity” of both the subject and the state. This 
comparison can bring to the surface that those beliefs, practices and institutions constituting 
ideology and working to legitimate the social order, do this especially by representing the 
interests of the dominant classes or categories as universal ones.108 This legitimating process 
is built on the oppression and exploitation of subordinate classes or cultures: not only do 
they not share the interests of the dominant ones, but they also see their own interests 
ignored or repressed for the sake of “unity” or “universality”. In forming ideology, the 
dominant class or culture will absorb the minority or the Otherness’s voice into their own, 
and also aggressively reject it from the social order, blaming it for the instability that 
actually originates in the social order itself. Displacing Otherness is a fundamental passage 
for the construction and the apparent solidity of any dominant identity (be it class, cultural, 
racial, and sexual) and the ideology to which they are related.109 When it comes to the 
formation of the modern subject, Western societies have progressively redefined gender and 
sexual norms in such a way as to draw new boundaries that would leave same-sex relations 
out of the dominant culture. As Foucault argues, homosexuality was actually elaborated in 
nineteenth-century legal, medical, and sexological discourses, which created new forms of 
control that claimed to disqualify it as a biological and social deviancy.110 Talking about the 
modern construct of the homosexual (whose development was dependent on the 
                                                 
106 See Alex Gladwin, op. cit. 
107 Gus Van Sant in David Román, “Shakespeare Out in Portland: Gus Van Sant’s My Own Private Idaho, 
Homoneurotics, and Boy Actors”, Siegel and Kibbey, p. 320, in Nemanja Protic, “Where is the Bawdy? 
Falstaffian Politics in Gus Van Sant’s My Own Private Idaho”, Literature/Film Quarterly, 2013; 41, 3, p. 191. 
108 See Alan Sinfield, Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading, cit., p. 113. 
109 See ibid.  




development of the modern subject and viceversa), Foucault maintains that it involves “a 
certain way of inverting the masculine and the feminine in oneself. Homosexuality appeared 
as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a 
kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of the soul.”111 Scientifically coding 
homosexuality as an “inversion” or “deviation” is then an active part of ideology. When in 
need to restrain and define modern identity, ideology fashioned it in relation to the allegedly 
subversion of gender categories.  
The “state of play” in the U.S.A. of the early 1990s, as My Own Private Idaho was 
shot and released, was determined by such a dominant culture, which not only regarded 
homosexuals as abnormal and rejected them, but also blamed them for the current 
devastating HIV/Aids epidemic. This very oppressive process is what, according to 
Foucault, can give voice to resistance and dissidence within that same culture, since even a 
stigmatising discourse may be turned around to signify the opposite. As the philosopher 
observes, the so-called “deviancy” tends to return from abasement by appropriating those 
same terms which were used to downgrade and condemn it in the first place: 
“[h]omosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 
‘naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by 
which it was medically disqualified.”112 This may imply occasional “great radical ruptures”, 
he goes on; but it is “the strategic codification of these points of resistance that makes a 
revolution possible.”113 
 
5.4.1 Aesthetic and Political Liminality 
 
This can be a perspective from which to analyse the strategy and the function of My 
Own Private Idaho within the cultural wave that responded to the dominant ostracism 
towards gay communities in early 1990s U.S.A. – “New Queer Cinema”. As a matter of 
fact, the leit motifs of loss and instability in the film are developed in terms specific to the 
cultural situation of the U.S.A. at the end of the Reagan-Bush era. In that historical moment, 
the downturn in the economy was starting to exacerbate the socio-political issues concerning 
those people left behind or misplaced outside the social system. One of the essential cultural 
contexts that needs to be considered for the film is a cinematographic movement about 
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homosexuality of the early 1990s. It emerged as the height of the HIV/Aids crisis in the U.S. 
had been increasing the rejection from society of those “sexually transgressive” 
categories/minorities. Being also held responsible for the illness, these minorities were 
consequently even more obscured, marginalised and displaced. Famously christened “New 
Queer Cinema” by the critic B. Ruby Rich114, this wave of films can be considered as a 
response to the degrading and stigmatization that the dominant culture was producing 
against homosexuals during the devastating HIV/Aids epidemic.115 My Own Private Idaho 
was acclaimed as one of its most famous and most successful examples, and placed among 
such films as Philadelphia (dir. Jonathan Demme, 1993) or more avant-garde expositions 
like Postcards from America (dir. Steve McLean, 1994). The urgent desire to challenge 
traditionally accepted representations of homosexuality on screen is what guides these films 
into re-working problematically a cultural capital. In particular, New Queer Cinema 
appropriates the cultural capital associated to Western, white, heterosexual and patriarchal 
societies, by interweaving traditional tropes, images and moments into a set of unusual, 
‘transgressive’ patterns. After the Aids-related issues had been neglected for over a decade 
by the U.S. government (President Ronald Reagan did not even pronounce the word “Aids” 
until years after the emergency began), this cinematographic movement sought to oppose 
this policy of marginalisation and omission by destabilising conventional representations of 
homosexuality on screen. New Queer Cinema was animated by the determination to fight 
against the condemnation and shunning of gay men, transgender folk and queers, which had 
been exacerbated during the previous decade. By (mis)using and subverting classical 
Hollywood film genres such as the Western or road movie, directors tried to contest and 
challenge the relegated status of queer identity and redefine its role within contemporary 
society.116 As B. Ruby Rich observed, the movies and phenomenon of NQC present “a new 
kind of film and video practice, one which takes up the aesthetic strategies that directors 
have already learned and applies them to a greater need than art for its own sake.”117 
According to the critic, NQC directors appropriated established cinematographic genres and 
techniques with a twofold aim. On the one hand, their use of pastiche pays tribute to creative 
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influences; on the other, it also carries a bold and subversive political assertion, in an 
exciting “meeting of political engagement and aesthetic invention”118:  
 
There are traces in [“NQC” films] of appropriation and pastiche, irony, as well as a 
reworking of history with social constructionism very much in mind. Definitively breaking with 
older humanist approaches, […] these works are irreverent, energetic, alternatively minimalist and 
excessive. Above all, they’re full of pleasure. They’re here, they’re queer, get hip to them.119  
 
Openly defying and re-defining Hollywood codes was then an act of both creative 
and socio-political defiance: the U.S. film industry had itself been hugely contributing to the 
repression and stigmatisation of homosexuality with its misrepresentations of gay identity 
through suicidal, murderous or in some other way unstable and negative characters. Much of 
NQC, questioning conventional representation, found its key aesthetic elements in the 
appropriation and reinvention of those traditionally celebrated by the road and buddy movie: 
the freedom of movement of the road; the liberation of “going West”; the pioneering spirit 
of the wild, outlaw West. The iteration of stereotypes of masculinity (the Cowboy, male-
male friendship and loyalty) in Hollywood buddy/road movies actually uncovered an 
underlying but subtle or suppressed anxiety about same-sex relations. The necessity to react 
to the widespread marginalisation of homosexual people in early ’90s America is at the roots 
of NQC films’ aesthetic choices. Among these, the subversion of the Hollywood buddy/road 
movie genre works against the over-assertion of heterosexuality and the latent homophobia 
it typically conveys.  
 
My Own Private Idaho, while reworking some of the traditional buddy/road movie 
features (a two-male road trip; sweeping motorcycle rides calling up images of Easy Rider-
style, or a campfire scene that visually invokes ultra-masculine Westerns), not only works 
within NQC subversion of genre expectations, but also adds both aesthetical and political 
challenges of its own. The appropriation and re-arrangement of Shakespearean and 
Wellesian tropes in Idaho does more than paralleling the subversive use of cultural capital 
typical of the emergent New Queer Cinema. As Thomas Cartelli writes, the film’s relocation 
of the Bard’s “minions of the moon” to the alleyways of Portland “makes Shakespeare 
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function in the interests of its socially and sexually marginalised protagonists.”120 The 
“recurring themes of fathers and sons, masked motives, and the socio-political callousness 
of intimate betrayal,”121 as Richard Jameson calls them, taken as they are from the Henriad 
as well as from Chimes at Midnight and relocated within the end-of-the-century American 
landscape, put an emphasised focus on  
 
urban youth culture and a series of broader cultural contexts – the disenfranchised within the 
capitalist system; institutional abuse, the corruptive power of money (which can buy pleasure and 
privilege), and even the exploitation of sexuality (used by Scott as a way of constructing his identity 
for public consumption). In essence, Van Sant misreads Shakespeare’s and Welles’s stories as a dark 
fable of the American dream.122  
 
Thus, the key moments in the Henry IV narratives chosen by Van Sant – the scenes 
in the hotel, the robbery, Hal’s confrontation with his father, the final rejection – seem to 
function as a mediation through which the film points up to a critique of sexual and 
economic disenfranchisement. My analysis shows that Shakespeare, caught within the 
sublime or metamorphic aesthetics of Idaho as given by the strategy of ‘repetition with a 
difference’, and turned into an integral, tangible part of that displaced, marginalised world, 
can thus undertake a disrupting socio-political function. First of all, the anachronistic 
pastiche of Shakespearean dialogues and street slang can result hard to follow, with an 
estranging or unsettling effect both for spectators unfamiliar and (maybe even more) for 
those familiar with the Henry plays. Van Sant intentionally offers no guidance to his 
viewers: “like the multicultural world it represents, the film’s disparate and competing 
domains confront its spectators head-on, persistently disturbing and alienating the audience 
as intruders in Van Sant’s Private Idaho.”123 Besides, the film’s visual style is connected to 
what Eric Edwards, one of Idaho’s two directors of photography, describes as a form of 
“unlearning”, through which the filmmakers abandon accepted methods to do things from a 
fresh point of view. Van Sant’s reinvention of Shakespeare’s texts through Welles’s editing 
style (which has been abhorred for a long time by most filmmakers except the most avant-
garde ones)  is a sort of unlearning for the spectator as well. Van Sant’s is a style for which 
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“[j]ump cuts here are a plot device,”124 and which compels the audience to deconstruct 
traditional representational categories and re-shape them in their own mind. As a matter of 
fact, the movement across a series of different cinematographic techniques, styles and 
languages contributes to a dynamic process, by which Van Sant forces the viewers 
themselves to move among the filmic images, and which ultimately delivers the dismantling 
power of the cinematic sublime on them. Relating the movements of the camera eye to those 
of the human eye, this mobile quality of the image in Idaho awakens the eye of the 
spectator, inviting it to not just passively observe frameless bodies, but to watch them 
intermittently, surround them, follow and imitate their movement. The spectator’s 
experience in watching Idaho acquires thus a tactile level, by which the eye is not merely a 
passive gaze anymore, but participates actively, in contact with the whole of the senses, 
becoming a body that reacts fully to the image-material it gets in touch with.125 Van Sant’s 
camera, thus, places the spectator’s eye inside the film, allowing him/her a sensuous 
intimacy with the filmed object that erodes the cinematographic frame and creates a mobile 
point of view that slides back and forth. The whole film’s impaired and unstable hold on 
conventional signifiers becomes thus intermittently isomorphic with the cognitive position 
of film spectators attempting to sort out Idaho’s divergent levels and channels of 
discourse.126 As Arthur and Liebler suggest, “the film’s categorical collisions” seem related 
to a fundamental liminality “meant to induce in the consciousness of film viewers a 
tolerance for unresolved contradictions and a receptivity to unconventional role-playing.”127 
With its sublime aesthetics made of uninterrupted transitions, My Own Private Idaho has the 
audience paradoxically ‘stuck’ in a perpetual liminality, in an unsettling process through 
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“LA LINGUA SCRITTA DELLA REALTA’”: 
L’ADATTAMENTO SHAKESPEARIANO E IL SUBLIME 
CINEMATOGRAFICO 
 
Lo scopo di questo lavoro è analizzare adattamenti, appropriazioni e rivisitazioni 
cinematografiche di specifici drammi shakespeariani, con particolare attenzione 
all’interazione che possono innescare con tematiche culturali, sociali e politiche 
contemporanee. Il sostegno teorico di tale analisi parte da una visione storico-materialistica 
dell’estetica e in particolare della categoria del sublime, considerata in relazione alle più 
specifiche problematiche degli ‘adaptation studies’.  
La nozione di sublime che guida l’intero lavoro è legata a un’estetica del disordine e 
della disarmonia e al suo potenziale destabilizzante: basata sull’assenza o la violazione di 
regole formali, la comparsa del sublime sembra scardinare l’unità dell’opera e creare un 
effetto di sorpresa e shock nel ricevente, in una sintesi delle caratteristiche e dell’importanza 
attribuita a tale concetto nella storia dell’estetica.  
A questo proposito, il primo capitolo propone una sintesi del legame fra la nozione 
filosofica di estetica e la realtà materiale, sottolineando il ruolo particolare del sublime in 
tale rapporto. A partire dalla condanna espressa da Platone nei confronti dell’arte mimetica, 
e dalla successiva rivalutazione del suo ruolo da parte di Aristotele, l’arte è fin dagli albori 
della civiltà occidentale considerata come strettamente legata alla realtà della percezione 
sensibile, incidendo in tal senso sia sull’individuo che sulla collettività. In questa direzione 
si colloca il concetto di sublime, apparso per la prima volta fra il terzo e il primo secolo d. C. 
nel trattato di retorica Περί Ύψους. Il sublime viene qui associato ad uno stile retorico 
elevato ed emotivamente intenso, capace di scuotere l’ascoltatore/lettore suscitando un 
effetto di stupore e sconcerto. Tale effetto è ottenuto per mezzo del superamento dei limiti 
tradizionalmente imposti alla creatività dello scrittore, di uno slancio verso la grandezza 
morale e spirituale del ‘genio naturale’ opposto alla mediocre impeccabilità prodotta dalla 
rigida applicazione delle regole. L’aggiunta di considerazioni etiche in relazione ad una 
nozione di base stilistica è la caratteristica essenziale che distingue il sublime fin dalla sua 




Περί Ύψους apparsa nel 1674 ad opera del neoclassicista francese Boileau. Prima che gli 
‘eccessi’ del sublime venissero assorbiti entro l’armonica razionalità del Neoclassicismo, 
Boileau fu pronto a riconoscerne l’essenza irregolare, definendolo nella sua prefazione un 
“je ne sais quoi”, ciò che nel discorso è “straordinario” e “meraviglioso”, colpisce e 
trasporta il ricevente.  
In età moderna, l’estetica si consolidò come categoria filosofica a sé stante o 
“scienza della cognizione sensibile” con il trattato Aesthetica di Alexander Baumgarten. Di 
conseguenza, anche la nozione di sublime cominciò ad attirare l’attenzione dei filosofi in 
maniera scientifica, a partire dalla Philosophical Inquiry into the Origins of our Feelings of 
the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757) di Edmund Burke. Spostando l’attenzione verso 
l’effetto fisiologico che ottiene sul soggetto, Burke definì il sublime come una forte 
emozione che getta la mente in uno stato di stupore inibendone le facoltà razionali, e ne 
individuò la causa nel piacere dato dalla sottrazione al dolore e al pericolo. L’empirismo di 
Burke sarebbe stato a breve superato dal ‘sublime trascendentale’ proposto da Immanuel 
Kant nella sua “Analitica del Sublime” (Critica del Giudizio, 1790). Piuttosto che negli 
oggetti del mondo sensibile, Kant riconobbe il sublime nella facoltà della Ragione che, al 
cospetto della grandezza e della forza della natura, è capace di elevare l’uomo verso la 
dimensione del ‘sovrasensibile’ trascendendo i limiti dei sensi.  
La svolta segnata dalla filosofia materialistica di Karl Marx è presa in esame in 
quanto centrale per lo sviluppo del lavoro. La rivalutazione della percezione sensibile, 
considerata come punto di partenza delle considerazioni storiche, economiche e politiche del 
filosofo, rilegge infatti in maniera decisiva il legame fra estetica e politica. In tal senso, 
fondamentale è il contributo dei successivi filosofi marxisti come Lukács, Benjamin e 
Adorno, per i quali mutate condizioni storiche e materiali determinano di necessità un nuovo 
tipo di arte, con una conseguentemente nuova funzione.  
La nozione di sublime, nel frattempo, aveva perso la propria centralità nel discorso 
dell’estetica fino all’avvento di Modernismo e Postmodernismo nel ventesimo secolo. Alla 
luce del dibattito tra arte realistica o ‘terapeutica’ ed arte moderna o d’avanguardia, il 
filosofo francese Jean-François Lyotard riconsidera il sublime come la nozione che meglio 
espone l’impossibilità di organizzare il mondo razionalmente. Sintetizzandone le 
caratteristiche nell’indeterminatezza, disarmonia e assenza di regole tipiche dell’arte 
d’avanguardia, Lyotard associa al sublime una funzione destabilizzante atta a rendere 




Dopo aver delineato le origini del sublime in relazione a una visione materialistica 
dell’estetica, il secondo capitolo è dedicato alla definizione di sublime nel cinema, inteso 
come categoria estetica che ha origine nel disordine e nella disarmonia formale di un’opera. 
In particolare, il capitolo esplora le condizioni attraverso le quali il ‘sublime 
cinematografico’ può realizzarsi, partendo dalle caratteristiche formali di incompletezza, 
irregolarità e disunione dell’opera cinematografica. Attraverso il ricorso a un’estetica 
cosiddetta “impura”, il sublime trasferisce nell’opera i tratti che hanno distinto tale nozione 
nel corso della sua storia, attribuendole anche la propria funzione destabilizzante. Aprendosi 
a una dialettica con il contesto materiale – culturale, sociale e politico – che l’ha prodotta e 
che ne è destinatario, le sfaldature di cui è composta l’opera mettono in discussione regole e 
categorie prestabilite dentro e fuori dai propri confini, distruggendo l’illusione di un ordine 
razionale della realtà e portandone alla luce invece fratture e contraddizioni.  
Il successivo passaggio nella ricostruzione del sublime cinematografico si propone di 
identificare le problematiche relative all’adattamento dei drammi shakespeariani al medium 
del cinema. Le caratteristiche di apertura e ambiguità dei testi shakespeariani hanno infatti 
favorito la loro continua reinterpretazione e ricreazione attraverso la storia, facendo così 
emergere tematiche e questioni legate alle varie epoche. Non essendo tenuti insieme da 
nessuna visione univoca o totalizzante, ogni performance dei testi shakespeariani è già di per 
sé un adattamento, che può al tempo stesso invitare a una lettura più radicale e quindi 
portare a una vera e propria appropriazione del dramma. Con la trasposizione sul mezzo 
cinematografico, il testo shakespeariano viene necessariamente adattato anche a diversi 
contesti storici, culturali, linguistici o socio-politici, il che spesso incoraggia letture da punti 
i vista nuovi o non convenzionali. Ciò determina un confronto più o meno esplicito sia con 
le problematiche concrete di un determinato momento storico, sia con le reazioni personali e 
intellettuali da parte del singolo artista (in questo caso del regista).  
Tale legame fra l’adattamento filmico e specifiche tematiche storiche e intellettuali 
può emergere in modo particolare grazie alle caratteristiche del medium del cinema. 
Rappresentando o riproducendo la realtà con un coinvolgimento più diretto della sfera della 
percezione sensibile, il cinema ha nello spettatore un impatto viscerale, che provoca un 
responso in primo luogo nei sensi e nelle emozioni. Possiamo così comprendere il sublime 
cinematografico come dato da un insieme di tecniche o espedienti che creano discontinuità 
nella forma filmica, che sfida le aspettative del pubblico ed è quindi in grado di innescare 
con questo un confronto attivo, una partecipazione. La funzione destabilizzante del sublime 




cinematografico con la realtà materiale: tramite la sovversione dell’ordine e dell’armonia 
nella forma filmica, lo spettatore viene riavvicinato o ‘elevato’ alla coscienza del caos e 
delle contraddizioni del reale.  
Gli adattamenti presi in considerazione, esasperando la frammentarietà e 
l’indeterminatezza dei testi shakespeariani di partenza, ne reinterpretano i conflitti e le 
ambiguità alla luce di un nuovo contesto storico e di diverse esigenze intellettuali. Il capitolo 
terzo analizza Chimes at Midnight, adattamento di Orson Welles del 1965 che rielabora la 
figura di Falstaff sulla base di diversi drammi di Shakespeare: in primo luogo, Henry IV, 
Parte I e II, a cui si aggiungono brevi passi da Richard II, Henry V, e The Merry Wives of 
Windsor. I testi di partenza sono manipolati in maniera radicale, con tagli drastici, 
riposizionamenti delle scene in ordine diverso rispetto all’originale, con la formazione di 
nuove sequenze che confondono i confini fra un dramma e l’altro, e con l’aggiunta di 
materiale selezionato da una delle fonti utilizzate da Shakespeare stesso, ossia le Cronache 
di Holinshed. All’estremo rimaneggiamento dei testi si aggiunge una serie di discordanze 
nella forma filmica, create tanto da consapevoli scelte estetiche quanto da imprecisioni 
tecniche più o meno casuali. Tali idiosincrasie stilistiche sono riconducibili in particolar 
modo all’incerta relazione fra immagine e suono a scapito di quest’ultimo: oltre ad essere a 
tratti impreciso e difficile da capire, l’audio nel film è sincronizzato in maniera inadeguata 
con le immagini in diverse sequenze, e in genere sembra risultare estraneo e distaccato 
rispetto agli eventi e ai personaggi riprodotti. Al tempo stesso, il montaggio veloce e a forti 
contrasti di Welles contribuisce a distrarre dal parlato o ad attribuirvi minore importanza a 
favore del visivo, con conseguente impatto più diretto e immediato della ‘realtà 
dell’immagine’ sullo spettatore.  
Il capitolo analizza l’instabilità e il disordine stilistico di Chimes at Midnight come 
mezzo per mettere innanzitutto in discussione letture retoriche dei testi shakespeariani e di 
temi essenziali quali la storia, il potere, la guerra. Nel rintracciare l’interazione del film con 
il contesto in cui è stato creato e in seguito recepito, l’analisi mette in luce come tali testi, 
reinterpretati da Welles nel 1965, esprimano un fondamentale senso di perdita sia dal punto 
di vista intellettuale o personale che storico. Le varie ‘falle’ che determinano lo stile del film 
realizzano così il potenziale destabilizzante del sublime in Chimes at Midnight: 
costituiscono una continua sfida verso il giudizio dello spettatore, il quale, di fronte a una 
forma artistica privata di logica e coerenza, è portato a mettere in discussione interpretazioni 




Il capitolo quarto è dedicato a Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole? di Pier Paolo Pasolini, 
rivisitazione o appropriazione dell’Othello che fa parte del film a episodi Capriccio 
all’Italiana (1968). Il corto di Pasolini ruota attorno alla rappresentazione del dramma 
shakespeariano in un teatro di marionette, recitato da burattini semi-umani, i quali alternano 
la finzione teatrale a momenti in cui, fuori dal palcoscenico, cercano di raggiungere 
consapevolezza di sé e del mondo. A fare da cornice allo spettacolo delle marionette vi è una 
serie di citazioni pittoriche, teatrali e cinematografiche, cosicché il dramma di Shakespeare 
risulta ‘incorporato’ in una rete di intertesti verbali e visivi che sovrappongono fra loro 
diversi stili e media. Basandosi di per sé su una moltitudine di prospettive che rivelano 
l’artificialità dell’opera d’arte, l’adattamento o l’‘incorporazione’ dell’Othello in tale 
complesso discorso intertestuale porta alla luce, esasperandole, le regole e le categorie della 
rappresentazione mimetica.  
Nel rintracciare la strategia per cui il testo shakespeariano viene appropriato o 
‘assimilato’ nella struttura intertestuale del film, l’analisi proposta sottolinea la resistenza 
che il mezzo cinematografico permette di porre a tale processo. Secondo Pasolini, il cinema 
è strutturato sulla nostra stessa percezione del mondo, e in quanto tale riproduce la realtà 
anziché semplicemente rappresentarla, trascinando lo spettatore sullo stesso livello o 
‘dentro’ la realtà stessa. L’opera cinematografica quindi fa parlare il contenuto attraverso 
una forma che è data dalla sua stessa, immediata materialità, e che sorpassa e dissolve i 
confini tradizionali della rappresentazione. In Che Cosa Sono le Nuvole, infatti, lo spettacolo 
di Othello rappresentato dalle marionette viene definitivamente interrotto dall’insurrezione 
del pubblico, con cui la realtà (che il film riproduce tramite la realtà stessa) irrompe 
bruscamente nella finzione teatrale, mettendola in crisi. L’immagine finale dei burattini che, 
morti per il mondo del palcoscenico, ammirano per la prima volta, estasiati, le nuvole 
sintetizza l’azione del sublime nel film, che porta alla sconvolgente scoperta del reale. 
Considerando i processi storici e sociali contemporanei a cui lo sguardo di Pasolini stesso è 
diretto, il cinema diventa infatti per il poeta la risposta più efficace alla necessità di 
esprimere una nuova realtà, proprio per questa capacità di mantenere intatta la 
destrutturante, ambigua essenza del reale. 
Il capitolo quinto prende in considerazione una singolare appropriazione 
shakespeariana ad opera di Gus Van Sant, My Own Private Idaho (1991). Il film si pone da 
subito come una ricollocazione culturalmente e socialmente specifica del testo di partenza: 
trasferisce e ingloba le due parti dell’Henry IV nel contesto della vita di strada negli Stati 




Midnight di Welles, spesso ricalcato scena per scena. My Own Private Idaho rivisita in 
maniera creativa e radicale i personaggi del Principe Hal e di Poins, riproponendoli come 
due prostituti gay adolescenti, Scott e Mike, che appartengono a una famiglia di ragazzi di 
strada con a capo il vecchio tossicodipendente Bob Pigeon, personaggio ispirato 
direttamente al Falstaff di Welles. Il nucleo shakespeariano del film è incentrato 
essenzialmente sulle relazioni fra Scott e i suoi due padri: quello per sangue, il sindaco di 
Portland, e quello per scelta, Bob Pigeon, che ripropongono i rapporti fra il Principe Hal, 
Henry IV e Falstaff. Nell’analizzare la rivisitazione dell’Henriad di Van Sant, il capitolo 
considera come tale narrazione s’intrecci non solo con quella parallela del personaggio di 
Mike, ma anche con una fitta rete di citazioni che rielaborano diversi linguaggi, stili e generi 
cinematografici. La struttura ibrida del film e la sua forma aperta, indefinita e in continua 
trasformazione, accompagnate da temi quali il viaggio e la ricerca dell’identità, sono 
analizzate come parte della strategia della ‘ripetizione con differenza’.  
Tale strategia è ciò attorno a cui si costruisce il sublime in My Own Private Idaho, in 
quanto permette di fare proprio il testo shakespeariano, frammentarlo e renderlo 
materialmente parte di una nuova epoca e di un nuovo ambiente. Shakespeare è difatti 
inserito nella dimensione degli ‘outsiders’, dei dimenticati del sistema economico, ai 
margini di ciò che è socialmente e sessualmente accettabile, ed è integrato alle sue 
specifiche problematiche culturali, sociali e ideologiche. Tale mondo è rappresentato tramite 
una forma cinematografica che nega e sovverte la rappresentazione tradizionale: una forma 
in movimento, fatta di transizioni ininterrotte fra diverse categorie che di fatto annulla ogni 
distinzione fra queste ultime. In questo senso l’appropriazione di Shakespeare assume la 
funzione destrutturante del sublime, per cui lo spettatore, costretto a muoversi egli stesso fra 
le immagini, si arresta in uno stato di liminalità, in un processo per cui la definizione di sé e 
dell’altro è costantemente sovvertita.  
 
 
 
